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ABSTRACT
Philosophical Foundations,
Social Power and Social 
Work Practice
by
Timothy D. Hamilton
Dr. Satish Sharma. Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Social Work 
University of Nevada. Las Vegas
The contemporary philosophical landscape, which affects the fields of 
philosophical endeavor and the ways power is framed, is described. The covert 
manner these influences effect social work practice is made more visible through the 
use of ethically oriented decision making patterns.
Ways that authority and discretion are used and abused, and abusive decision­
making. are described making them easier to recognize and mitigate. Knowledge of 
current and potential ways that social power operates provides social workers tools in 
promoting the goals of empowerment and uncovering and enhancing clients' strengths.
Finally, a public sphere within which a reflective social work practice could 
operate, using concepts generated by other members of a social science public, 
addressing the interplay of power and ethics, is delineated.
Ill
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Social power is abused in every conceivable sphere of activity within which 
individual human beings take part. From the home to workplace, from small business 
to corporate empire, from educational to religious settings, power is abused between 
people. These abuses are not always blatant and visible; if they were they would be 
much easier to identify and mitigate. Often theses abuses are covert; hidden in 
presuppositions and patterns of tradition and socialization not generally open to 
questioning. Religious systems, ethical systems and penal systems have been demised 
to reduce the frequency of occurrence but still abuses occur. This project undertakes 
to identify and clarify where and how these abuses occur in ways that effect social 
work practice. It seeks to describe how even the ways communication occurs within 
and between individuals and groups of individuals facilitates these abuses. The project 
attempts to survey a wide enough scope to encompass a majority of the spheres of 
activity social workers are concerned with while limiting the scope to social work 
practice. It proposes a framework of self-reflexivity from which to approach these 
arenas. This investigation begins with the basic groundwork of any profession; it's 
knowledge base.
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Knowledge generation in social work, as in any other social science discipline, 
has a “philosophical groundwork”. This groundwork is usually implicit; buried in the 
philosophical assumptions of the authors’ works used to generate social work/ social 
science knowledge. In order to more adequately understand social science’s current 
philosophical foundations, the general groundwork o f contemporary philosophy must 
be familiar to the researcher. This general groundwork includes the three “pillars” of 
philosophy; epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, and the contemporary arguments 
that buffet these fields o f endeavor. These arguments are set in yet another underlying 
groundwork which is the modemity/postmodemity debate. Within this groundwork, 
social influences operate to effect how this groundwork is perceived, or not perceived, 
as structuring concerns which derive from the philosophical issues the groundwork 
itself reflects. These influences operate in primarily indirect ways through sometimes 
indiscernible middle-grounds or marginal spaces. More directly, these influences 
operate through discretionary decision making within the fields of endeavor social work 
draws upon for information from which to make it’s own decisions.
These academic fields are those areas of the “communication community” 
within the “public sphere” that are drawn on by social work, as a discipline, and used 
for its construction of research and practice wisdom and application to the fields o f 
service social work approaches. The social construction o f meaning-systems partakes 
o f many influences. Social construction of meaning is not unfamiliar to anyone; power 
relations are not unfamiliar to anyone; “reflexive practice,” that activity that social 
workers will be called upon to be more attendant to, is not unfamiliar to anyone. Even
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the modernity / postmodemity debate is not new to the field of social work. What may 
be a potentially new consideration is that social workers could attend more closely to 
what power/ethical currents are embedded in the sources o f information taken as 
authorities (in the issues considered as relevant to social work practice) as well as 
attending to what has been set aside in favor of power considerations in the generation 
o f information utilized to generate practice information.
Power and ethics are almost interdependent terms. The power issues that occur 
in all o f  our everyday interactions from interpersonal relationships, employment in 
agencies, to public government, though on different scales, are expressed through 
similar dynamic structures. Where do power and ethics begin to effects the tenets of 
each o f the academic disciplines that social work draws on to do it’s work? Where is 
the middle ground (the margin) where power meets ethics; where do they interface?
This middle ground is important to talk about; to make visible through bringing 
it into focus in the public sphere. What operates within this middle ground; this 
“marginal” area, that delineates what becomes even admitted to the public sphere for 
consideration as knowledge? What operates within this marginal territory that allows 
power to hold sway here and ethics to hold sway there? What operates in this margin 
to marginalize some voices and to privilege others? Within the field that is the social 
work “communication community” in the public sphere, what determines what is 
acceptable as Knowledge? Currently it is what is privileged by those who perpetuate 
the current paradigm of “scientific” procedure as knowledge. The questions being 
asked are about how the scientific, or any other, methodology was privileged over
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
some other mode of approach to knowledge development. This is not about the debate 
between positivism and it’s opponents, nor about the debate between externally 
replicable knowledge and introspection; it’s about the process that occurs when one 
side o f any dichotomy, or one option among a range of choices for that matter, gets 
chosen over the other. It is about what is used as and called knowledge when 
information is sought after for policy decision making, research, and practice materials.
Finally this paper asks of individual social workers what ranges o f  
considerations are looked at when choosing materials to use in generating practice 
research. Whose information is privileged in the moment o f the decision about which 
knowledge to use and act on as information. How does any individual voice attempt to 
be recognized by the public sphere? Is it by utilizing (as is tradition) those materials 
whose author’s “names” have been privileged; regardless of the positions they have 
philosophically in terms of their power usage?
Thus, the main foci of this project will include the following. Outlining some of 
the major themes that surface in the contemporary currents of what is being called the 
modemity/postmodemity debate will set the basic groundwork. Some o f the ways this 
debate effects the issues under exploration here, metaphysics, ethics, epistemology and 
social power, are clarified. Then each major “pillar” of philosophical influence, 
metaphysics, ethics and epistemology, is explored in terms of how each contributes to 
the construction of social work practice wisdom. Through this process the currents of 
modernist/postmodernist themes are highlighted.
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After outlining themes of philosophy applicable to a social work perspective, 
the focus moves to an exploration of the ways in which knowledge is generated or 
constructed. The different views about what has been, and what currently is, seen as 
knowledge construction are delineated as well as how even these views are effected by 
modem / postmodem thinking. How the final pillar o f  philosophy, ethics, is influenced 
by the modem/postmodem currents and how these currents affect social work issues is 
clarified.
At this point, the project shifts focus to delineate some o f the frameworks 
through which power has been described in recent literature. In addition, the theme of 
social power is critically “deconstructed” to make visible it’s workings within and 
behind the scheme o f things. The media, authority, and activities, discretion and 
decision making, are also here critically deconstructed in order to make more clear for 
social workers how these workings function and some o f  the milieu within which these 
workings can be expected to be present. Then, the spaces within which social power 
operates and the “systematicity” that allows such pervasive activity are explored. Here 
the means of exploration, deconstruction, is also clarified. Having described some o f 
the workings of social power, current conceptualizations o f social power are more 
easily understandable. Though not the paper’s focus, following current 
conceptualizations, alternatives are offered.
Finally, the themes highlighted in previous section are brought to bear on social 
work practice. The areas o f the public sphere that social work practice occurs within, 
and is expected to have the most effect in, is described with regard to how activities are
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affected by the philosophical and power themes mentioned above. As a member among 
other members within this public sphere, social work’s communication community 
characteristics are outlined. Then, themes with which other members o f the public 
sphere are concerned, themes of importance to social work, are outlined. This outline 
attempts to take into consideration how the philosophical and power issues described 
above affect these themes. Then a reflective practitioner framework of approach 
focused on ethical answers to power abuses is presented as a potential strategy to apply 
to effect the goal o f  reflective practitioners engaged in balancing power abuses in social 
work research and practice.
Philosophical Groundwork in Social Sciences
In this section the major themes involved in the Modemity/Postmodemity 
debate as well as those addressed within the fields o f metaphysics, epistemology and 
ethics will be outlined briefly. Here only the contours of the modemity-postmodemity 
debate will be drawn. Characterizations, first o f modernity and then o f postmodemity, 
will outline the intellectual space each current animates. Then variations on the 
differentiation within these two frames o f reference will be delineated. Finally the 
general themes that are the focus of the debate will be outlined briefly. The sections 
below will select from the extant literature specific areas of modemity/postmodemity 
debate which will be most pertinent to a social worker’s focus as s/he utilizes issues of 
a philosophical groundwork engaging in a practice that would seek to balance power.
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Modemity/Postmodemity Debate 
The Modernity/Postmodemity debates in philosophy affect the dialogues going 
on about the questions regarding philosophical themes in the academic disciplines 
making up the three basic elements of philosophy (Habermas, 1997; p.39); 
metaphysics, epistemology and ethics (Honderich, 1995). These three elements are all 
concerned with rational thinking about “the general nature o f the world (metaphysics), 
justification o f belief (epistemology or theory of knowledge), and the conduct of life 
(ethics or theory o f  value) (Honderich, 1995; p. 666). The debate is centrally focused 
on two issues o f utmost interest to social work research and practice; power and 
limitations o f power (Kondrat, 1995; Laird, 1995; Pardeck, Murphy & Choi 1994; 
Pozatek, 1994).
The discussion is initiated by outlining the specific issues within this debate
relevant to social work concerns. What is known as dialouge or research in
modernity’s perspective is, in postmodemity, now “discourse.” Rosenau (1992)
defines “discourse” as “all that is written or spoken that invites dialogue or
conversation” (p.xi). Discourses, which can be modem or postmodern, act to go past
the activity o f dialogue in that they also take part in the activity of “social constmction”
of the reality they delineate (Humphries, 1997; p.644). “Social construction,” another
important issue in the debate is defined by Kenneth Gergen ( 1985) as
principally concemed with explicating the processes by which people come to 
describe, explain or otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in 
which they live. It attempts to articulate common forms o f understanding as 
they now exist, as they have existed in prior historical periods, and as they 
might existshould creative attention become so directed, (p.266)
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The social construction issue will be treated more completely below. What is 
important about the social construction issue at this time is the idea in the 
modemity/postmodemity debate that dialogues o f modernity are said to have expressed 
structural power abuses based on objectivity ofinformation(Fraser & Nicholson, 1990; 
Giroux, 1991; Humphries, 1997; Wilson, 1997) and discourses o f postmodemity 
challenge these dialogues (Rosenau, 1992; Best & Kellner, 1991) partly through the 
social construction perspective.
Metaphysics
Metaphysics has been defined as “speculations on the nature of being, truth, and 
knowledge” (Fowler & Fowler, 1949). It concems itself with the nature o f ultimate 
reality, what is there, what things exist, and how it is that this could be the case 
(Grayling, 1995). Categories of concem include monism/pluralism, ontology, identity, 
causation, space and time, and appearance and reality (Honderich, 1995).
Contemporary problems are approached through a “trillema whose terms are illusion, 
well founded appearance, and fundamental reality” (Honderich, 1995; p.559). These 
problems include questions of ( 1 ) minds and mental phenomena and are concemed with 
the foundations, primacy and location of the origins o f experiential reality; (2) values 
and “the normative” and look to the significance o f how these frameworks are applied 
to elements of cognitive and physical experience; and (3) free will and to what extent 
the concepts of “freedom” and “free will” apply within a context where physical laws 
have some sort of ultimate influence over our actions or decisions (Honderich, 1995).
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These issues give rise to debates in areas such as “universals” in the distinctions 
between identity and predication, “substance” in the sense o f distinguishing what is a 
substance from what is perceived and “causation” in issues such as what aspects of 
reality have external causes and what can be controlled by one’s efforts (Grayling, 
1995).
Epistemology
Epistemology has been defined as “a branch o f philosophy which investigates 
the origins, structure, methods and validity o f knowledge” (Runes, 1960; p.94). This 
project will be narrowed to that topic matter which concems the social services 
communication community. We must scan, briefly, a tapestry o f the field. The weft is 
woven of the ideas about knowledge generated by philosophers from Plato to the 
present worked into the warp o f intemal and extemai reality as experienced by these 
philosophers and their contemporaries.
Plato’s project was oriented toward shifting the focus o f his contemporaries, 
the elite o f Greece, away from the senses toward refinement o f the intellect. Descartes 
tried to exercise this intellect to  differentiate the vague inner representations form those 
which were more distinct. Locke shifted the focus away from the inner representations 
toward the objects of sense whose appearances could also be taken as presentations of 
knowledge. Hume looked to the “impressions” these presentations made to derive 
knowledge which compelled one’s interest. Kant took clarified, distinct ideas and 
joined them with the compelling impressions by “synthesis” through a system o f  rules
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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which were set up by the mind itself. “Before Kant, an inquiry into "the nature and 
origin o f knowledge" had been a search for privileged inner representations" (Rorty, 
1979; p. 158-161). In twentieth century philosophy, the “Anglo-Saxon” tradition 
dating to Russell focused on logic and separated epistemology from psychology to 
focus on propositions. The “Germanic” tradition moved toward a “defense o f freedom 
and spirituality” (Rorty, 1979). The logical-positivist tradition that social work 
currently grounds itself in was viewed by contemporaries of Comte as more o f a 
philosophy o f science (Reamer, 1993).
Ethics
Ethics has been defined as “that study or discipline which concems itself with 
judgments o f approval or disapproval, judgments as to the rightness or wrongness, 
goodness or badness, virtue or vice, desirability or wisdom of actions, dispositions, 
ends, objects, of states of affairs” (Runes, 1960; p.98). It can be subdivided into a 
number o f  frames of reference. Greek ethics, began with the Sophists and continued 
through Plato’s dialogues and Aristotle’s ethical works. Christian ethics is tied to a 
religious reality. Ethical Naturalism looks to nature as a template, dissociated from any 
religious view, for how to relate to other humans and to one’s own emotions. 
Utilitarianism would look to a sort o f mathematical calculation of happinesses minus 
sadnesses for the greatest number of individuals. Kantian and Post-Kantian ethics 
maintained that it was one’s duty to do what was right for it’s own sake in adherence 
to a universally recognized “categorical imperative.” Twentieth-Century ethics, which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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is more analytical than other approaches in it’s exploration of the “good,” “virtue,” and 
what is currently construed as “valuable” (Honderich, 1995). It concems itself with the 
values decided upon as motivating thought and action in the present and future for 
individuals. The ethical is differentiated from the moral in terms of ethicists differences 
over which is more broad in scope or more focused on rules and/or obligations on 
actions (Bauman, 1993; Grayling, 1995; Williams, 1995).
The debate between modernity and postmodemity effects how the themes 
current within each of the above academic fields are expressed. It has been necessary 
to set forth an historical groundwork of the three pillars of philosophy in order to 
portray the scope of each of these fields. It is also intended as an overview, for a social 
worker generating practice information, of some o f the areas within each o f these fields 
where potential discretional misuses could occur. What may have been previously 
accepted as “traditional” perspectives are now brought into question in terms of power 
abuses occurring.
Social Power
Just as it has been necessary to set forth the groundwork of philosophy above 
to clarify possible locations o f potential abuses, here it is necessary to set forth some of 
the basic aspects o f “social power” we will be concemed with below. Power is 
understood in a number o f ways and the specific dimensions to be explored will be 
outlined to separate them fi-om dimensions not o f concem. Social workers will be 
faced with direct abuses o f  social power with clients, co-workers and with
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representatives of employer auspices. Immediately, in differentiating social power from 
power in general, the discussion of the concept of power, as it affects at least two 
individuals, becomes necessary. Power can be said to operate within at least three 
human interactive contexts; “practical, moral and evaluative” (Morriss. 1987). The 
“practical” context concems things like recognizing that a bus going 50 mph has the 
power to take the life of a pedestrian. The “moral” context concems, among other 
things, having the wherewithal to affect some kind of change and failing to act to do so 
resulting in a detrimental state of affairs occurring, or acting to effect some detrimental 
state. The “evaluative” context concems not an individual responsibility but a “set of 
social arrangements” (Morriss, 1987; p.40). Here concem will primarily be focused on 
the “moral” context, secondarily with the “evaluative” context and not at all with the 
“practical” context. Following is a look at how authority and discretion have the 
potential to be used or abused (Handler, 1991) and how these potentialities could be 
addressed.
Authority and Discretion 
Social work hasn’t concemed itself much with the specific concepts o f authority 
or discretion in the recent past. This is exemplified in the absence of the two topics 
from the current edition o f the Encyclopedia of Social Work The Social Work 
Dictionary also contains similar lacunae. “Authority” is defined in three words: 
“expertise or power” (Barker, 1995). “Power” is defined simply as “the possession of 
resources that enables individuals to do something independently or to exercise
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influence and control over others” (Barker, 1995). Discretion is not defined. These 
lacunae seem unusual given the recent focus on empowerment (Pinderhughes, 1983) in 
the social work literature of the last decades.
Authority and discretion are interactive concepts and operate in the spaces 
between rules or norms in many facets of social work practice. The role o f authority 
that operates to privilege (Furr, 1995) in some cases and to marginalize (Mohan, 1996) 
in others will be investigated. For instance, governmental policy-making involves the 
use of power through the authority invested in it to make decisions based on the 
available information at the time the decision was required and on sanction by the 
voting population (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993). Similarly the social worker who 
would carry out policy in decisions made in the moment in interventions with clients 
exercises discretionary power (March, 1987). Tropman & Erlich, (1987) describe 
three modes of approach to use of discretion in an authority position as force, 
inducement, or value consensus. Force is generally seen to generate resentment and 
has been identified as a “conflict strategy”. Inducement occupies a middle ground 
between value consensus and force and requires the ability to manipulate the goods 
used to induce. Value consensus frequently occurs through agreement about a course 
o f action based on some sort o f socialization (Tropman & Erlich, 1987; p.265). The 
process of “investment” with authority requires that there be an investing entity who 
“holds” the power it invests. This holding conveys value on the holder The investee 
then becomes the mediator for the expression of social power to it’s object. As
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mediator, the social actor takes on some characteristics of a marginal quality. This 
leads to a discussion o f marginal terms.
Marginal Terms
A discussion about “marginal terms” is necessary because social power 
frequently operates in the margins between prescribed rules and those who are 
obligated to constrain themselves by those rules (Hawkins, 1992). Before exploring 
this idea, a look at what constitutes a “margin” and the ways in which this term will be 
used here will be required. A description taken from Jacques Derrida ( 1982) will serve 
to outline the intellectual space requiring recognition. The “margin,” for Derrida, is the 
place at which the limit is drawn between two texts, it is that which constrains one 
discourse from becoming another, that which limits one thing from becoming that in 
relation to which it is defined (Derrida, 1982). Next, the use of the term “boundaries” 
(Barker, 1995) in social work applications, and how it functions there in a way similar 
to the Derridean concept, is discussed. Then the process through which a person might 
become “marginal” (Marger, 1997) or “marginalized” (Ferguson, Gever, Minh-ha, & 
West, 1990) will be explored. Most importantly, it must be remembered that “power” 
operates within these marginal spaces. Marginalization, for the individual who has 
become a “marginal man” [sic], is to be “living within one culture while belonging to 
another culture; and being tom by the demands that this state of affairs puts upon him” 
(Marger, 1997; p. 114).
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The concept of the boundaries in social work is similar in nature to that of the 
margin. It is defined as “the regions separating two psychological or social systems. 
Analogous to the membranes of living cells [functioning] to differentiate systems and to 
permit the development of identity.... " (Barker, 1995; p.40). As with the marginal 
man, the culture or idea which has been marginalized (Tucker, 1990) has some aspect 
of it’s identity set aside by a “hidden center” Ferguson, 1990) o f social power or 
privilege. Often, this marginalizing activity has been “authorized” by indirect (and 
sometimes direct) consent from agents whose duty is to be an advocate for the very 
population it marginalizes.
Conceptualizing Social Power 
How is social power conceptualized? Is it action on actions of another 
(Foucault, 1983)? Is it aligning oneself with an individual or collective known to be 
effective in getting it’s wishes realized (Rae, 1988)? Is it only a matter o f the context 
that it’s activity is situated in (Wartenberg, 1992)? Here some elements of the general 
understanding of social power will be selected and applied to the specific contexts 
social workers will be interested in. What is the relationship between social power and 
authority? Power is usually spoken of within the context o f political activity (Raz,
1990; Wartenberg, 1992) but it is being recognized more frequently that the “personal 
is political” (Van Den Burgh & Cooper, 1995) and that power affects interpersonal 
relations in more than just the political realm (Wartenberg, 1992). Authority can be 
said to enable one to exercise “power to require action” (Raz, 1990; p. 115). How does
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one act when one is “invested” with “authority”*’ One of the aspects o f  this question is 
that authority is a mediate term. This aspect will be treated in detail below. Another 
aspect is that authority can be “legitimate” or “illegitimate”. If one’s power is 
legitimate, how does one use this legitimacy (Lane, 1988)? Whose interests are in the 
forefront when one claims authority to be obeyed in some state of affairs (Wolff,
1990)7 How does one make good decisions when faced with situations like “ethical 
dilemmas” (Reamer, 1990)7 How does one choose when one’s own interests vie with 
those of the client; especially when there are “alternate possibilities” o f outcome one 
sees given the different choices available (Frankfurt, 1988; p.6)7 The individual has the 
responsibility to mediate how these questions will be answered through “gaining 
knowledge, reflecting on motives, predicting outcomes...” (Wolff 1990; p.25) in order 
to make a good decision. How is this mediate aspect of the term “authority” 
important?
Social Work Practice
Having presented the philosophical and social power groundwork through and 
within which power abuses could occur, a look will be taken at how these affect social 
work practice. In this section, three questions will be addressed; ( 1 ) what could an 
enhanced focus on power and ethics interactions entail in social work research in the 
public sphere and how could it be promulgated?; (2) how do the influences of 
philosophical currents in contemporary society emerge in (a) the currents’ expressions 
in the fields social work draws upon to build it’s research bases, and (b) the ideas social
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work research generates; and (3) how are these currents affected by forms of power 
and where are these forms of power limited by ethical considerations in decisions made 
by the individual practitioner? Also addressed will be the philosophical and social 
power groundworks which come together in the activity o f social work practice 
outlined below.
Social Work in the Public Sphere 
Social work carries on it’s activity at all times through some form of 
communication in some form of public sphere (Edwards, 1995). It is necessary to set 
down specific comportments to communicative action from Habermas ( 1984) and 
Derrida (1981) in order to clearly establish (1) the kind o f activity which we will 
propose within (2) the “public” space wherein this activity will take place. This public 
space has been designated by Habermas (1989) as the “public sphere” and further 
differentiated by what Karl-Otto Apel (1980) describes as the “communication 
community.” The “public sphere” is a discursive space separate from the “private 
domain” on one hand and the “public authority” on the other (Calhoun, 1992). It is 
primarily a political field o f discourse among “private citizens” focused on the activity 
o f the public authority and the value and validity of this authority’s actions. This 
discourse is taken up by an “unlimited communication community” which, through 
intersubjective agreement about what constitutes the procedures argumentation will 
take among themselves, mutually define the topics of immediate, critical interest (Apel, 
1980). This relatively broad field of interest can be further narrowed and localized by
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Maarten Hajer’s (1993) concept of “discourse coalition” which “is basically a group of 
social actors who share a social construct” which “requires that the analysis go beyond 
the investigations of differences of opinion” to analysis of “social practices from which 
social constructs emerge” (Hajer, 1993; p.45). For the purposes of this study, this 
sphere o f communicative activity will be identified as consisting o f those consumers of 
the literature generated within the social services professions as well as that information 
publicly discussed in a range of academic and debate forums of research and practical 
application. The actors who would join in the communicative action of this social work 
“discourse coalition” would be those who look to implement an intensive focus on 
reflective techniques which question the interaction of social power, ethics and 
epistemology as they apply to practical formulations o f “practice wisdom” (DeRoos, 
1990) through a forum o f “rational-critical” discourse (Rosenau, 1992; p. 14). Social 
workers acting in this public sphere utilize language incorporating philosophical and 
power frameworks that are not always explicit in the course o f interactions. Making 
these frameworks explicit through a general description of the public sphere and a 
specific description of social work’s public sphere will enhance the individual social 
worker’s ability to make decisions based on non-abusive criteria.
Social Work and Epistemology 
“Decisionmakers seem to know, or at least sense, that most information is 
tainted by the process by which it is generated” (March, 1987; p.295). How do social 
workers avoid generating “tainted” information? The focus taken here will primarily be
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on how it is that we know what it is that we know. Given that rationality is, in a 
number o f ways, “bounded” (March & Simons, 1958) understanding must be 
developed about the processes of decision-making in everyday practice (DeRoos,
1990). Social workers must take more closely into consideration how the things taken 
as knowledge are founded on presuppositions o f those individuals who generated that 
knowledge. Do these presuppositions still obtain in current society; the society we 
must think and act within? Perhaps these presuppositions are still valid...but what if 
they are not?
Steven Such (1990) provides a framework within which the strand of 
epistemology most associated with the focal point of these concerns will be situated. 
Stich delineates three “traditional” epistemological projects undertaken by 
philosophers. The first project involves evaluation of the methods of reasoning used to 
construct existing knowledge; how reason is used to arrive at the conclusions. The 
second project is focused on determining what knowledge is; what states o f affairs can 
be called knowledge. A third project concerns itself with answering those skeptics that 
argue against the possibility that knowledge can be had.
This study limits itself to explorations of the first of these projects; an 
evaluation of methodologies of reasoning relative to social work practice. Three 
different approaches to the methodology o f reasoning in the construction o f knowledge 
will be examined These will correspond to the three “traditional” frames o f reference 
that have been accepted as valid in knowledge construction; justification, truth, and 
belief. The delineation and contribution o f each to the construction o f knowledge will
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be considered. The above outlined traditional structures of knowledge construction 
that have been the accepted paradigm in knowledge construction are open to questions 
posed by the “social construction” perspective. It is necessary to delineate these 
structures to find invisible tendencies to traditional privileging habitus. With these 
invisible structures more clarified, discretionary decision making may be facilitated 
taking into consideration utilizations o f social power.
Social Work and Social Power 
Above a general circumscription of idea of social power is outlined, but where 
does social work’s “social power” derive from? As with other professional disciplines, 
part o f it’s power lies in it’s ability to define what social work is as a profession (Leiby, 
1978). What is not always so visible is the ways social work aligns itself with certain 
“preference centers” (March, 1988). These preference centers can be political policy­
making centers, academic discipline research inputs, or even client demands (Compton 
& Galaway, 1979). That professionals be “self reflective” (Schon, 1983) applies even 
more stringently to professional social workers (Rubin & Babbie, 1997, Sheafor,
Horesji & Horesji, 1994; Zastrow, 1995). This social worker self reflectiveness must 
include an element of ethical awareness (Gillespie, 1995; Reamer, 1990; 1993) that 
makes provision for deciding closely about “the importance o f  what we care about” 
(Frankfurt, 1988; p.90) as individual social workers engaged in professional work in 
the public sphere.
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Social science institutions, such as social work, base professional philosophies 
on bodies o f knowledge generated by disciplines that legitimate their activity (Compton 
& Galaway, 1979; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Reamer, 1993). The structures of 
power and ethics built into the philosophies these source disciplines used then become 
passed on through the language used to convey ideas (Bourdieu, 1991) into social 
work research.
One o f the ways balancing “what we care about” as social workers against 
invisible value structures can be accomplished is through social work practitioners 
attending to the ways that their decisions can be affected by the philosophical bases the 
research they use to make these decisions were based on (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Reamer 1993) and in attending to the ways these ethical decisions affect everyday 
practice. Knowing the layout o f the modemity/postmodemity debate can widen the 
understanding of the philosophical landscape to include the considerations prominent 
within the social construction o f practice wisdom. To enhance a social workers ability 
to make ethical decisions within situations social power may be a factor will promote 
the balancing function of these practice decisions.
The Adopted Perspectives
The critical approach of the modemity/postmodemity debate encompasses 
every field o f expression academic or aesthetic. It generally expresses it’s views in 
forums utilizing philosophical terms. It offers meta-critical and meta-philosophical 
views o f the contemporary landscape of social thought and so must be considered in
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any project seeking to discover unchallenged presumptions about normative uses o f 
social power. The influences that the three pillars o f philosophy outlined above, 
metaphysics, epistemology and ethics are subjected to, are made explicit through the 
rational-critical process of exploration. In addition, academic fields, which are 
themselves affected by the above influences, make up the framework of the social 
sciences drawn upon by social workers.
Social work draws from a wide array of disciplines in formulating it’s strategies 
for providing service to populations of clientele. In the history o f the field, this service 
provision has been o f a “cognitive” sort. Social workers from Mary Richmond to the 
present have tried to “reason” with clientele in order to change some course of action 
taken by clientele that was causing problems to those individuals. They have tried to 
reason with community agents to provide for services where services were needed 
(Leiby, 1988, Trattner, 1994). Reasoning processes were called into play on the part 
of social workers in order to call the same processes into play in the “object 
individuals” (Leiby, 1988). What guiding factors were in place for individual social 
workers who had to deal with populations whose ranges of experience were vastly 
different from their own? The value systems in place in those early eras of social work 
were products o f their contemporary social context (Reamer, 1995). They derived 
from the values in place in disciplines drawn upon for practice strategies. These values 
predominantly expressed the logical positivist perspective present in the formative years 
of the social sciences (Habermas, 1993; Giddens & Turner, 1989).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
Cognitive science identifies a research framework (Von Eckardt, 1993) that 
includes six fields of endeavor. These six fields, for the purposes o f this study, will be; 
1) anthropology, 2) communications, 3) law, 4) politics, 5) psychology, and 6) 
sociology. In this study, two o f the more mathematically oriented fields are exchanged 
for two fields which more closely align with social work and from which social work is 
more likely to draw in future activity. Each of these disciplines approaches the 
concepts o f power and ethics differently. Each of these disciplines have influence on 
how individual social workers in the field formulate and discharge their activities as 
social workers. Contemporary work in these fields will be reviewed focusing on how 
these disciplines orient themselves to issues affecting social work practice. It is 
necessary to categorize these disciplines into socially oriented, corresponding to the 
macrosystemic, and personally oriented, or microsystemic, foci for our purposes. 
Socially oriented influences structure how individuals orient perceptions o f interactions 
between client and society. Personally oriented influences structure understanding of 
intrapersonal psychology and how individuals understand the psychologies o f other 
minds.
There will not be a single answer to questions o f ethical power usage. What 
must occur then is for a methodology or comportment toward power usage to integrate 
the diversity of perspectives, even as small as that represented in our sampling, to be 
designated as feasible. This methodology must be amenable to a number of “plural” 
(Rescher, 1993) interests to be addressed in such a way that communicative action 
could occur (Habermas, 1984). The view here aims at being pragmatic; that is it must
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practically applicable (Honderich, 1995; p. 709) within the multilevel contexts o f social 
work practice.
The perspectives utilized by this project include the view that the resource 
framework that social work draws from is structured in a sort o f nested form. There 
are a series o f “levels” of critical perspectives that frame the discourse occurring in 
academia that affect social workers efforts to generate practice wisdom. The first level 
is that o f  the critical activity in such areas as the modemity/postmodemity debate. 
Research generation requires communicative activity(i.e. a forum, individual 
participants, etc.) and therefore requires language which in turn requires reasoned 
cognitive practices. Cognitive practices presuppose the ability to learn from new 
information. The modemity/postmodemity debate has proponents and antagonist 
within each of the specific fields of the next level; the contemporary expressions of 
research in the three pillars o f philosophy described above. Their views are expressed 
in their theoretical formulations within their respective fields. These theoretical 
underpinnings are not always made manifest in their stated assumptions. These fields 
are then utilized by researchers in the next level, the six fields also described above in 
making their field specific formulations. Finally, social workers utilize information 
from these latter fields, whose knowledge generators do not always specify their 
philosophical positions, to generate practice knowledge. The following will describe in 
as concise a manner possible the specific presuppositions this project is based on.
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The Methodology
The framework for the methodology of this study derives from B. Von
Eckardt's (1993) What is Cognitive Science. This paper will follow her description of
a “research framework” though within a narrower scope and different goal than what
she takes. Von Eckardt describes cognitive science as encompassing a number of
“disciplines” including philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, psychology, neuroscience,
and computer science. For the purposes o f this project focus will be on a narrower
range of this field o f human sciences, as outlined above, avoiding areas where
“determination” or “causality” can be said to have clearly probable influence. After
outlining Von Eckardt’s framework, applications o f  it’s specific attributes which will to
this project will be delineated. This research framework
consists o f  four basic sets of elements; a set o f assumptions that provide a pre- 
theoretic specification of the domain under study...; a set o f basic empirical 
research questions, formulated pre-theoretically... ; a set o f substantive 
assumptions that embody the approach being taken in answering the basic 
questions...; and a set o f methodological questions.... (Eckardt, 1993; p. 18)
Within the set o f  elements designated as “domain specifying assumptions” are included
an “identification” assumption, “property” assumptions, and “grouping” assumptions.
The “basic questions” will focus inquiry more narrowly the intent of the project. The
“substantive assumptions” will be oriented to the content within each “discipline” that
will be presented. The “methodological assumptions” further delineate the types o f
answers that will be valid to the intent of the project.
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The domain assumptions are as follows:
1. There are spheres of activity o f a cognitive sort (i.e., academic disciplines, 
communication communities) wherein systems o f interactive influence can be said 
to operate (i.e. social power );
2. Within the above spheres o f activity, certain self-regulative frameworks are 
established called ethics;
3. There is a certain space o f discourse that provides a forum for the above to operate 
within;
4. This cognitive field of action is not structured by “determinism” or “causation” (i.e. 
mathematical logic or biological necessity).
The following will be the basic research questions:
1. What are power and ethics?
2. How do power and ethics limit each other"’
3. What characterizes the contexts o f the interaction of power and ethics?
4. How are power and ethics interactive in the spheres of discourse that effect social 
work?
5. How may individual social workers utilize knowledge of the above interactions in 
developing “practice wisdom”?
The following will be the “substantive” or working assumptions:
I . The availability and conceptualization of “power” influences choices o f actions 
taken
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2. An individual’s recognition of ethics potentially limits the uses o f power; ethics 
itself has “power” that it is able to meet “power” with;
3. Power and ethics are socially constructed concepts;
4. Power can be “used” constructively and destructively;
5. Within each academic discipline there are differences in the social constructions of 
power and ethics;
6. The academic activity occurring in disciplines social work draws information from 
affects social work.
Finally, the methodological assumptions are as follows:
1. The boundaries between power and ethics are determinable;
2. These boundaries can be delineated by studying the ways that conceptual 
descriptions o f constructs, relevant to social work, within a given academic 
discipline are expressed;
3. There are linguistic components (i.e. speech acts; things done with words etc.) of 
the theoretical descriptions which display the power/ethical structures;
4. These linguistic components (i.e. phrases, metaphors, terms, etc.) can be explored 
“deconstructively” / “critically” to analyze their assumptions and applications to 
informational resources utilized by social workers.
While this project only uses a portion of the above described research
framework, it does so for reasons consistent with the projects goals. The framework
provides some specificity through which to analyze the specific intents o f  culling out
presuppositions from the texts to be utilized as informational resources. Also, this
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framework was designed by Von Ekardt with the scientific research paradigm in mind. 
That paradigm is not amenable to the idea of social constructions o f realities and would 
seek “objectivity” which the social construction perspective views as inadequate to 
social interaction and, for the purposes o f this project, is inadequate for the intent of 
clarifying hidden discretionary power misuses.
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PHILOSOPHIC.\L GROUNDWORK 
IN SOCIAL SCIENCES
Outlined above are the contours of the philosophical groundwork upon which 
lie the themes of interest to social work drawn from the particular fields to be 
explored. In this section an attempt will be made to narrow the philosophical topic 
matter under scrutiny to those philosophical themes arising in a review of the social 
work literature and from a review of the literature in disciplines social work draws 
upon. The field of metaphysics will not be explored to the depth that ethics and 
epistemology will be. Metaphysics provides the ground from which some themes 
derive but social work is not engaged in generating metaphysical materials as a matter 
of general practice. Social work is, however, pragmatically concerned with 
epistemology and ethics so these two topic areas will be delved into in more detail.
Modernity/Postmodernity
This section begins with a characterization of modernity as a philosophical 
trend in public discourse; in part so that each of the elements of the debate 
postmoderaity poses as a philosophical trend in public discourse will be more clearly
29
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articulable. This characterization begins with four elemental shifts in the intellectual 
landscape “modernity” took from “premodemity." “Modernity” signified shifts in (a) 
the predominance of the secular over the ecclesiastical in forms and conceptions of 
political power, sovereignty and legitimacy within the structured boundaries required 
by the complexity of modem nation-states; (b) the type of commodities exchange from 
a barter system to a money based system able to service market demand for extensive 
personal ownership of mass produced goods; (c) the traditional interpersonal/political 
ties generated and maintained by social hierarchies as well as redefinition of gender- 
role designations and practicalities to be defined by patriarchal forms, and. finally: (d) 
the characterization of the general world view from religious to materialist (Hall.
1996; p.8). Lash and Friedman ( 1992) hold that “modemity is a matter of movement, 
of flux, of change of unpredictability” ( p. 1). It reportedly was engendered as a force 
for social change and progress from “ignorance and irrationality” into the new modes 
of industrialization, bureaucracy, and the rational / objective, procedures and rules, and 
humanist individual orientations (Rosenau, 1992). It is self-reflexive (d’Entreves & 
Benhabib. 1996), serious, and possessed of visions of a comprehensive truth (Best & 
Kellner. 1991; Rosenau, 1992). Modemity is “high,” for example, when, as with 
Jurgen Habermas ( 1987). it is “utopian in it’s hope for a communicative paradise” 
expressed in ethical discourse (Lash & Friedman, 1992; p.3) and “low” when, with 
Marshall Berman ( 1992), it is pragmatic and focused on a “‘modemism in the 
streets;”' expressed with a concem for an “ethics without blueprints” (Berman. 1992; 
Lash & Friedman. 1992; p.3).
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Postmodemity, on the other hand, has been designated as a “discourse” vying 
with the “totalizing” discourse of modemity in a playful, “insouciant” eclectic fashion 
(Rosenau, 1992). It challenges (a) “all-encompassing world views, be they political, 
religious or social”(Rosenau, 1992; p .6); (b) modernity’s view that capitalism has done 
anything to alleviate the suffering of the downtrodden or oppressed; (c) “hierarchical, 
bureaucratic decision-making” (p.7) frameworks that privilege experts over 
“everyman”; (d) the setting aside of things emotional, metaphysical, mystical in favor of 
the rational, (Best & Kellner, 1991; Rosenau, 1992). Postmodemity is said to be 
bringing in a new “social formation” ushered in by innovative new technologies, all 
requiring new conceptualizations to cope with the new modes o f experience 
intersubjectivity and culture (Best & Kellner, 1991). Postmodemity centers around a 
responsibility to othemess vs. modernism’s responsibility to act (d’Entreves, 1996). 
Postmodemity can be either “skeptical,” offering a dark, gloomy nihilist visions o f 
endings and disintegration, or “affirmative” offering a somewhat more optimistic view 
about movement toward a newer configuration of non-ideological value positions 
(Rosenau, 1992; p. 15). It generates new conceptions of meaning constmction locating 
this meaning primarily in the local, immediate usages of language (Giroux, 1991; 
Lyotard, 1984; Rosenau, 1992) rather than in a meta-narrative.
Pauline Rosenau (1992) has outlined the issues of contention in the modemity- 
postmodemity debate as they specifically apply to the social sciences and we will follow 
her lead. First, there is question of what is a “text” and how a reader relates to what 
s/he reads. Modemity sees the text as written by an author, the property o f that author
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and as such privileging the author over the text. Postmodemity would eliminate the 
presence o f the author from an ownership association to her text. The reader of the 
text is then the primary meaning-maker with regard to the text. Second, modemity put 
forward a sense of identity granted to an individual “subject.” This sense o f identity 
granted some freedoms to the subject relative to it’s subject status. Postmodemity 
would, in some cases, eliminate the idea “subject” and all the presuppositions that come 
with this idea. Other views call for a completely revised “postmodem subject.” Third, 
modernity holds to the position that history was important, that “time” and “space” 
have specific locations that they identify and bound. Postmodemity would dissolve 
these boundaries and would remove these constraints and limits to understanding 
reality in different ways. Temporal juxtaposition of events comes into question.
Fourth, modemity holds that “theory” and “tmth” have a place in the scheme of thing 
regarding an orientation to experience. Objectivity is possible if enough of the facts are 
in place. Postmodemity holds that there is no “objective” truth and therefore no 
groundwork on which to set any totalizing theoretical structures. Relative viewpoints 
are valid. Fifth, modemity allowed for representation o f the knowable and to some 
extent the unknowable in experience. Postmodemity would disallow the ability to 
“represent” as a measure to confine and restrain that which is attempted to be 
represented. Sixth, modemity set forth certain rules for methods of accumulating and 
generating knowledge. Objective, replicable causality was desired in order to 
determine certainty. Postmodemity denies causality within the social sciences and
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resists rule structures that would privilege one form o f knowledge generation over 
another. Realty is understood to be socially constructed at each given point in time 
(Rosenau, 1992). Social workers are faced with variability in practice situations that 
some o f  the structures o f modernity do not allow for. Much of the knowledge base o f 
social work was generated within the framework o f modem social science and so took 
for granted the sometimes dogmatic impositions o f structure and perspective on 
situations where fluidity o f purpose and approach would have better served the client. 
Postmodemity perhaps takes too far the attempted deconstruction o f existing social 
structures in the attempt to expose social power abuses in their many forms but is 
necessary to get at unquestioned presuppositions. The contemporary view of 
knowledge as “local” and “socially constmcted” does more justice to the needs o f the 
client populations served by social work practitioners. In the case o f a battered 
woman, for example, socialization may have played a part in her staying in a situation 
which was emotionally and physically abusive to her. Pattems o f socialized role 
requirements may have left her without the perceived options to consider in deciding 
whether or not to stay with her particular abusive partner. Her identity as wife and 
mother may have left her without the idea that she is an individual woman and she need 
not accept someone else’s social constriction of her reality. By proceeding with this 
client in a direction that would take a less socially determined and a more immediately 
determined perspective on her reality, she may be able to identify options for herself 
that would serve to free her from the oppressive sort o f  structure imposed by received
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views o f the female role within a family structure. In this way the existing male- 
dominated structure supported in many places by modemity is questioned and 
presuppositions that supported a situation of interpersonal power abuse are eliminated.
Metaphysical, Epistemological, Ethical,
Social Power Issue Grounding 
Metaphysical concerns are reflected in debates about the postmodern “subject” 
(Lyotard, 1984; Mohan, 1996, 1997) whether this is in questions about “identity” in 
general (Smith & White, 1997) or the “self’ in particular (Mohan, 1996). The issue 
focuses on how the identity o f the individual “client” is constructed socially (Kondrat, 
1995; Laird, 1995) and how this could affect the client (Mohan, 1996; Smith & White, 
1997). How does social work view the “development” o f a self (Beny, 1995; Germain, 
1994) or “pathologies” o f the self (Cutler, 1991; Goldstein, 1990)? How do social 
workers proceed in assessing these pathologies? Whose reality has authority? Do we 
let the client’s story determine the outcome of this assessment (Raffbul & Holmes,
1986; Franklin & Jordan, 1995)? How do we proceed in treatment ( Dean & Fenby, 
1989; Laird, 1995)?
One of the epistemological issues surfacing within the debate for the social 
work field currently is the issue of “grand narratives” (Humphries, 1997; Leonard,
1996; Krueger, 1997) or “metanarratives” (Lyotard, 1984; Rosenau, 1992). The 
“metanarrative” according to Lyotard (1984) presumes a (modem) “metasubject” who 
sees the issues, about which s/he is speaking, from outside and is therefore able to form
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the most appropriate response from this objective perspective (p.34). The question 
here becomes an issue of decision between theory (Bisno & Cox, 1997; Polansky,
1986) or “local knowledge” (Geertz, 1983) and which is to be privileged over the other 
(Laird, 1995; Pardeck et al., 1994). This issue surfaces in determinations of who is 
published (Kondrat, 1995; Tucker, 1996), who decides what educational curricula to 
mandate (Humphries, 1997), and which philosophical values are reflected in social 
work activities (Dean & Fenby, 1989).
Ethics, in social work, has taken for it's subject matter, among other topics, 
research processes (Gillespie, 1995), liability issues (Gelman, Pollack & Auerbach, 
1996), assessment issues (Goldstein, 1990), educational curricula issues (Kayser, 
Rothstein & Stevenson, 1997), and ethical, reflective practice issues (Abramson, 1996; 
Reamer 1995). Ethical foci have been both other and self oriented illustrating the 
different relative levels o f “moral self-development” (Kegan, 1982) among the 
individual social worker decisions prompting the specific ethics research. Ethics in 
social work, as in any field, is concerned with the resolution o f value conflicts between 
personal and professional interests (Gillespie, 1995; Manning 1997; Reamer, 1995). 
Proponents of the modemity / postmodemity debate in ethics include, (1) an overview 
o f the field by Bauman (1993), (2) a modernist perspective from Habermas, (1990,
1993) and, (3) for postmodemity, Derrida, (1978). Somewhere between these two 
positions is Foucault (1983). We will look more closely at these positions below.
Social power concerns in social work can be delineated through the themes of 
“client self determination” (Ewalt, & Mokuau, 1995; Pinderhughes, 1983),
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“empowerment perspective” (Gutierrez, GlenMaye, & DeLois, 1995; Kondrat, 1995; 
Zippay, 1995), “strengths perspective” (Chapin, 1995; Goldstein, 1990; Weik & 
Saleeby, 1995) and “social constructionist perspective” (Berlin, 1996; Goldstein, 1995) 
with regard to our clients. With regard to ourselves as workers, issues o f social power 
take the form of differentiation of our field o f work (Abbott, 1995; Barber, 1995; 
Tucker, 1996) and the privileging o f our research bases (Furr, 1995).
Philosophical Bases of Social 
Construction of Knowledge 
Social construction as a perspective is more than a technique o f approach to 
practice (Neimeyer, 1993); it approaches the status o f a paradigm or in Masterson’s 
(1970) terms a “metaparadigm” in that it provides “a new way of seeing”, or “an 
organizing principle governing perception itself’ (Masterson, 1970; p 65). To some 
extent, whenever we argue for a particular viewpoint, we are engaged in the process of 
social construction. While a number of sources for social construction are utilized by 
various social workers in different applications (Granvold, 1996; Hoffman, 1990; 
Imbrogno, 1996; Franklin & Jordan, 1995), Kenneth Gergen, (1985) following Berger 
& Luckmann ( 1966), delineated a framework for “social construction” that can be 
effectively utilized by contemporary social work researchers and practitioners in 
understanding this perspective. Gergen (1985) makes the following points:
1. social reality can not be limited to the “maps” of reality, constructed with concepts 
expressed in the words used to describe that reality, without taking into
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consideration the linguistic contexts operated within. These include, but are not 
limited to, intention, sense data, and motivation;
2. words used are “social artifacts” dependent on the participation o f the two (or 
more) individuals between which the words occurred, and the reference bases of 
these individuals (i.e. cultural, geographic, philosophical, political, symbolic etc.);
3. the degree to which a given understanding remains valid across time and contexts 
“evolves” as do the ways structures determining what obtains as socially acceptable 
categories defining that which is included in various concepts;
4. the negotiated forms of social interactivity have significance for maintaining 
pattems o f interaction which may become identified as “culture” or “norms” and 
which can be applied to actions and persons. (Gergen, 1985)
Gergen (1985) identifies social construction as “exogenic” or deriving from “events in 
the world” or “endogenic” when derived fi"om processes seated in the organism 
(p.269). As we will show social construction o f concepts influences every category of 
experiences we are concemed with in this study including communication (Lakoff, 
1980), ethics (Richardson, 1995), social power (Goldman, 1972), and social work 
research and practice (Fisher, 1995; Furr, 1995; Granvold, 1996; Imbrogno, 1996).
Metaphysics
Of the constmcts identified above as metaphysical (Honderich, 1995) we will 
limit our treatment to three of most concem to social work; identity, 
appearance/reality, and causation. The questions addressed here will be concemed
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with how contemporary metaphysical issues find their way into social work discourses 
and will be traced through the paths social work takes to define it’s positions relative to 
these issues. As with other disciplines, social work derives it’s philosophical positions 
from sources it views as reflecting it’s clientele’s interests in it’s efforts to “broaden it’s 
knowledge base” (Reamer, 1993). Frequently these sources are contemporary and so 
are affected by the contemporary debates moving through the field drawn upon. 
Sometimes outmoded sources are used because of their status as “authorities” within a 
field o f endeavor. While it may seem to many social workers that metaphysical 
questions are far removed from the daily actions social workers must take in their 
work, many of these everyday decisions are based on uninspected metaphysical 
positions. These positions may have been present with the social worker when s/he 
entered the field, they may have been conveyed by a favorite mentor or they may have 
been consciously instilled by the educational curricula mandated by contemporary 
Council on Social Work Education [CSWE] accreditation standards. If the individual 
social worker makes decisions based on unrecognized precedents it can be harmful to 
the client population dealt with. For example, with the abuser of the battered woman 
mentioned earlier, many of the social role expectations that “allow” him not to question 
his physically abusive behavior are accepted as traditional ways for men to act in their 
environments. To not be adept at management of emotional conflict, to physically 
address perceived threats to his emotional well being, and to consider it the “place” of
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the woman to act in certain ways regarding him may be part of his received role as a 
man in society.
Some social workers come into the field knowing their own minds regarding 
their personal philosophies regarding issues that they care about deeply. Some social 
workers only discover these values through the course of their work. Values 
surrounding the social power generally come into question for any individual having to 
get along in contemporary society. What will be attempted here will be to clarify the 
currents of power and ethics as they are expressed in the modem/postmodem context 
o f contemporary society. This is intended to provide social workers with a more 
adequate knowledge of this philosophical groundwork as it affects even the most 
familiar and cherished beliefs systems as well as providing a key to understanding (and 
better serving) populations of individuals with differing philosophical positions.
First delineated will be three metaphysical issues that are currently considered 
relevant in social work literature. Then follows a look at how academic fields social 
work derives material for knowledge production from frame these themes in their 
literature. Then how the modemity/postmodemity debates reflect the meeting places 
between power and ethics issues relative to these issues is discussed.
What Questions are Viable
Viable questions in the social construction of categories pertinent to social 
work practice relative to identity concem “minds and the mental” and in social work 
are expressed in the question o f what constitutes “self’ (Spencer & Adams, 1990). The
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questions of appearance/reality may be related to “norms and values” about what, for 
social work, constitutes “illness” (Gorenstein, 1984). Finally, questions about 
causation bring up issues o f “free will” and, for social work, concern about what 
constitutes “power” (Pinderhughes, 1993).
Among the other issues in the debate about “self’ is the issue o f making 
meaning. What are the dimensions of “meaning?” Two main streams o f thought within 
theories of meaning to be explored here are the linguistic and the existential 
(Honderich, 1995). The explication of this issue will encompass tributaries to both 
streams. Is meaning objectively determined or does it belong exclusively to the 
individual (Barwise, 1988)7 Do I let someone else’s view of me determine who I am or 
is this a decision I must come to on my own internal information alone (Nagel, 1986)"’ 
Who decides the answer to these questions? Modemity wanted the “subject “ to be 
able to define herself at any given juncture based on objective criteria. The subject as 
“self’ had the power to define his own world and who s/he was in it. Postmodemity 
would, altematively, take away this freedom of self-definition in favor o f the view that 
merely linguistic convention determines the self and give the individuality back to the 
individual without the “subject-ivity”(Rosenau, 1992). For the former to obtain means 
that the person’s sense of self is still tied to the demands of the collective whatever 
form that takes. For the latter to hold, the person is able to completely define 
themselves regardless of extemal norms.
A specific aspect o f  the “illness” construct is what constructs the health issue. 
What is “illness” and what is “wellness”? This brings up the question o f what the thing
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referred to as “health"’ is. A “substance” is said to be a semi-permanent referent that 
can be recognized as existing in reality (Wiggins, 1995; p.214). Are the properties that 
“health” has consistent and incontrovertible? Even within the framework of mental 
health, the properties of the thing health change from discovery to discovery. Illness is 
sometimes said to be “little more than a descriptive label for behavior most of us find 
unusual, unpleasant or annoying. (Lilienfeld, 1995; p.3). What “norm” or measuring 
stick is this “health” issue compared to? Thomas Szasz (1960) maintains that illness is 
simply a deviation from a norm that is psychosocially, ethically and legally determined 
(Lilienfeld, 1995; p.6). Who decides who fits the measurement and who doesn’t?
This issue is inevitably a question of dual focus; what is good for the individual 
balanced against what is good for society (Nagel, 1986; p. 187). While norms are 
established by the modem perspective in order to give a sense of place in the overall 
scheme of things, the postmodern would eliminate normative positions that are seen to 
be ideologically designated (Rosenau, 1992).
With the issue of “power” comes questions about how it causes effects in the 
individual in her/his immediate environment. What does power do'’ Concerns 
frequently about whether it is “held” and “used” by individuals or by collectives, 
intentionally or unintentionally, whether this done so legitimately or illegitimately and 
whether this action effects the actions o f others (Lukes, 1991; p. 83). How does it 
effect it’s goals? Individuals try to answer questions like this in terms o f ‘if that hadn’t 
happened this would not have happened.’ These decisions are said to pose a potential 
other set of circumstances or a “counterfactual” situation (Bennett, 1993) that, having
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not occurred, a given situation would not be what it is. Does this mean that we think 
the potential event would have happened if we (or someone else) had not done 
something to change it? This leads to question o f whether our action actually could 
have been different or if it was “determined” in some way. “Do we have free will?”
The answer one gives oneself to this question significantly alters how one makes 
decisions and how one views the world (Dennett, 1984). While modernity assures 
individuals that the will is in fact free, there is still much dispute over the idea as a 
metaphysical postulation (Nagel, 1986). Postmodern skeptics “dispute...the 
assumptions ensuring this free will” (Rosenau, 1992; p.21) and delineate constraints 
placed on it by the mechanisms o f society. Affirmative postmodernists explore 
“postmetaphysical” directions.
The questions social workers ask themselves and their clientele about specific 
issues are structured by many influences in the environment. This environment includes 
the knowledge constructions available at the time the questions are being asked and the 
restrictions the individual social worker is under from the employing auspices. For 
social workers to frame their questions in terms that take into consideration social 
power influences requires a knowledge of how these influences can affect the questions 
asked as well as the philosophical concepts and currents represented in the terms used 
to ask the questions.
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Post-Metaphysical Thinking 
This perspective is followed for a number of reasons. This section is named for 
a text written by Jurgen Habermas (1993) and will follow his argument for the types o f 
issues the social sciences are most concerned with. The modemity/postmdemity debate 
brings into question the viability of the category “metaphysical” and yet some of the 
debate's issues are still centered on classical metaphysical themes.
Habermas’ (1993) modem position, in contrast to the themes o f (a) “totalizing 
thinking that aims at the one and the whole,” (b) “objectivistic self-understanding of 
science and technology,” (c) “an unsituated reason that had been idealistically 
apotheosized,” and a tendency to posit the (d) “precedence of theory over practice,” 
set forth a new “procedural rationality,” a “detranscendentalizaion o f inherited basic 
concepts,” and a shift to a “linguistic turn” in philosophy which occurred within the 
context o f  a “lifeworld background” (Habermas, 1993; pp.33-53). His procedural 
rationality looks to dealing with immediate reality in interactive ways not based on 
some precedent of contextual unity. The detrancendentalization would leave reason 
situated in the space between individual thinkers bounded only by their mutual abilities 
to generate and utilize rule systems for communication for their mutual benefits rather 
than based on a priori guidelines. A linguistic turn would situate language as the tool 
and structural edifice by which meaning is generated between individual “subjects” 
without depriving them of their differences. The lifeworld background will set the 
“horizon” within which the interactiveness of all disciplines with philosophy can be 
facilitated to accord pragmatic concerns a validity equaling that accorded to theory.
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Habermas here sets the parameters for the social constructionist perspective from his 
socio-critical frame.
Postmodemity maintains a need to get away from all “meta-narratives”; from 
the need for a “we” that is all inclusive. Richard Rorty (1992) maintains that this “we” 
position ethnocentrically constrains difference and looks for a “true self’ o f  all men 
instead o f recognizing individual contingent historical reality. I. M. Young (1992) 
parallels this position with her focus on the need to recognize that difference has as 
much value as unity or consensus. She maintains that the call to universal agreement 
privileges unity over differences. Rorty holds that this creates a situation that stifles the 
voices o f difference; that it deprives them o f a voice to speak their differences into 
(p.85). Baudrillard (1984) would cast aside all attempt to generate a structure from 
which to generate meaning claiming that it conceals through depth and that what is 
needed is visible transparency of textuality. He would allow “infinite proliferation” of 
potential meanings in such a way as to deprive the subject the ability to instill 
sovereignty over the object. He would end the ability of the subject to subject the 
object to it’s whim and instead take the position of the object itself. He would take 
everything to it’s logical absurdity in order to generate new unseen meanings (Best & 
Kellner, 1991; pp. 126-133). These meanings and the ways they would be constructed 
would ‘always already” be only “local knowledge” (Geertz, 1983) and would eschew 
the standard ways of epistemological procedure.
Social workers willing to take on the burden of a new framework for argument 
in developing practice knowledge will be benefited by knowing the frameworks that the
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pervious modes of argumentation were founded on as well as what potential new 
frameworks could look like. Arguments based on precedents from one side or the 
other of the modemity/postmodemity debate present the individual social worker with 
different kinds o f  premises from which to build arguments. These expanded sets of 
possible structures provide aid in making the most potentially power-balanced decisions 
within the given moment o f argument or knowledge construction.
Epistemology
Historically, epistemology has been concerned with the nature o f  knowledge 
and truth; is associated with metaphysics, logic and truth; and investigates questions 
such as; a) is knowledge possible’, b) what are it’s limits?, c) what are it’s origins?, d) 
how is it obtained?, e) what is the proper method to use in obtaining it?, f) how is it 
constituted?, g) what is it’s structure?, and h) what is the relation between knowledge 
and truth (Runes, I960)? Contemporaneously, these questions are approached through 
the framework o f  a number o f specific problem areas; ( I ) justification looks at the 
kinds o f things we hold as beliefs and the various type o f beliefs we can have; (2) 
structure o f justification determines what evidence is used to come to the point that we 
call a belief justified; (3) knowledge must be defined by where we find it and who has 
determined what it is; (4) skepticism is concerned with the reasoning process going into 
knowledge construction and even the mere possibility o f knowledge; (5) naturalistic 
epistemology evaluates the strategies utilized in the processes of justification and belief 
in all systems o f  knowledge (Honderich, 1995). Here concern will be focused on that
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“naturalistic epistemology” (Komblith, 1994) which encourages interdisciplinary input 
to knowledge formulation.
Social work is more directly focused on issues of knowledge construction than 
with the metaphysical issues which are part o f  this knowledge construction. This is 
exemplified, historically, in social work’s primarily “logical positivist” approach to 
research methodology (Reamer, 1993; Reid, 1995; L. Williams, 1995; Wodarski, Feit, 
& Green, 1995). This is due primarily to an emphasis on the need in social work to 
justify research results through “objective verification” (Reamer, 1993; p. 122). Herein 
lies a main point in the modemity/postmodemity debate in social work epistemology; 
the connection point between values and knowledge and between observer objectivity 
and subjectivity. This debate is expressed by the modem view that an objective, value 
free, scientific position is possible while the postmodern perspective maintains that all 
knowledge is subjective, value laden and socially constructed (Rosenau, 1992; p. 110). 
In this section we will address the issue o f how knowledge is constructed in general 
ways and how the modem/postmodem debate is reflected in the process.
Building Blocks o f Knowledge Construction 
Contemporary issues in epistemology span a number o f dimensions including; 
subjective vs. objective knowledge (Wright, 1993), local vs. universal knowledge 
(Geertz, 1983), is there truth? (Cooper, 1993), the “mind/body problem” (Nagel,
1994), and the functioning of reason (Nozick, 1993; Stich, 1990).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
At this point it is possible to pose another question; “whose perspective on 
answering these questions will be admitted to the discourse on the questions 
epistemology recognizes as valid?” Further, who determines what is a valid question 
for epistemology to be concerned with? Each o f the thinkers in the “genealogy” of 
epistemology outlined above shifted the way their field o f interest was viewed by their 
contemporaries. Each time a new thinker comes to prominence, s/he reconstructs or 
redefines the way that history, and the thinkers s/he privileges, are viewed (Collins, 
1985). This, in it’s essence, promotes the “paradigm shift” that Kuhn (1970) describes. 
And yet Masterson (1970) found that Kuhn (1970) characterized “paradigm shift” in 21 
different ways. She has grouped these characterizations into three categories; those 
detailing philosophical areas are “metaphysical paradigms,” those generating social 
recognition are “sociological paradigms,” and those instrumentally oriented are 
“construct paradigms” (Masterson, 1970; p.65). Though it shares elements o f the 
construct paradigm in it’s linguistic elements, social construction of knowledge is 
primarily a metapardigm. Before we turn to social constructionist perspectives, we will 
review briefly the current generally accepted modes o f generating knowledge.
According to Kim (1994), justification is a “normative,” (that is a regulative) 
notion. For a belief to be “justified” is for it to be acceptable generally; it is an ideal. 
Justification is the action of accepting the belief. Certain conditions must be “analyzed 
and identified” as being in evidence for the action ofjustiScation to take place. One 
part o f these conditions includes there being “foundational” sets of “beliefs” or “truths” 
that our currently-in-process belief (x) is being compared to. Then, the current belief
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will be decided to be “justified” just to the extent it follows from or is coherent with the 
other already established beliefs or truths. The previous beliefrtruth is the “evidence” 
for the justification of the current belief x  (Kim, 1994). Throughout these and other 
arguments on justification, the previously established set of truths or beliefs was 
established by someone before us.
Next, follows a look at what constitutes a “belief' and how creation knowledge 
occurs by revising beliefs. Gilbert Harman (1994), in setting out a theory of belief 
revision, delineates some of what he sees as basic types of beliefs. He divides belief- 
revision theories into “foundations” and “coherence” types. Basic beliefs within the 
foundational theory are those beliefs which are intrinsically justified; that is, they do not 
rely on other beliefs for their justification. Other beliefs are grounded in reference to 
these basic beliefs. Beliefs are either “explicit” or “implicit” ; frequently, explicit beliefs 
are founded on implicit beliefs. Within the foundational framework these beliefs cannot 
be infinitely circular; that is, they cannot rely on other beliefs ad infinitum.
Within the coherence theory, if all the beliefs that one holds fit together and do 
not contradict one another, then one is justified in retaining these beliefs. In contrast to 
the foundations theory, the justifications can be circular and infinite. If one finds that 
one’s justification for holding a belief is removed, (usually by a gain o f information 
from an outside source) then one simply adjusts that belief to accommodate the new 
information. One of the main goals of Harman’s belief revision is to explore why 
people hold onto beliefs when their justification has been revised. His view is that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
while the foundations view is more appealing to our intuitions (and our sense o f logic) 
the coherence theory is the one we actually use to revise our beliefs (Harman, 1994).
The final element to be explored will be that o f truth. There are a number of 
ways of understanding “truth” as a term. Truth is a “value” as related to utterances of 
language (Quine, 1980), or to relations o f propositions to each other. In these cases it 
is a “logical” term. Truth is related to the “nature o f being” in metaphysical texts 
(Collingwood, 1940) but for our purposes, Michael Friedman’s ( 1994) account will 
align theories o f truth with building o f knowledge. Friedman establishes a connection 
between truth and confirmation; knowledge that has been confirmed is “true” 
knowledge. He maintains that “theories are confirmed” if their “observational 
consequences are true” (Friedman, 1994; p. 168). Another way to say this is that 
theories are true if they correspond to the facts observed (Popper, 1979). And yet, as 
Friedman points out, the “facts” then must be proven to be true. In addition, he points 
out that knowledge contains “non-observational statements” which must be sorted out. 
He proposes that statements that make up a theory must be set within a notion of 
“limits.” When the collected set o f observations are as complete as they can be at the 
specific point in time when the knowledge is formulated (Friedman, 1994). So how do 
social workers use these building blocks in social construction o f knowledge bases? All 
o f the above epistemological constructs proceed from the modernist perspective that 
requires and supports a privileging o f metanarratives and universal views.
It has been necessary to go into some depth with the explication of the generally 
accepted view o f knowledge construction for two reasons; (a) to represent all the
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potential areas where structures o f the traditional modem perspective come into play 
with received views of epistemology and (b) to represent how other philosophical 
themes are present but not explicit within the framework of traditional epistemology. 
Even within the above described structure exist adherents to either side o f the 
modemity/postmodemity debate. Their usage of specific philosophical terms and 
concepts within the context of their epistemological endeavor expresses their particular 
perspectives and prejudices as well as with whom they align their assignment of 
authority and thus social power.
Building Blocks o f Social Construction 
of Knowledge
A shift to a look at a more postmodem epistemological form expressed in the 
social constructionist scholarship follows. The focus here is limited to the four aspects 
of social construction we have derived from Gergen (1985) above. Beginning with 
conceptual and linguistic contexts a look is taken at what affects these elements used in 
generating social work knowledge and how the modemity/postmodemity debate affects 
these elements. One frequently overlooked aspect of everyday thinking is how the 
metaphors o f vernacular speech can structure the concepts social workers use with 
clients and in social work research. Lakoff & Johnson (1980) describe how the 
concepts used to describe that which is not common in terms of that which is common 
(in whatever context) structures how things are framed and how things are done in 
everyday life (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980 p.454). Everyday thinking is reflected in
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communications with others and can display many things about how individuals act in 
the world and what values are important. It also can display intersubjective 
incongruities of thought relative to other minds (p.455).
The linguistic contexts within which these concepts are expressed take into 
closer consideration how the terms we use contribute to the issue. Here the questions 
become, (a) what was the intended meaning of the linguistic expression uttered 
(Habermas, 1992; p.58)? and, (b) from within whose frame of reference does the 
desired meaning derive (p.44)? The very frame of “social construction” itself presumes 
a context which includes an agent and some “construction materials” (i.e. materials of 
knowledge) and yet says nothing about a plan for the construction that takes place.
This area o f knowledge construction becomes a marginal space. And yet it places the 
locus o f knowledge generation, which determines the existence o f things, in the 
possession o f the human individual (van Dijk, 1994; p. 108); not in some reality that we 
see through but darkly’. The view that the words we use in sentences are “social 
artifacts” is underlined by Austin (1979) in the argument he delineates about whether or 
not there is a “single thing called the meaning” of a word or even of a sentence (Austin, 
1979; p.60). Austin further talks about the denotative and connotative meaning of 
words having referents located in the objects themselves vs. referents located in the 
communicative activity between the perceivers (Austin, 1979; p.57).
The understandings of the meanings of terms, contexts and the sentences in 
which they used, as well as the contexts within which they occur between even the 
same two individuals at different times, are continually evolving or “updated and
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changed by various types of mental operations such as... interpretation, inference, 
categorization and evaluation.. .” ( van Dijk, 1994; p. 112). The meanings o f the same 
information can be understood in different ways by groups separated by ideological, 
power, or other marginalizing differences such as race, gender, religious background 
(van Dijk, 1994; p. 117). These same meanings are revised through a process of 
“recursive communication” Krippendorf (1994) through which one’s communications, 
one’s understanding of these communications, one’s practices, and one’s view o f these 
practices, are adjusted through recursive communication loops encountering the same 
components functioning in a second agent with whom one is in contact (Krippendorf, 
1994; p. 85). This describes the communication view of social construction.
Giddens (1987) relates that the “‘linguistic turn’...explores the intersection 
between language and the constitution of social practices” (Giddens, 1987; p . 199). It 
enables individuals to know what these practices are and how to maneuver among 
exigencies o f everyday life to make functional decisions. “Contexts form settings of 
action whose qualities agents routinely draw upon in the course of orientating what 
they do and what they say to one another” (Giddens, 1987; p.215). The “things” 
drawn upon are “cultural artifacts” and require a “medium of transmission across 
contexts”, “a means of storage” and “a means of retrieval” (p.216) in order to be put to 
use. All these items are functions of the communicative activity of the individual with 
other individuals or his/her environment.
Postmodemity’s position towards epistemology is most adequately reflected in 
the social construction perspective (Rosenau, 1992). According to this view, there are
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no objective perspectives that enable the observer to disentangle her/his value positions 
even when s/he knows what they are and expresses them up front. These value 
positions crop up in the metaphors o f everyday speech that individuals engaged in 
conversation do not stop to consider in each moment of the conversation. Modernity’s 
perspective would be more adequately reflected in the view that privileges 
“foundationalist” (Benhabib, 1996; Fairlamb, 1994) frames o f reference that would 
provide normative information through consesensually accepted elements of an 
externally verifiable reality. These pieces of information would be value free and would 
reflect no ideological or research standpoint. But is this realistic? Does this view hide 
from itself the privileging of sameness over difference (Benhabib, 1996). It is just here 
that ethical considerations come into play in answering these questions.
Ethics
Twentieth century ethics spans a vast array o f philosophical work. Most widely 
stated, the concern o f  ethics and moral philosophy is with “right and wrong action” 
(Honderich, 1995; p.591). Before briefly outlining the field and narrowing the focus to 
what will be considered here, the difference between “ethics” and “morality” must be 
delineated. For the moment we will simply define this difference. Below more detail 
about their distinctions and their similarities will be related. In delineating the 
difference between ethics and morality, Williams (1995a) states that “...the terms 
‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ do have slightly different resonances. Ethical’ (derived from a 
Greek word for personal character) carries a broader conception, including a concern
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with the value o f different kinds of life and activity; ‘moral’ (derived from a Latin word 
for social custom) tends to narrow it’s interests to rules and obligations, and to the 
experiences and considerations most closely related to those...” (Williams, 1995a; 
p. 546). Williams further states that confidence is a “desirable state” for one to be in 
with regard to one’s ethical precepts; not having confidence (note that certainty is not 
required) can give rise to a “general doubt” (Williams, 1995b; p.203). This general 
doubt can lead to ethical quandaries (Bauman, 1993; p.21) and errors of decision 
making and may set the stage for akratic action. Bauman (1993), while agreeing on 
this latter point, generally views “morality” as more encompassing in it’s ability to 
express the completeness of a self and “ethics” as more restricted to sets o f rules 
“wishing to be the moral code” (Bauman, 1993; p.21). Bauman’s perspectives will 
generally be followed in treating moral/ethical questions.
It must be stated at the outset that what is sought here is not just one more 
ethical perspective that would presume to set itself alongside other extant ethical 
positions. The ethical position of this study will be more aligned with a reflexive 
“moral judgment” (Honderich, 1995, Thomas, 1993) technique that would, among 
other issues, be addressing, in social work specifically, the problem of “akrasia” 
(Broadie, 1994; Honderich, 1995; McIntyre, 1990), or akratic decisions based on 
unexamined philosophical positions coming into play at crucial times within the 
decision making process. In Broadie’s (1994) succinct terms, “how can a person 
knowingly and freely engage in an action that s/he regards as inferior to some other 
action understood by him/her to be, at the time, an available option (Broadie, 1994;
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p.229)?” Going into the philosophical minutiae of this question would take us out of 
the scope of his project but the practical course of reflexive moral judgment will be 
framed with this question in mind. Elements of this question will resurface with regard 
to the meeting places, the “margins”, of power and ethics discussed below.
In the following sections then, discussion covers the scope of the topics “ethics” 
and “morality” and the differences between these two frames of reference as described 
above. The contours o f the modemity/postmodemity debate in these areas will be 
outlined. Finally we will focus on the elements of that middle ground that a social 
worker must delineate for him/herself in order to make good decisions in everyday 
practice and research decisions.
Ethics/Morality Distinctions 
Ethics in it’s widest sense includes theoretical and applied branches. The 
applied branch will be immediately eliminated as it looks at questions more narrowly 
focused which will be delineated later. Theoretical ethics includes “metaethics” and 
“normative ethics.” Metaethics subsumes questions of the nature of morality, moral 
psychology, and moral epistemology. Normative ethics includes issues o f duty and 
issues of value. Some of the most significant ethical positions include “Divine- 
command” views. Rationalism, Intuitionism, Consequentialism, Justice, Prescriptivism, 
and Emotivism (Honderich, 1995, p.940). Within the scope of this project, which does 
not purport to be review o f ethical theories, we will not be proceeding systematically 
through delineations o f each theory’s positions and then supporting one that fits our
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value preferences. Reamer ( 1993) has already provided an overview o f these theories 
and it is unnecessary to duplicate his work here. Having done so, he sets the stage for 
the next section o f our project. Where he outlined the whole field o f philosophical 
input to ethical theory, here focus will be on specific philosophical elements of ethics 
relevant to the social work issues highlighted above.
Bauman (1993) characterizes modem moral/ethical thinking as making certain 
presumptions about the moral character of humanity in general. Modem ethicists saw 
human “evil” as a sort of inborn trait that individuals could not overcome by themselves 
(Ricoeur, 1974). According to this view, people needed ethical systems of rule to 
provide for an ideal to follow in order to approach morality. Individuals were told that 
individuals could not possibly know what their own best interests were since they don’t 
have the discernment o f the authorities who have determined what these interests were 
for them. In order for individual’s best interests to be met appropriately, resources 
must be restricted to what the “wise” thought best. According to this view, these wise 
men based their decisions on emotion-free reason and this type of thinking is not 
available to the common man (Bauman, 1993).
Bauman’s (1993) view of postmodem morality sees the individual as the moral 
actor responsible for all his/her decisions and as capable of coming to these decisions 
unencumbered by the constraints o f an ethical system imposed from outside 
him/herself. Where modem ethics constructed ethical systems to combat irrationality, 
ambiguity and emotion, these efforts were part of the illusion that to do so 
(construction o f systems) would eliminate these non-rational elements fi'om the
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everyday activities o f individuals. The focus in postmodemity is shifting from being 
ethical for the requirements of a law-like set o f rules prescribing behavior, to self- 
determined morality that must be constructed in the moment of decision making 
between two individuals. Moral judgement becomes here the province of the individual 
rather than the collective (Bauman, 1993).
What are the characteristics o f moral judgement that social workers may 
reflexively develop? Thomas (1993) designates five problems he considers pertinent to 
the functioning of moral judgement. The first of these is the “specification o f moral 
judgement” wtiich includes an aspect o f characterization such as universality, a 
designation o f “objects” of moral focus such as actions of individual agents or 
collectivities, and, finally, the “elucidation o f moral concepts”; a specific array or 
“range” o f moral concepts including but not limited to types or linguistic analyses of 
concepts such as ‘good’ or ‘treacherous’ The second is “moral judgement and the 
moral standard” wtiich includes, on the one hand, the “moral criterion”, a type of 
reference point such as “monism”, “pluralism” or “particularity”, and on the other hand 
a “moral ideal” which looks more to a kind of person “I ought to be” . The third 
problem is that o f “justification of moral judgement” and includes the means by which 
judgements justify themselves such as truth claims, rational procedures or “natural” 
moral qualities. The fourth problem is the connection between “logic, reasoning, and 
moral judgement” and concerns itself with the questions o f structural validity o f moral 
arguments like the “is-ought gap” which attempts to derive an evaluation fi"om 
descriptions, the “ought implies can” or the “naturalistic fallacy” in which a moral
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description is taken as a real property. The fifth problem concerns “moral judgement 
and moral responsibility” and incorporates excuses from culpability, free will vs. 
determinism, and punishment and forgiveness (Thomas 1993; pp. 1-24). Although 
much o f Thomas’ argument is structured from modem perspective, these faculties 
must be attended to and developed as elements of ethical grounding used by the 
postmodern reflective moral agent in search of answers to the questions concerning 
expressions o f power involved in practice decisions and research generation in social 
work practice.
Modemity/Postmodemity and Ethics in Practice
The modemity/postmodemity debate in the problems of ethics and moral 
philosophy follows the contours o f the linguistic tum in philosophy in general 
(Honderich, 1995). The effects that the modernity / postmodemity debate have on 
contemporary ethics issue will be o f foremost interest and practical significance to 
social workers. To some extent professional codes o f ethics would not be necessary if 
there were not abuses of power in some form or another (Reamer, 1993; p.41), but 
ethics itself addresses wider concems than those dealing only with issues of power. 
These elements may draw upon different aspects o f different theoretical positions at 
different times. With regard to this study, these will include those issues within which 
power meets ethics in practical questions.
The constructs “self’, “illness” and “free will” become topics o f ethical as well 
as metaphysical and epistemological concern. With “authority” comes the questions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
about how the worker orients to the client self; client morality as perceived by a social 
worker; “victim” or “perpetrator” status as perceived by client and worker; and client 
need for information. All are foci of how we might exercise authority unwittingly or 
consciously in our roles as social workers (Reamer, 1993; pp.62-63). Do social 
workers take a “paternalistic” view of the client; claiming that the client needs help and 
we are the expert who knows what help it is that they need regardless o f what the 
client’s view is of this help?
Decisions about “illness” of a client are closely associated to the view, or 
perspective, that we as social workers know what “mental illness” is, that a decision by 
a client to commit suicide is the product of a ‘sick’ mind and needs our intervention to 
stop the client from making this decision (Reamer, 1993 p.52) yet by other views, this 
decision is not the province of anyone outside the individual who is making the decision 
about him/herself (Hillman, 1964; Szasz, 1986). What kind of problems social workers 
see the client to have (regardless, sometimes, of the client’s own perspectives) 
determine what treatment provisions are made or whether assistance is given 
(Gitterman, 1991; Reamer, 1993; pp. 59, 63).
What kind of free will do social workers allow to clients? Do clients see 
themselves as having free will or do they see their lives as determined by some fate 
(Reamer, 1993; p.60)? How do workers contribute to a client’s sense o f helplessness 
through our accommodating “their needs” through our (rather than their) perspective 
of what those needs are? There is, in social work currently, a focus in client self- 
determination or “empowerment” (Gutierrez, GlenMaye, & DeLois, 1995;
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Pinderhughes, 1983; Reamer, 1993) but do social workers facilitate empowerment or 
are they seen by the client as a further cause of their ill fate? Do we tell ourselves that 
our clients misfortune was due to his drug use and he couldn’t help it or do we allow 
that he could have made different choices? And what decisions do we make about him 
at this choice point relative to services rendered’
What perspective do social workers have on our own system of ethics/morality’ 
Do social workers have illusions that we must shed about our clients and ourselves?
Do we take the modem view that the client is trying to rip the system off for all s/he 
can (Bauman, 1993; p.30; Handler, 1993) or do we take the postmodern view that the 
client is only taking what is needed to survive (Handler, 1993; p.48). Do social 
workers make decisions based on our perceptions o f what the clients best interests are 
in our perspective, modeling a modem view (Bauman, 1993; p.27), or, taking the 
postmodem view, allow that the clients decisions are the best they can make at the time 
(ibid, p. 47)? Do we take the modem view that the poverty stricken are unable to be 
different (Bauman, 1993; Mincy, 1994; Heclo, 1994) or do we take the postmodem 
view o f self-creating selves (Bauman, 1993, p. 72) able, with access to resources, to 
make good decisions based on these resources? What are our views as social workers 
about how and who has the power o f distributing the available resources?
The elements o f the philosophical groundwork described above become part of 
a project aimed at the fullest understanding of the underlying cognitive elements within 
a theoretical knowledge structure that supports abuses o f social power whether 
knowingly or unknowingly. The debate o f postmdemity with modernity in the rational-
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critical forum of communicative interaction brings forward for inspection many of the 
presupposed and therefore sometimes hidden abuses o f social power built into the very 
frameworks designed to question these abuses. Elements of knowledge derived from 
existing knowledge bases utilized in the construction of new knowledge bases, such as 
in social work and related fields, may be questioned by the individual social worker 
interested in generating knowledge free from social power abuses. Part of how this 
occurs is through the acknowledgment by the social worker that the knowledge 
relevant to a given client/social worker dyad must be developed within that dyad with 
supplements coming from outside to compliment that local knowledge base. Decisions 
made require that the best interests o f the client served must be placed, ethically, ahead 
o f the interests of the social worker’s comfort or the auspices’ financial concems.
These are not simple situations to make decisions within and the impetus to take the 
easy, less personally conflicted way may be alluring. For example, when a client is 
encountered in practice whose personal hygiene is non-existent and the consequent is 
having to spend an unpleasant hour with this client, it may be more pleasant to shorten 
service contact time for that client and perhaps neglect to provide some vitally needed 
resource to that client. The social power exercised in that instance may be less visible 
and overt than in the case o f the domestic violence situation but it exists nonetheless.
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SOCIAL POWER
Social power was once thought to be mainly the province of the field of 
politics but is now being seen as more pervasive than that (Van Den Bergh & Cooper,
1995). There are representative theories about how power operates within each field 
of endeavor that social work commonly draws upon for information in knowledge 
construction including anthropology (Wilson. 1988), communication (Krippendorf. 
1991; 1994). law, (Hawkins. 1991) philosophy. (Foucault. 1972. 1977) politics 
(Benhabib. 1996). psychology. (Flanagan & Rorty, 1990) and sociology. (Lukes.
1990).
Here each of these variations on theories of power is surveyed to delineate 
effects on constructs of interest within each field covered by the scope of the current 
project. In a later section specific aspects of theories of power from within each of 
these fields will be highlighted as discussion centers on how ( 1 ) these theories meet 
with ethical restraints within each of the individual fields. (2) how these theories are 
affected by the modernity / postmodemity debate, and (3) how these theories might be 
reflected in social work “practice wisdom”. Here primary concem will be with general 
theories of power. In addition, the concept of “authority" will be explored with regard 
to how it functions as a middle or “marginal” term between power and individual
62
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“agents” affected by power. Also explored will be the concept o f the “margin” and the 
“marginal” and how the mediating process take place through these spaces. It is 
through this mediating process that power can privilege some and “marginalize” others.
Authority, Discretion and Decision Making
Authority is defined by R.B. Friedman (1990) as “power that is legitimized”
(p.60). As such the “authority” has assumed the license to act based on a set structure 
for distribution of the licensure it holds (Friedman, 1990). Authority is that middle 
term that mediates between the holder o f power and the agent whose actions are 
influenced by that power (Wolff, 1990). “Discretion” is the authority that acts as a 
middle term for the individual in his decisions to act in a certain way given a situation 
that has no rule to cover it (Hawkins, 1992). Decision making is integrally involved in 
the areas of both authority and discretion. This section will describe the relations 
between these three aspects of social power
Authority can be said to function through two main categories of media; 
organizational and individual. In the organizational category would be included 
bureaucratic (Hummel, 1994) and organizational (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). While 
most bureaucracies are also organizations, not all organizations function 
bureaucratically. The forms decision making takes and the ways discretion is used set 
some of the distinctions between these two aspects o f this level. In the individual 
category, “norms” of a community (Rae, 1988) or what Bordieu (1990) calls “habitus” 
or collective practices o f small groups o f  people who share a community cormection
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(Bordieu, 1990) exert influence over individuals. The final type is one of those varied 
modes of authority that one individual seeks to gain over another either granted by 
sovereignty of some sort (Finnis, 1990) or coercive force (Airaksinen, 1992). 
Individuals in all categories use or abuse discretion in some fi-om or fashion.
Discretion is identified by Hawkins (1991), writing in the legal field, as the 
“space, as it were, between legal rules in which legal actors may exercise choice” and 
he goes on to say that this capacity may be “formally granted or it may be assumed” 
(Hawkins, 1991, p. 11) .  The latter usage o f authority is fi’equently seen to abuse it’s 
discretionary ability to meet it’s own needs (Lane, 1988). Discretion, or the “space” 
that is called discretion, is on or between the margins of rule fi-ameworks. “Those who 
can no more rely on discretion need rules badly” (Bauman, 1993; p. 116). Authority,
(to be described below) also resident in this space between, acts sometimes to 
“institutionalize experience” through discretion about when to apply rules because lives 
and activities function more effectively when so structured (Feldman, 1991). Schneider 
( 1991 ) has identified four modes through which decision makers use discretion.
“Khadi discretion” which he notes is not a Western form, takes cases individually 
including “legal, ethical, emotional, and political considerations” (p.61). “Rule-failure” 
discretion is given to an authority when a situation exists which is seen as so complex 
rules cannot be imagined. “Rule-building” discretion applies to situations when 
authorities are seen to be capable of constructing better rules than those which 
currently exist in the situation approached. Finally, “rule-compromise” discretion 
passes decision making authority on to an individual when the decision making body is
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unable to come to agreement on the rules (Schneider, 1991; p.61-65). Throughout our 
discussion, we will be focusing on how authority, discretion and decision making occur 
within fields o f unequal power relations. Though these dynamics take form and are 
expressed through descriptions o f legal discourse, they are present and be applied to 
everyday professional activities, including social work, and not limited to the legal 
sphere.
Faces o f Authority
Here, the different forms of authority and how the problems authority may be of 
concem to social workers interested in becoming aware o f the functioning o f social 
power in social work research and practice will be discussed. A description o f the 
bureaucratic mode o f authority which many social workers work both under and 
through in everyday tasks is given. Hummel (1994) relates that bureaucracy imposes 
it’s structure on the individuals involved with it in six ways; “socially, culturally, 
psychologically, linguistically, cognitively and politically (Hummel, 1994; p. 5).
Socially and culturally, bureaucracy attunes itself only to those aspects o f reality that 
have been given recognition as being parts o f policy. Purportedly, this is the way that 
organizational social action is organized in ways so that it can be measured responsibly. 
Individuals go through “socialization” to internalize organizational “norms, values, and 
attitudes” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 14-15). Psychologically and cognitively, 
bureaucrats may seem to their clients (and even to themselves) to be “headless and 
soulless” (Hummel, 1994, p.5) and frequently may be confused as to where their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
bureaucratie and real selves differ. Patterns of “values” are rationally decided upon and 
become part o f  an indoctrination to a bureaucratic milieu (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
p 17). Linguistically, the terms used within the organization seem to outsiders to be 
imbued with a secret mode of meaning inaccessible to them. “Their discussion is 
punctuated with multiple and diverse examples o f potential sources of rationalized 
myths: public opinion, educational systems, laws, courts, professions, ideologies, 
technologies...” (Scott, 1991, p. 167) and the list goes on. “Bureaucratic language is 
power language... ” (Hummel, 1994; p. 16) and bureaucratic users assume that clientele 
must listen to them as if their voice was law
Regardless of the field or academic discipline, there is an organization which 
maintains the interests of the field; whether this is in the practical application of the 
field’s knowledge to it’s topic matter or as a progenitor of theoretical discourse. There 
are organizational structures that are not bureaucratic in their approach to those who 
they interact with. The new literature describes how organizations are now looking in 
different directions to promote change that benefits not only themselves but asks 
questions like ‘“ if organizations structure so closely how individuals think and act, how 
does institutional change occur’” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; p.28)? Rather than the 
slow moving ways we are used to seeing bureaucracies’ actions take, the new 
organizations may have to implement “big bang” decisions where everything about the 
previous structure the organization carried is changed in record time in response to an 
external event (Manning, 1991). Policy decision making, previously inextricably linked 
to values generated by the bureaucracy, may become associated with the more personal
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values (Dunn, 1993) o f a specific visionary CEO. Regardless of the type, organizations
express influence through some measure o f authority.
The first of two relatively individual levels o f authoritative influence we will
highlight will involve that structured by what Bordieu (1993) calls “habitus.”
DiMaggio & Powell (1991) outline four aspects of this “habitus” theory o f influence.
“First, it provides an alternative account to role theory of the differentiation of 
cognitive understandings and behavioral norms along social-structural lines. 
Second, it moves beyond the Freudian imagery of “internalization” to posit a 
generative grammar of strategic behavior, rooted in but not fully determined by 
the past. Third it is multidimensional in two senses: pointing to a substantive 
theory of practical evaluation rooted in differences in the habitus o f class 
factions; and providing an account of “rational” strategies o f action as 
themselves institutionalized. Fourth, it offers an alternative solution to the 
Parsonian problem o f the allocations o persons to social positions (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; p.26).”
Bordieu (1990) says that the “habitus” produces and reproduces schemes and practical 
activities based on the history of the ways the constituents of these schemes and 
activities have been evaluated and understood in the past. He maintains that it inscribes 
an “active presence o f past experiences” in order to insure that the ways thing were 
done in the past as the ways things are done now (Bordieu, 1991; p.54). This pattern 
parallels Eliade’s (1965) idea o f an “eternal return” where the original pattern o f action 
for a culture is set down in it’s mythology and every subsequent generation must do the 
thing, usually some ritual activities, the ways they were done in the past in order to 
participate with the divinity in the act o f creation (Eliade, 1965).
The final individual mode of authority occurs when an individual is given a right 
to do something by a “power-holder,” an individual in possession o f a position that
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allow her the ability to grant such rights to others, as when one is in the position of 
“expert” or “specialist” who, through some special knowledge, has been privileged to 
act, or ratify actions o f others. As mentioned before, this authority can be legitimate or 
it can be illegitimate yet claimed to be legitimate (Raz, 1990; p.2). It lies within the 
purview o f the decisionmaker how this discretion affects legitimacy.
Faces o f Discretion 
Discretion is inevitably tied up with matters o f decisionmaking (Manning,
1991), it is an “act of choice” (Feldman, 1991; p .167). We follow Feldman (1991) in 
defining discretion “as the legitimate right to make choices based on one’s authoritative 
assessment o f  a situation. As such, discretion is an exercise o f authority” (Feldman, 
1991; p. 164). Decisionmaking theories span the range o f fields of endeavor we survey 
in this project including social work (Rooney, 1992), anthropology (Bordieu, 1990), 
communication (vanDijk 1994), law (Hawkins, 1991), philosophy (Broadie, 1994), 
politics (Kymlicka, 1990), psychology (Fischoff, 1988) and sociology (Homans, 1987). 
Two orientations can be delineated within decision theories; utilitarian or behavioral 
modes (Fischoff, 1988) and what, for lack o f a better term, could be described as 
evaluative modes (Frankfurt, 1988; Taylor, 1985). The behavioral/utilitarian modes 
focus on things such as level of certainty, “subjective expected utility,” and rationality 
(Fischoflf, 1988; p. 154). Evaluative frames o f reference take into consideration more 
than the value o f the outcome to individual interests, our certainty about having 
considered all the options and whether or not our decisions were rational. This mode
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looks at the reality o f uncertainty, emotionality, and the locality and specificity of need 
for the kinds o f evaluations that are made whether these are “strong” or “weak”
(Taylor, 1985; v. 1, p.33). These two strands of decision theories may inscribe the 
modem and postmodern discourses respectively in this aspect o f these issues.
The use o f  discretion in decision making is as structured by rules as it is 
functional between the delineations of those rules (Baumgartner, 1991). Discretion 
comes into play in the interpretation o f rules as well as in their exercise and this is the 
location o f  their arbitrariness. Discretion has been identified as an open area encircled 
by a set o f  restrictions (Schneider, 1991). Discretion is “subjective” justice where rules 
are “formal.” Justice can be arbitrary, such as when not related to formal ends, and 
power can be exercised illegitimately, even by legitimated decisionmakers, resulting in 
potentially intrusive behavior by institutional authority (Baumgartner, 1991; Hawkins, 
1991b). Discretion can operate in the choices between “courses o f action and inaction” 
(Hawkins, 1991b). Much of the policy making in bureaucratic structures is focused on 
how decisionmakers structure future decisionmaking policy. Policy, in this sense, is the 
set o f rules structuring the activity of discretion itself (Hawkins, 1991b; p 28). What 
happens to those who fall between the rules; the “hard cases” (Dworkin, 1985)? What 
happens when individuals fall into the marginal areas?
Decision making by social workers is a critical part of social work practice. 
Authority and discretion in decision making can easily be taken for granted by those 
individuals endowed with their usages. A clear image o f what processes are at play 
with these concepts can provide for a social worker taking into account the perspective
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o f  the client population affected by the result o f the decisions made. Sometime the 
bureaucracy constrains the social worker to being able to make only one kind of 
decision in a given set of circumstances. What reality is possibly missed by that 
bureaucratic structure with regard to the effects of it’s policy enforcements by a social 
worker, which, if recognized by the social worker, can be questioned and even changed 
to eliminate an abusive type of decision making policy? Can the social worker in the 
situation advocate for the client population to help the bureaucracy change a policy 
dictate that marginalizes an individual client or client population?
Margins/Marginalizations
Authority is a term occupying the “margin” between epistemology, ethics and 
social power. It’s activity resides in the “intellectual space” (Bauman, 1993; p. 146) 
that occupies the “between” of these concepts. Another term occupying a “marginal” 
location is “discretion” which operates in the “space between legal rules” (Hawkins, 
1992; p. 11). It functions in the way of Heidegger’s “clearing” (Shatzki, 1992; p.81) for 
assisting in understanding the workings o f authority and discretion. We use the term 
“marginal” in Derrida’s (1982) sense because it conveys minutiae o f meaning not 
available prior to it’s appearance. We use Derrida’s term marginal also because it 
begets another o f his terms; “differance” which also applies to the relation that 
“authority” has to epistemology and social power. “Differance” implies, for Derrida, 
both a differentiation from and a deference for the closely associated other terms 
(Derrida, 1982; p.8). We also use differance in it’s connection to margin in it’s
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activities of “movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation,
.. .referral, detour, postponement...” (Derrida, 1981; p. 8) because this kind of 
movement describes the ways power “marginalizes” (Ferguson, 1990) as well as 
privileging (Furr, 1995) certain individuals and groups. This marginal area where 
power operates via authority or discretion through differance has remained mostly 
unlocated and undescribed, though the activities of power and the ways power 
marginalizes have been well described (Ferguson, Gever, Minh-ha & West, 1990). By 
use o f this term we most accurately associate all three terms as they interact with each 
other in our usage of them in language.
So what is the point of delineating this marginal space? According to Ferguson 
(1990), if power continues to work from this “hidden place” (Ferguson, 1990; p.9) then 
it continues to operate as it currently does in it’s activities of marginalization and 
oppression. Yet, it could become open to exposure and exploration if those structural 
dynamics which keep it hidden are no longer in place (Bordieu, 1991). The concept of 
the margin and the movement that takes place therein called differance also suggest for 
Derrida a questioning o f the “authority of presence” and of the “limits which constrain 
us” (Derrida, 1982; p. 10). Although Derrida is speaking of language as Being this 
questioning can also be applied to the language that conveys power. Bourdieu (1991) 
holds that the domination language holds over us though it’s constructive capacity will 
cease to do so only when this capacity is brought “to light” and “the intellectulist 
philosophy which treats language as an object of contemplation rather than an 
instrument of power . ..” acknowledges this (Bordieu, 1991; p.37). As long as power
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can operate invisibly, it can continue to operate indefinitely. When it can be questioned 
at that choice point o f a discretionary decision, especially by a dynamic o f self­
questioning, where it operates in the margin as discretion or authority, then it begins to 
become visible and amenable to change. The affects o f shifting from a pattern of 
relatively unreflective or akratic decision making, to a more reflective one can have an 
impact on the whole system, whether intellectual or social, that this pattern operates 
within.
Deconstruction and Marginal Terms 
We will try to establish elements o f the “general system” (Gasche, 1987) that 
will help establish the mobile contours or “ordered clusters of traits o f possibilities 
which in one and the same movement constitute and reconstitute systems” (Gasche, 
1987; p.7). Here, at the “margins” of the interaction between social power and it’s 
expressions in such outlets as social work practice or epistemology, exist the media for 
use and misuse of social power. At this juncture it is necessary to expand on Gasche s 
notion o f the ‘general system’ and extend it to it’s potential parallel in social systems by 
means o f the social theorist Niklas Luhmann. While Gashe’s analysis pertains primarily 
to intellectual systems, the structure and dynamics described fit closely enough to 
Luhmann’s social systems description to be functionally applicable. The social system 
can be conceived of as an “iteration that is not a reiteration” (Bauman, 1993; p. 103); a 
habitus repeated on a macrosystemic scale. Luhmann’s (1995) Social Svstems 
delineates a postmodern idea of systematicity that retains the modem characteristic of
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universality. He describes a system concept which might provide a pattern for a non-
abusive postmodern social power to operate through. It is a network o f separate but
interconnected relations that reflect postmodern “localist” views of society. His system
exemplifies the notion of systematicity and could be complimentary to a social work
frame o f reference. It combines the views of micro, meso and macrosytemic
perspectives into one simultaneously interactive view. Knodt’s (1995) succinct
description delineates his idea;
“Luhmarm lays out a theoretical groundwork which subsequently provides for a 
description of modem society as a complex system of communications that has 
differentiated itself horizontally into a network of interconnected social 
subsystems. Each of these subsystems reproduces itself recursively on the basis 
o f  it’s own, system specific operations. Each of them observes itself and it’s 
environment, but whatever they observe is marked by their unique perspective, 
by the selectivity o f the particular distinctions they use for observations. There 
is no Archimedian point from which this network could be contained in an all- 
embracing vision. And yet—and this is perhaps Luhmann’s most controversial 
proposition—the theory o f  social systems, like any “supertheory,” insists on the 
universality o f it’s claims. This is not to say that the theory claims an exclusive 
right to some ultimate, non-contingent truth, but that it must account for the 
self-implicative nature o f  it’s own observations: a general theory of social 
systems must deal with everything social, including itself as a contingent part of 
the reality it describes. (Knodt, 1995; p.xii)
This concept o f the “margin,” then, becomes most important to tfiis endeavor as we
seek to establish that there are these points o f meeting between what is called “social
power” and what is called “epistemology” within and between these subsystems as well
as what is inside and outside o f these margins. In addition, it is important to the project
o f  finding the location and characteristics o f the limitations social power and ethics
impose on each other. Derrida poses the issue: what “compels us to count in it’s [the
topic] margin more or less than one believes is said or read” ? (Derrida, 1982; p.xxiv).
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What parts of our social power come from the knowledge base we have? What parts
o f the construction o f that initial knowledge base were founded on some individual’s or
group’s social power? It is at this point that the technique o f “deconstruction” comes
into play. The intent of deconstruction is to bring ‘to light’ that which is hidden in the
presuppositions (hidden in the margins); for Derrida, the presuppositions o f literature
and philosophy, for us the presuppositions o f knowledge and what it enables power to
utilize. Our definition of deconstruction derives from Rodolphe Gasche (1987)
Deconstruction must be understood, we contend, as the attempt to “account,” 
in a certain manner, for a heterogeneous variety or manifold o f non-logical 
contradictions and discursive inequalities of all sorts that continues to haunt and 
fissure even the most succes^il development of philosophical arguments and 
their systematic exposition.... These dissimilarities are to be located, first, in 
concept-formation; second, on the level o f strategies o f philosophical 
argumentation; and third, on the level o f the textual arrangement and 
disposition o f  the different parts of a philosophical work. (Gasche, 1987; p. 4)
Our usage of the technical aspects of deconstruction will focus primarily on the first, to
a small extent on the second and not at all on the third modality described by Gasche.
Deconstruction takes up it’s task with the following premises; ( I)  philosophic
concepts, while being separate necessarily from other concepts, embody values that are
in opposition of sorts to other concepts with which they may be inextricably linked; (2)
different levels or modalities of concepts can self contradict as when a philosopher
argues in writing that writing is futile and speech is all (Gasche, 1987; p.4). Finally,
deconstruction is concerned with generation o f “minimal syntheses that regulate the
non-canonical and non-philosophical problems o f philosophical discourse...” (Gasche,
1987; pp.5-6). How frequently do we look for the logical inconsistencies in statements
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or practice decisions we make? How often do we make a different choice about the 
statement or the decision once we notice the inconsistency when it means we will have 
to do so in front o f our client or boss? How will it look for our authority if we do so? 
How is it looked upon by our clients or our boss if we do so? In taking it to 
Luhmann’s scale, how do the parts of the system claim they work together and yet 
refuse to monitor their activity? How is this refusal expressed? How does it act to 
marginalize?
Reifying Terms?
“Reification” is, in philosophy, the “fallacy of taking abstractions and regarding 
them as actually existing entities that are causally efficacious and ontologically prior 
and superior to their referents” (Angeles, 1981; p.243). Reification is also known as 
the fallacy o f “misplaced concreteness” (ibid., p.243). Are the words we use to talk 
about the things we talk about equivalent to the things themselves? Is the individual in 
the culture different from our own a “savage” with only “prelogical mentality” (Levy- 
Bruhl, 1985)? Is Saddam Hussein the “ monster” the news media depicts him as or is 
this only an “intentional characterization” (Livingston, 1996)? Is the “criminal” really 
“culpable” for his crime or is his future now dimmed only by someone’s misguided 
legal construction of his reality (Dworkin, 1985; p. 72; Simester & Smith, 1996; p.8). 
Am ‘T ’ who I say I am or does my understanding of myself so differ from your 
understanding of who I am that it creates a problem in some interpersonal setting 
(Hyppolite, 1997)? Is an issue like the practice of “hazing” or sexual harassment in the
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military really against military code or does it only become so when it becomes 
politically public (Zizek, 1997)? Is the new “chronic fatigue syndrome” a discovery or 
is it the social construction of a psychological entity that has plagued overworked 
individuals from time immemorial (Jordan et al., 1997)? Do “classes” in society 
actually have structures or are these structures only in the minds o f the observers doing 
the research on them (Giddens, 1982)'’ In each case above, the label as referent is 
applied to the individual and decisions are made based on the meaning o f the referent. 
How do social policies marginalize through social construction, those populations that 
are “margianlized” (Ferguson, 1990)? How is it that society can deny the generation of 
patterns o f dominance on the one hand and supply justifications for them on the other 
hand (Hartsock, 1983)? These questions range from the extreme to the more subtle 
and represent more the cross section of the diversity of the fields they come from than 
any claim to complete representativness. They represent only a small sampling o f the 
ways in which the objects of our study come under the influence of individual social 
constructions of reality. They also may be taken to show how far social science 
professionals have come in regards to self awareness of our own epistemic 
ethnocentricity. We return to the question, how do our policies marginalize their 
intended recipients? Does this occur through the process o f treating individuals as 
equivalent to the labels they have accumulated?
Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993) relates that “people want policy to be informed 
and well analyzed, perhaps correct or scientific, yet they also want policy making to be 
democratic and hence necessarily an exercise o f power” (Lindblom & Woodhouse,
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1993; p. 7). Throughout the process o f this activity, values come into focus. Which 
labels come to have value? Whose values hold the upper hand in any given decision is 
always a matter of what might be called a “discourse coalition” or some collective body 
o f  decision makers that hold to the same idea or “construct” (Hajer, 1993). As long as 
an administrative bureaucratic body, such as our agency “auspices, holds a given 
construct as primary (such as the medical model of client “pathology”) and hold the 
keys to “manipulating the political power bases o f the organization in imposing that 
knowledge...” (Hummel, 1994) the value structures will be slow to change. Until 
organizations can implement within their structures ways to “constrain the inclination 
and the capacity of actors to optimize as well as privilege some groups whose interests 
are secured by prevailing rewards and sanctions.. . ” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) those 
groups who are currently being marginalized through this reification process will 
continue to be marginalized through this mode o f social power exercise.
Postmodern thinkers have been significant in creating new lenses through which 
to see old structures o f interaction in which social power is functioning. The 
dichotomies o f thinking established and maintained by some modem philosophical 
categories kept the workings of social power “hidden” from view of those not 
participating in this power usage. It is necessary to utilize these new lenses to locate 
the ways in which misuses o f authority and discretion occur in order to have access to 
challenge these misuses through the critical communicative approach. Social workers 
are familiar with client populations o f individuals who have been “marginalized” 
through race, gender or creed and will be able to utilize some of the postmodern lenses
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to enable themselves to “deconstruct” social power abuses and assist clients in 
returning to self determining status.
Conceptualizing Social Power
So how is it that one individual or group of individuals become marginalized? 
What necessarily must be the state o f affairs within which this occurs*’ We have stated 
above that social power acts in a covert manner through discretional authority to 
enforce this marginalizing tendency. Here, the arena of social power we will be 
concerned with is outlined concisely by A. I. Goldman (1972); “the domain of power is 
not confined to the political realm, narrowly conceived; employers have power over 
employees, and teachers have power over students” (Goldman, 1972; p.221) as well. 
While Goldman has outlined the broad contours of the field, or portion thereof we will 
focus on, we will look to A. Kemohan (1989) for a description of some o f the forms 
expressions o f social power takes. Following J. K. Galbraith, (1983) he classifies 
power as;
condign power which includes physical force and negative sanction, 
compensatory power, which includes inducement and incentive, and 
conditioned power,. . . which not only affects the final outcome o f a person’s 
choices, but also the process of choosing itself the site of human agency. 
(Kemohan, 1989; p. 712)
These forms of expression of social power are interwoven through the o f theories of
social power we will overview. The survey we undertake will determine where each
theory grounds authority in some reference to knowledge.
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Thomas Wartenberg ( 1992) outlines a “situated concept of power” which 
includes a model of a social field of interaction within which a social dyad functions.
His concept includes the peripheral social agents and their responses to the dyadic 
agents as well as their power relation to each other. An example of this would be the 
teacher-student dyadic structure which involves the teachers power to evaluate a 
student and a peripheral social other’s use of the teacher’s evaluation of the student to 
empower or disempower the student as a result o f that evaluation. The focal point is a 
“differential structure o f orientation” that the peripheral social agents use to empower 
by alignment of themselves with one or another of the dyadic members. But whose 
preferences are met by the student/teacher interaction? Is the teacher constrained by 
social policy to act in the student’s favor or on his own?
One answer to this question can be clarified by an analysis of the field both 
individuals are situated in. J.G. March (1988) claims there is a need to develop a 
measurement o f comparison of a field o f personal preferences which involves an 
assessment o f the “value distances” between alternative outcomes of differential 
interests o f given individuals being satisfied. There is an “intertemporal” element built 
into consideration of the interests o f “future citizens” while considering those of 
present citizens. These interests would constitute a field of interests wherein political 
action could be said to align with some interests while ignoring others. March calls this 
“preference pooling” and goes on to say this locates “a preference center o f society 
where those individuals with preferences close to the center would be said to have
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power while those individuals whose preferences are further from the center are 
marginalized and disempowered (March, 1988; p.65).”
These preference centers are located, recognized and developed through 
participation in “social processes of identity, learning and discussion”(ibid, p. 66). 
Society, in the above example, privileges the student on the basis of the teacher’s 
evaluation o f the student’s knowledge. But how does the individual utilize his own 
sense o f identity in ways that accommodate both her own needs and those o f society*’ 
Does the person develop this identity in a way that would take both views into 
perspective (Nagel, 1986) or does she only take her own perspective?
R. Lane (1988) delineates an “experiential” analysis o f power that provides a 
subjective framework for the understanding of power. In his theory, the “power 
holder” seeks some “good” in society. This good becomes in some way “addictive” for 
him. When decisional conflicts over “goods” come to the fore, say, through the 
information that what is considered as an individual “good” is not viewed by society in 
the same light, a dynamic called “post decisional dissonance reduction” occurs enabling 
the individual to allay conflict by rationalizing previous choices. If control o f  one’s 
subordinates is a good to an employer, control can become addictive. Rather than 
adjusting these expressions of control upon information from other sources that use of 
this control is excessive, the authority may simply justify future controlling behavior in 
order to maximize his own sense of good and reduce his dissonance.
In each o f these theories of the dynamics of social power, authority was 
associated with a reference to some authoritative position, whether this was an
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employment/educator position, a collective decision making body, or simply a 
hedonistic preference, and the knowledge implied to be associated with that position. 
Whose knowledge is privileged over that knowledge with which it competes? Whose 
social power does one person think it politically feasible to align with over another 
person? What level o f  personal awareness does an individual actor make decisions 
from?
Social Power and Authority 
Above we have elaborated how decisional discretion could be associated with 
and used either legitimately or illegitimately though authority in ambiguous or marginal 
situations. Here the focus is narrows to treat authority more exclusively. At this point 
we must attend to the caution of Lukes (1977) position that power is an “essentially 
contested concept” and merely draw some of the contours o f social power. Power is 
attributed to individual actors in their interactions with other individual actors. Power 
is attributed expression though direct and indirect modalities. Power affects cognitive 
and behavioral capacities o f individuals. Power may be expressed intentionally and 
unintentionally. Power is not limited to expression through interpersonal modes; it may 
be embedded in infrastructures (Lukes, 1977).
Authority is associated with social power through a number o f different 
perspectives Lukes (1990) calls (1) the “official” perspective, which includes State 
distributed relations, (2) an “unofficial” perspective, which is associated with the day to 
day administration o f  organizational or auspices policies, (3) a position which is
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described as being between the aforementioned two perspectives which can be seen by 
what is done rather than what is said will be done (Lukes, 1990; p.205). Those persons 
in the positions viewed consensually to be associated with authority are accorded social 
power.
R. B. Friedman (1990) describes the relationship between knowledge and 
authority as expressed by one person who defers to another person because s\he “is 
thought to have special knowledge” (Friedman, 1990; p.80) which is somehow not 
available to others. He points out that the essential component o f this view is the 
construance o f  differential availability of knowledge within a group o f persons of 
otherwise equal status. Something is construed by one individual (m) as being available 
to this privileged other person (t) due to some characteristic of his/her personality that 
potentiates to receipt of knowledge. It is the combination of this mysterious other 
thing in the personality of t with knowledge that requires that / be deferred to.
Lukes (1990) following Friedman, talks about consensus in this attribution of 
authority to another. Consensus is found because the shared ground is in regard to 
what constitutes authority as well as what constitutes knowledge; the knowledge and 
authority privileged by a given discourse coalition. Also, through consensus in 
maintenance o f the existing status quo, those whose interests are aligned with existing 
preference pool stand to gain more by support rather than resistance o f such activity. 
These frameworks are the dominant ideologies seen to be modem in character and 
which are challenged by postmodern discourse.
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Postmodem Power?
We have modem and postmodern versions o f metaphysics, ethics and 
epistemology but do we have a postmodern theory of power? Both modernity and 
postmodemity refer, usually in derogatory terms, to power and it’s effects, but they 
both refer primarily to the same activities and usages of power. While both 
perspectives offer altematives to how what is currently understood as power is utilized, 
neither offers a viable alternative to the power abuser for realizing his/her needs. Is 
there an altemative existing? What would a postmodern theory o f power look like*’ 
What would be required of the power abuser to shift from “abuse” in it’s definition of 
misuse of discretionary authority for personal gain to activities that meet his/her needs 
in non-abusive activities? Michel Foucault (1980) has made some suggestions; 
Mahatma Gandhi (1950, 1957) and Paolo Freire (1970, 1994) embody the kind of 
distributory framework that could be articulated into theory and practice. Although 
Foucault’s theories are present in the public sphere as generators of attention and 
controversy, Foucault operated within French intellectual spheres and was not as 
immediately faced by the realties of the kinds o f power Gandhi was and Friere were 
faced with. How could there be a synthesis o f these modes of power that would be 
accepted by one who currently abuses power? Is this even possible? Is it possible that 
if this proposed synthesis were available (i.e. articulated to and within the public 
sphere) that potential power abuses may be mitigated and detoured? Is it possible to 
marginalize, in some distant future, even the abuse of power itself? Perhaps not, but to 
move in that direction is necessary.
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Foucault’s (1982) conclusion is that “the political, ethical, social, philosophical 
problem o f our day is not to try and liberate the individual from the state, and from the 
states institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type o f 
individualization which is linked to the state” ( p. 216). Foucault (1982) differentiates 
between “power relations”, “relationships o f communication” and “objective 
capacities” . Yet, he maintains, there are “blocks in which the adjustment o f abilities, 
the resources o f communication and power relations constitute regulated and concerted 
systems” ( p. 218). Power is manifest differently through these three aspects of 
interaction and is not preventative of consent between aspects. More directly, it is 
“action upon actions of others” (p.220). As such, it maintains the cognizance of 
freedom as accounted to these acting agents. A situation where activity by one agent is 
“determined” by another is not seen as a power relations. Foucault points the way to 
balancing such relations. He outlines four aspects that must be considered, I ) “The 
system o f differentiation” which facilitates action of one agent on another including 
class, economic, cultural and knowledge privileging distinctions; 2) “Types of 
objectives”, those exercising power engage intentionally; 3) “The means of bringing 
power relations into being”, which are modes of knowledge, military forces, informal 
political systems; 4) “Forms of institutionalization. .” such as societal structures o f law 
and observation and, 5) The degrees of rationalization...” it is elaborated, transformed, 
organized; it endows itself with processes which are more or less adjusted to the 
situation” (p. 223-224). Using the frameworks Foucault has elaborated is it possible to 
establish whether a specific context is imbalanced in one direction or another.
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Ideological constraints can be superseded, socialization can be restructured and 
interpersonal activities modified.
Gandhi believed in the ability o f men as individuals to see a set o f options once 
they were made available and choose from among them the one which followed most 
closely to a path o f Truth. Gandhi's work as a Barrister in England led to his standing 
up for the rights o f individuals and collective bodies o f persons in India and Africa in an 
effort to balance unequal power relations between individuals and between individuals 
and governments. Gandhi (1957) described events he was involved in as well as 
circumstances surrounding them for the individuals that were affected by these events 
including those institutions responsible for the situations coming about and in order to 
make his actions within those situations intelligible to those he opposed. His final 
effect was to balance power relations between two groups o f individuals in an 
oppressive relationship. Michel Foucault’s (1972) view of power relationships is 
embodied in and by a distribution of knowledge through discourse in a network 
structure and presents us with an engaged mode of power relations; discourse requires 
that there be an exchange between at least two persons, each view being accorded 
equal validity, not a disengaging, distancing mode as that which operates in oppressive 
as well as other relationships. Gandhi worked for just such mode of balancing power 
through the activity o f  education; both of individuals and groups.
The method Freire (1970) describes, that he uses in South American 
communities, parallels Gandhi's activity in India. Freire begins his educative process by 
exploring the worldviews o f his students directly.
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The investigation of what I have termed the people's thematic universe" - the 
complex of their "generative themes"- inaugurates the dialogue of education ... 
the methodology of that investigation must likewise be dialogical, affording the 
opportunity both to discover generative themes and to stimulate people's 
awareness in regard to these themes... the object o f the investigation is not 
■persons...but rather the thought language with which men and women refer to 
reality, the levels at which they perceive that reality, and their view of the world 
within which their generative themes are found, (p.78)
This paragraph sums up all the basic attributes which I think can be applied to social
work settings to ensure power abuses do not occur. When these settings are
approached through an understanding of Foucault's revision of power relations, and
Gandhi’s example of activist conflict resolution we may find increased effectiveness in
dealing with power abuses. By bringing these three perspectives together we move in
the direction of integration of theory and practice so necessary to social work (Tucker,
Garvin & Sarri, 1997) that could be considered in formulation of a model for individual
praxis which prioritizes balancing power relations.
Social power is a major factor in the person-environment equation affecting the
practice o f contemporary social workers. Social power, as a resource, is a factor of
existence many of the individuals, with which social workers meet daily, find lacking in
their lives. Frequently, these individuals have only experienced the negative outcomes
o f social power. Knowing the functioning of existing conceptualizations of systems of
social power, as well as potential altematives, can aid social workers in recognizing and
correcting abuses through creative restmcturing of conceptualization which may later
become functional systems themselves.
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To revisit the abused woman above; consider the possibility that she has just left 
the abusive situation with her children due to the abuse she was receiving. She then 
files for divorces and requests compensation, say, child support, that is legally hers, but 
she has no job skills because her abuser has not allowed her to work. The abuser, 
being the wage earner, has access to an attorney and through this attorney, convinces 
the court that she is an unfit mother and that he should have the children. This is not 
because he wants them but because it is another way to attack her. The court does not 
see the latter (it is not a “visible” power abuse) but grants the abuser his petition on the 
“facts.”
It is necessary to in some way describe the diflferent potential manifestations o f 
the uses and abuses o f social power to work toward making the specifics o f the 
dynamics described above open to question. When these dynamics can be opened to 
question they can then provide a “clearing” or social workers to advocate in new ways 
to assist clients in managing the potential negative experiences of social power abuses. 
Seeing how authority and discretion come together in a technically just but practically 
destructive (in this case for the mother and her children) manner provide the impetus to 
move toward advocacy that would provide information to the legitimate authority and 
end the potential for occurrence of the sort of abuse described above.
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SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE
This final section weaves together (hopefully) the strands developed in part 
above. It begins by delineating a notion of the “public sphere" derived primarily from 
Jurgen Habermas ( 1984. 1987.1989. 1993) and commentators on his work on the 
public sphere (Benhabib. 1992; Calhoun. 1992) supplemented by other perspectives 
(Bauman. 1993; LeFebvre. 1991). A notion of social work’s public sphere will be 
differentiated from the notions about the general public sphere through descri%)tions of 
the relative activities (Calhoun. 1992; Benhabib. 1992; Wamke. 1995) that social 
work is concerned with in a public sphere. Then follows a description of activities 
more closely associated with a “communication community” (Apel. 1980) and the 
kinds of “discourse analysis” that could take place there (Bordieu. 1991; Calhoun. 
1995; Dunn. 1993; Fraser. 1992 McCarthy. 1992). How the themes described above 
from metaphysics and ethics combine to produce epistemological discourse within a 
social work communication community will be discussed.
Next, in the section on epistemology. will follow a description of the 
characteristics of that communication community. Above a communication 
community has been designated that consists of representatives of the fields of 
anthropology, communication, law. philosophy, politics, psychology, and sociology.
88
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As the philosophical themes of modemity/postmodemity have been discussed above, 
no further analysis of this field will occur here. Those perspectives will continue to 
provide critical frameworks of the other fields. The issue of “pluralism" ( Rescher. 
1993) and how it would effect consideration of input from other fields will be 
discussed. A limited selection of the literature from each of these fields will be 
surveyed to determine the ways these fields express the themes of power and ethics. 
The meeting places of these two perspectives will be explored with regard to 
constructs o f immediate interest to social work. An attempt will be made to delineate 
which types o f discourses are privileged within these fields in order to clarify what 
kinds of themes affect social work practice.
Finally, in the last section on social work and social power we will pursue a 
course of social work “discourse ethics” and attempt to describe this course from a 
number of different perspectives including but not limited to Habermas. ( 1990. 1993). 
Apel. ( 1980). Honneth. ( 1995). We will attempt to integrate this discourse ethics with 
Schon’s ( 1983) framework of a “reflective practitioner” and Nielson's ( 1996) “politics 
of ethics” as they apply within organizational structures such as those encountered in 
social work relationships. We will use the work of Robert Kegan ( 1982. 1994) to 
delineate the issues associated with the evolution of moral judgement of a reflective 
practitioner as s/he generates knowledge for social work practice. Different levels of 
the issues which social workers and their clientele are affected by and which they 
affect with everyday decisions will be explored.
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Social W ork In the Public Sphere
Lefebvre ( 1991 ) points to the necessity to define the notions of space we seek 
to put into use. Above we have delineated that space called the “margin” by Derrida 
(1982) in order to put it to use in our descriptions of the location of the meeting of 
power and ethics. That space above had the nature of the Heidegerean “clearing” or 
that “space or realm of illumination in whose light things can show or manifest 
themselves to people ...” (Schatzki, 1992; p.81). And yet even when things become 
clear, decisions must be made in the moment by a decision maker. This idea of the 
“public sphere” we will develop will function in a similar way to allow a location of 
“clarity” to arise. Lefebvre designates a “social space” that “is not a thing among other 
things, nor a product among other products: rather, it subsumes things produced and 
encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity” and yet it 
“permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others. 
Social space implies a great diversity of knowledge” (Lefebvre, 1991; p.73). Bauman 
(1993) says this social space encompasses “a complex interaction of three interwoven, 
yet distinct, processes - those o f cognitive, aesthetic and moral spacings - and their 
respective products” (p. 145). Each of these spaces is “constructed” differently; the 
cognitive through “acquisition and distribution of knowledge;” the aesthetic through 
“affective” considerations; and the moral through a “distribution of felt/assumed 
responsibility” (p. 146). The public space to be designated here will not be so wide in 
scope as that described by LeFebvre but will certainly include the diversity of 
knowledge he mentions and some of those elements outlined by Bauman. Calhoun’s
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(1992) synopsis of Habermas (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere will be utilized in the description that follows unless otherwise noted. This 
public sphere was originally a masculine gendered, primarily political space wherein 
individuals from the “educated, propertied” population carried on “discourse” which 
excluded less fortunate others as well as their interests. This sphere gradually 
expanded to include both a wider range of interests and non-elite classes o f individuals 
into the discourse. Habermas saw the main importance of this public sphere in it’s 
ability to provide a location for social integration of “rational-critical discourse” which 
was separate from the “state” interests as well as from the “private realm” of the family. 
It became the location to bring into recognition the interests o f “organizations created 
for sustaining life” as matters for “public discussion” (Calhoun, 1992; pp. 1-16). At it’s 
height, it included four significant elements: (I) that members not only not worry about 
equality of status but “disregarded status altogether....” (2) the discussion included the 
“problematization” of issues that had remained previously unquestioned, (3) it included 
among it’s ranks any o f those individuals who had access to reading materials, could 
formulate and express opinions on the specific topics of interest and (4) it established 
itself as “accessible” to potentially all of the public individuals (Habermas, 1989: p. 36- 
38). Benhabib (1992) outlines elements o f two other models o f the public sphere 
which she contrasts with Habermas’ model and which will be of interest to our project. 
She maintains that all o f these spaces “become sites o f power, of common action 
coordinated through speech and persuasion” (Benhabib, 1992; p 78). She notes that
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even the topics included in the discourse are matters decided by power. Lyotard,
(1988) has pointed out that discourse o f some communication communities can be seen 
even to structure the topics in terms such that dissenting views have no way to argue 
about the differences (Lyotard, 1988; pxii). The ways to define or “predefine” 
(Benhabib, 1992) differences are eliminated by the linguistic rule structures generated 
and perpetuated by the “habitus” (Bordieu, 1980, 1991) dominant in power. She 
maintains that the content of the discourse in not as important as the means to go about 
the arguing. What is necessary is “reflexive questioning o f issues by all those affected 
by their foreseeable consequences and the recognition o f their right to do so (Benhabib, 
1992; p 81). Fraser (1992) relates that this public sphere was conceptualized as one 
mode of brining the state to account for it’s actions before the citizenry. She relates 
that though this was the ideal, the reality was that the public sphere described by 
Habermas was gendered in it’s self formulations and much more exclusive than the 
ideal. Fraser would seek to redefine what was considered “public” as inscribing 
marginalizing tendencies built into the ideology of a “bourgeois, masculinist 
conception” of the public (Fraser, 1992). Fraser acknowledges that while the ideal 
openness has not occurred thus far, it remains a potential for a pluralized community of 
“subaltern counterpublics” including “discursive arenas where members of subordinated 
social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional 
interpretations o f their identities, interests and needs” (Fraser, 1992, p. 123). Bordieu 
(1991) describes how the power of domination is inscribed within the language used to
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carry on discursive relations and that the only way to make these dominating practicing 
visible is by “bringing to light the operations o f object construction” that are 
perpetuated linguistically (Bordieu, 1991; p.38). Social workers engaged in generation 
of practice wisdom for inclusion in the public sphere can establish a sort o f  self 
reflexive communication community to work towards this.
Social Work’s Communication Community 
How could a public sphere composed o f a social work “communication 
community” contribute to this endeavor? How can social workers act as advocates of 
“subaltern” publics in the process of our generation o f knowledge and practice wisdom 
that become a recognized part o f an argument or discourse in the public sphere? Karl- 
Otto Apel (1980) holds that there is a “transcendental” groundwork for the very form 
defined as “argument” that presupposes a “communication community” that 
understands it’s premises. He fitrther holds that argumentative actions as such are not 
discernible outside o f the possibility that their teleological ends could not be evaluated 
by those who observed them. His “transcendental” groundwork would frame the 
activity o f argumentation or discourse, but not the constructs argued. Therefore, that 
action of evaluation, or the inscription of “values” into the “subjective-intersubjective” 
space between individuals is, in Derrida’s terms “always already” (Spivak 1976) present 
in the action o f argumentation (Apel, 1980; pp. 142-144). What kind o f values can we 
recognize in the discourse o f the communication community? Apel (1980) argues for a 
“universal ethics” on which to ground this discourse for needs that inevitably face
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mankind. McCarthy (1992) relates that even these needs themselves are structured by 
the contemporary values of given cultures. Ideally, he says, discourse in the public 
sphere will accord different interests similar accord in discussion and he goes on to 
designate the requirement to differentiate what constitutes general need from 
“subcultural” needs relative to definitions o f the “good life” or what M. Nussbaum
(1993) calls the “quality of life”. Discourse will allow questions o f general needs 
(values) to remain open to discussion and the language these issues are discussed in 
open to revision. The result will be that individuals “adopt a reflective attitude toward 
their own expressive manifestations” (McCarthy, 1992; p. 56) in order to become 
clearer about what their own values are and what decisions are made deriving from 
these values. McCarthy describes a “web o f informal communication” (p. 59) that 
organizes itself around mutual interests in order to address the problem of 
dissemination o f values relevant to society into the public sphere for further decision 
making to take place. This formulation parallels Hajer’s (1993) idea of a “discourse 
coalition” which is “basically a group of actors who share a social construct” (p.45) 
which they further bring to a wider populace through a number o f means including 
“debate and persuasion” (Hajer, 1993; p.48). These constructs arise within specific 
contexts and are comprised of “ideas, concepts and categories” through which they 
organize their discourse. These are the ways that social artifacts o f whatever 
formulation are socially constructed whether this be through knowledge dissemination 
in educational curricula, published books and periodicals, or reference materials used
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for projects such as this thesis. These social constructs or artifacts are embedded in the 
unspecified positions that the researchers assume when generating their research. Of 
primary importance to social workers is to recognize that when making our daily 
practice or research decisions, we must be aware what presuppositions are present and 
make these explicit minimally to ourselves, maximally to the populations we serve. In 
order to do this we must identify these presuppositions in social work research 
resources and recognize what forms they may take.
Sources of Social Work Knowledge 
Social work literature calls for an examination of research practices and the 
inputs to these research practices (Laird, 1995), as well as for an examination o f 
privileging procedures for the inputs to these practices (Furr, 1995; Tucker, 1996). A 
renewed attention is called to “boundaries;” sometimes to reassert the boundaries 
between social work and other disciplines (Abbott, 1995) and sometimes to relax those 
boundaries (Imbrogno, 1996; Laird, 1995; Tucker, Garvin and Sarri, 1997). We are 
reminded, as social workers, to be aware o f how we are affected by power 
(Pinderhughes, 1983, 1996) and to “reflect on knowing oneself ethically” (Abramson, 
1996; p. 195). The “epistemological subsystem” (comprised of all the inputs to 
“practice wisdom”) o f social work practice knowledge inputs interrelates with the 
“ideological subsystem” (which includes values, beliefs and attitudes) to affect decision 
making about specific practice decisions (Souflee, 1993; pp.317-330). One way of 
beginning to address these concerns is to determine first some of the fields that are
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drawn upon to influence social work’s values, beliefs and attitudes. The section begins 
with a review of the social work literature drawn from different social work 
specializations to determine the range of issues social work literature drawing on each 
of the separate fields explores. Very few articles were found to be exclusively 
dedicated to any one field of endeavor outside o f social work. A review of some o f the 
themes articles drawing on specific fields outside o f social work speak about follows. 
The scope o f this project does not allow for more than a representative sampling of 
social work periodical literature from which to draw for the purposes of this study.
Here focus is on the themes described above as relevant to social work endeavors.
Among the many issues that social workers draw upon anthropological 
scholarship for is the aspect o f cultural input into “meaning-making” (Pozatek, 1994). 
Though Western culture has it’s sources o f non-analytical meaning making, much of 
the current academic research in meaning making takes an analytical tone (Stich & 
Warfield, 1994). Social workers must be aware that other systems of meaning-making 
have greater value in cultures dissimilar to our own. Another issue of import is the 
issue o f “ethnic sensitivity” (Schlesinger, & Devore, 1995) which calls on social 
workers to be aware, through knowledge of a given culture, (Drower, 1996; Spencer & 
Markstrom-Adams, 1990) what kinds of values exist as values in that culture. Finally, 
while we look outside of our own culture when we think of anthropological studies, we 
have certain segments of the population, such as the gang culture (Molidor, 1996; 
Jankowski, 1991) or the homeless (Blau, 1992; Marin & Vacha, 1994) within our 
culture that represent separate cultures.
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Communication theory offers social work a wealth of theoretical knowledge to 
build on and make daily practice interventions (Nelson, 1984). Bateson (1972) from 
whom so many family therapy systems are derived, focused primarily on 
communications. Strategies for interacting with various client populations (Rooney, 
1992) rely on basic communication styles seeking to promote rapport, rather than 
curtail it, in the face o f values differences between clients and social workers. Decision 
making at community organizing meeting utilize communication strategies in order to 
get their information out and attain the highest level o f integration o f this information 
(Tropman & Momingstar, 1995).
Legal issues involving social workers include a recognized need to integrate 
“legal issues” into the education curricula for social work graduate programs (Kopels 
& Gustavsson, 1996) so that social workers will understand the processes o f legal 
reasoning. This addition will benefit not only social work practitioners but their 
clientele. Additionally, social workers would be well advised to have a greater 
understanding of their potential liabilities relative to practice decisions (Gelman,
Pollack & Auerbach, 1996; Reamer, 1994). These practice issues range from 
confidentiality issues (Alexander, 1997) of clients involving agency, court system or 
private practice to misconduct issues (Jayarante, Croxton & Mattison 1997).
Currently, philosophy’s primary input into social work processes come in the 
form o f  the aspects o f the modemity/postmdemity debate (Humphries, 1997; Smith & 
White, 1997) delineated above. Issues of power use and abuse, also delineated above, 
are matters o f concern (Hartman 1992; Pinderhughes, 1997). Critical theory, in the
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form o f Habermas’ ideas, also are represented in social work arenas (Dean & Fenby, 
1989; Kondrat, 1995).
Politics (the general category is used rather than “political philosophy,” 
“political science,” or “political theory” for simplicity’s sake) offers a number of 
different dimensions that are important. Some of the issues generated in the political 
arena are more encompassing in their effects on social workers and their client 
populations than all the other potential inputs mentioned above (Fisher, 1995). The 
movements o f social policy within the houses of government are determiners of where 
social workers can or cannot be enabled to provide for the welfare individual members 
of populations they serve (Barber, 1995; Gibson, 1997; LeGrand, 1997). Issues of 
public opinion frequently run congressional / senatorial policy making procedures 
(Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993) and result in shifts o f attitude with widespread 
political effect. Designations of “race,” “welfare” or “federal responsibility” are social 
constructions affected by research, public opinion, and power issues (Ewalt, 1996; 
Latting, 1990; Morris, 1993).
Psychology has by far the most voluminous input to social work literature. As 
psychotherapy in some form or another comprises a substantial part o f social work 
practice, much information is drawn from this field to apply to human behavioral 
understanding from the intersubjecive (Chescheir, 1995; Saari, 1995) to the 
interpersonal (Germain, 1994). Concerns are present about how practitioners and 
families construct their interpretations of the pathologies o f  those they interact with 
(Cutler, 1991; Mattiani & Kirk 1991; Raffoul & Holmes, 1986; Saari 1992). As
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psychology is as young a “science” as social work and new formulations o f  “pathology” 
and “causes” of illness incessantly change with new discoveries this is problematic area.
Sociology is the last main input to social work research that will be treated 
here. It is the primary source of the views about social construction (Goldstein, 1990) 
though many of these “constructivist” social workers look to the secondary sources for 
their ideas o f social construction (Berlin, 1996; Franklin & Jordan, 1995; Granvold,
1996). These constructivist perspectives are concerned with the issues o f  assessment 
(Franklin & Jordan, 1995) meaning (Berlin, 1996), psychotherapy (Granvold, 1996), 
and designations of strength or pathology (Goldstein, 1990). In addition, concerns 
about what constitutes a family (Berlin, 1996; Weik & Saleeby, 1995) are addressed. 
Analyses o f the development of “practice wisdom” (DeRoos, 1990; Klein & Blom,
1995) and knowledge construction process are also in the forefront.
Descriptions have been given above about how general social power dynamics 
interact with discretionary use o f sanctioned and unsanctioned authority in spheres 
outside of social work. Organizational dynamics obtain within milieu including 
academic, corporate, social scientific and non-social scientific settings. While 
separation between academic and organizational interests are maintained almost as 
religiously as the separation of church and state, influences still exist. The focus here is 
for social workers to keep all o f these dynamics in view along with their affective costs, 
while making decisions about knowledge generation. Social workers can be part o f a 
new forging of power relations through their modes of knowledge generation in the 
public sphere.
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Social work and Epistemology
One of the characteristics of power abuse is that it would seek to draw things to 
itself and distribute nothing. Therefore, one o f the ways to immediately shift this 
imbalancing will be to focus on redistributing that resource which is abused most by 
power; information (Bordieu, 1991; Mohan, 1996). One of the ways this may be done 
is to adopt a more “pluralistic” position with regard to what is acknowledged as valid 
input within a public sphere or communication community (Rescher, 1993). Social 
workers can allow for differences (Fraser, 1990; Lyotard, 1988; Fraser, 1990; Lyotard, 
1988; Young, 1990) to be recognized and accommodated instead of marginalizing.
The position taken here is that as social work tends to draw on a number o f fields for 
input to research/ knowledge construction (Mohan, 1996; Tucker, Garvin & Sarri,
1997), it will be beneficial for social workers to know how the groundwork o f 
philosophy outlined above as the modernity/ postmodemity debate, metaphysics, 
epistemology and ethics interact with conditions of power use or abuse. While 
Habermas ( 1990) looks to consensus within the communication community in order for 
there to be “rational” discourse , Rescher (1993) describes some of what he sees to be 
the problems with the practicality of this view. He maintains that rational consensus 
requires of the collective o f individuals that they all think about the same things in the 
same way given the evidence at their current disposal. The consensual view, he says, 
also requires an intersubjective objectivity that would be difficult to attain (Rescher, 
1993; p.51). He holds that individual’s decision making strategies are based on their 
integration o f incoming information and aligning their views to accommodate this
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incoming information with preexisting experience. He maintains that the results are not 
based on “intersubjectively invariant factors, but emerge from the reactions of 
individual agents proceeding on the basis of their personalized... backgrounds of 
experience” (Rescher, 1993; p.66). Rescher relates the idea that just as it is 
unreasonable to require a universal frame o f reference for all individuals to ground a 
“discourse ethics” neither is it reasonable to expect a universal frame o f reference for 
cross-disciplinary values and attitudes even (or especially) with regard to issues like 
power and ethics. Though Rescher’s cautions are valuable to heed, regarding content 
of information, it is Habermas’ and Apel’s positions on the framework for 
argumentative form consensus that will be aligned with here.
Authority and Values in Social Work Practice 
A survey o f  brief selections from the literatures of the separate fields used as 
inputs to social work knowledge bases serves to convey a sense of the relative 
directions themes take regarding topics of interest to social work. These will be the 
issues of power and ethics as they affect metaphysical (such as “minds & the mental”, 
“norms and values” or “free will”) or epistemological issues (such as “justification,” 
“beliefs” or “truth”) outlined above.
Among other issues, anthropology addresses that of “viewpoint” (Shokeid,
1997) including views of “self’ as it touches both field researcher (Wilson, 1988) and 
“the native’s point o f  view” (Geertz, 1984; Jones, 1970). Whose viewpoint must be 
the one taken with regard to what is “published” about the particular “culture” in
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question (Shokeid, 1997; Schweder, 1984; Wilson, 1988), the interviewer’s or the 
interviewee’s? Questions arise concerning how one justifies one’s own “belief’ about 
what is “true” for human beings across cultures (Bordieu, 1977, Mitchell, 1988; 
Schweder, 1984) relative to that of the individual within the culture one is studying. 
Interviews and the use the confidentiality extended to one (by individuals who were 
non-attendant to a “participant-observer” status of their interviewer) within the course 
o f the interviews one does to get information for ones research purposes (Mitchell, 
1988; Jones, 1970; Wilson, 1988) become a concern.
Communication spans a number o f applicable media relative to how power and 
ethics interact. Similar, and in connection to, the issue of perspective in anthropology, 
one theme centers on the issue of “whose voice gets heard” (Ellsworth, 1989;
Hubbach, 1989; Krippendorf, 1995; Tannen, 1995)? Tannen describes the ways that 
“linguistic style” privileges masculine self-referential communication styles over 
feminine associate-inclusive communication styles as the norm for organizational 
discourse (Tannen, 1995). Ellsworth relates that even the “pedagogy of 
empowerment” can still marginalize for race and gender (Ellsworth, 1989). Whose 
voices are represented in the “mass media” (Ferre, 1990; Self & Self, 1994; Thompson,
1994) and whose are silenced? Self & Self ( 1994) describe how computer software in 
multicultural settings privilege the perspectives o f one culture (ours, where the 
software was designed) over others in such things as “default language,” iconic 
referents, and computer keyboard labeling (Self & Self, 1994).
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Legal theory, among other issues, is concerned with aspects of norms (Fegan, 
1996; Salter, 1997), justifications of norms & values (Priban, 1997), abuses o f 
discretion (Nelken, & Levi, 1996), and social constructions of the “criminal” (Collier, 
1997; Simester & Smith, 1996), the family (Diduck, 1995), communities (Abel, 1995; 
Collier, 1997), and discourse about the justice o f theses issues (Chesterman, 1997; 
Priban, 1997; Salter, 1997). Norms here are designated in the guise of the “external 
conduct of individuals” (Salter, 1997) and therefore can be utilized by administrative 
bodies to marginalize individuals and communities who do not match some template 
(Abel, 1995). This justification of norms come through the “legislative process” 
(Salter, 1997) which assigns a value of “true” (Priban, 1997) to the position backing it. 
This power position must be questioned through an “interrogation of justice” 
(Chesterman, 1997) about it’s validity (Duff, 1996) and about it’s labeling “criminals” 
as “culpable” or not (Dworkin, 1985; Simester & Smith, 1996).
Political concerns focus on arguments about “notions of the common good” 
(Blitz, 1996; Palaver, 1995), “civic consciousness” and “free will” (Sandoz, 1996), 
ideologies and power (Weiss, 1997; Zizek, 1997) uses o f authority (Durrheim, 1997; 
Winant, 1997). In addition political foci are global (Kaarbo, 1997; Weiss, 1997) 
national (Hanus, 1996; Rosati & Creed, 1997) or more individual (Zizek, 1997) in 
focus. Notions of “the common good” are tied up with facets of, again, perspective 
(Palaver, 1995); whether it be an individual perspective or that of the collective in 
communities (Blitz, 1996; Dirrheim, 1997; Nagel, 1991) or with superpowers (Rosati
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& Creed, 1997; Weiss, 1997). By whose authority does some “good” become 
“common” and how is this “truth” (Durrheim, 1997 determined?
Psychology addresses a manifold o f issues including values (Schwartz, 1990), 
and pathology as a “value” (Wakefield, 1992). Social constructivist viewpoints are 
reflected in “constructivist psychotherapies” ( Neimeyer, 1993), family “realities” 
(Hoffman, 1990), and “possible selves” (Markus & Nurius, 1986) to name just a few. 
The construction of selves, from psychology’s perspective, has to integrate 
experimental vs. experiential perspectives (Jennings, 1986), temporal locations (i.e. 
memories, immediate statuses, projected futures) and shifts across these locations 
(Markus & Nurse, 1986). Included are “postmodern” identities (Smith, 1994) as well 
as what is of value to these selves (Schwartz, 1986). Is the pathology attributed to a 
loved one (or to oneself) the function of a societal “value” about “stigmatize[d] socially 
undesirable behavior that is not really disordered” (Wakefield, 1992; p.3 73)? Persons 
(1986) notes the necessity to study the actually occurring process “rather than the 
psychiatric diagnosis” (Persons, 1986; p. 1252).
Sociological concerns include issues of revisioning self concepts (Mohan, 1996; 
Van Kreiken, 1997), ethnocentric privileging of one cultural form of norms over 
another (Mohan, 1996, 1997; Ramakrishnan & Balgopal, 1994). Challenges to state 
authority include those o f  postmodernist research (Banks & Mangan, 1995; Leonard,
1996),and class and race (Fegan & Vera, 1994; Marshall & Swift, 1993; Mohan,
1997). Revisioning the self, for Mohan (1996), means looking at alternatives to the 
Freudian frames of reference that have come to obfuscate the senses meaning o f the
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new self (Mohan, 1996) and, for Van Kreiken (1997), taking a longer temporal view 
relative to self-construction (Van Kreiken, 1997). Ideas about class and racism include 
exploding the “melting pot” myth of American government as well as “racist rituals” 
(Fegan & Vera, 1994). In addition, the discussions o f the view of class as the “unequal 
distribution of power and advantage” (Marshall & Swift, 1993; p. 190).
Each o f the fields surveyed above have their own sets o f “values” and theses 
values are expressed in the themes and concepts utilized by the individual authors of 
their generation o f field specific knowledge bases. Many of the values present in the 
frameworks of these fields overlap with or are equivalent to social work values. Some, 
however, may not be. Some “traditional” values in theses other fields may not be 
questioned by those individuals who generate research. Social workers are called upon 
to engage in this critical questioning process themselves when utilizing this research for 
social work purposes. It is positive for the field o f  social work for there to be input 
from other social science fields (Tucker, Garvin & Sari, 1997). Yet close attention 
must be paid to which values are seen as “authoritative” in these other fields.
Authority, Discretion, Privileging and 
Social Construction of Knowledge 
Each o f the above descriptions contributes to the intellectual diversity o f social 
work practice wisdom through their slightly different perspectives on each o f the topics 
o f interest explored. As with a “treatment team” or “ enhanced collaborative 
approach” (Guttierez, GlenMaye, & DeLois, 1995; p.254), to social work practice
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activity, the combinations of perspectives allows a fuller picture of the construct 
discussed. The theme we pursue next concentrates on how an imbalance can begin to 
occur structurally. Social workers are familiar with components o f “traditional” 
knowledge construction, including references to the previous individuals that have 
formulated the “facts,” statements, and propositions that have gone into this theory 
building. This is a requirement of contemporary research; backing up one’s statements 
with references to “authorities.” This brings us to the question “what privileges the 
knowledge of the references that these authors use to validate their statements (Furr, 
1995)? (What privileges the references I use to validate or provide evidence for my 
statements? Where do my references or their references get their authority?)
Hopefully, social workers can create for themselves the ability to look at the issue 
under scrutiny from enough different perspectives to see the myriad of values that 
attach to that issue from the different perspectives. From this wider view then the 
individual social worker can determine which values s/he can identify as being aligned 
with individual and social work values.
Do authors get authority or value simply from having published within a field 
already (Tucker, 1996) or from publishing within their own field or “tu rf’ (Abbott,
1995)? Do they get this authority simply by being an author (Derrida, 1982)? Do 
authors get their authority from the number of other authors that refer to them in other 
texts (Merton, 1988)? There is an element of consensuality here, a sort of 
“communicative rationality,” that frequently is identified as “instrumental rationality” 
(Chriss, 1995; p. 548) but which can be taken as consensuality of a communication
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community active in the public sphere. The public sphere generates, through 
consensuality, authority that acts within the margin between social power and 
knowledge (Bordieu, 1991; p.5). Authority, as described above, is inextricably bound 
up between the notions of epistemology and social power (Friedman, 1990). Merton 
(1988) talks about the “Matthew effect” wherein the first author of a multiply authored 
work, or sometimes simply the previously published author, is remembered and quoted 
while the subsequent authors are forgotten (Merton, 1988; p.319-320). This effect 
shows a selective inattention to detail which can in some instances act to marginalize. 
The call for reflexive activity regarding issues such as attribution of authority comes 
from within each field surveyed here; social work (Abramson, 1996; White, 1997), 
anthropology (Wilson, 1988), communication (Ellsworth, 1989; Ferre, 1990), law 
(Fegan, 1996), politics (Winant, 1997), psychology (Hoffman, 1990; Kraus & Fussell, 
1990) and sociology (Bordieu, 1990).
So what would a “discourse ethics” that took into consideration the plurality 
and diversity o f the above range of fields and perspectives acting in the public sphere 
look like? To begin to sketch an outline of this process, Habermas’ (1990) formulation 
is instructive. Habermas begins his account with a consideration of resentment as an 
individual’s emotional response to a wrong done as an example o f a moral 
consciousness. The point Habermas makes is that the shift in appraisal by the 
individual of his/her emotional state from second person experiencing to third person 
evaluating results in a shift in perspective widening the perception o f moral/ethical 
constituents of the interaction. According to McCarthy (1978) norms, “rationality
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and... maxims of action cannot be decided upon monologically-within the horizon o f the 
solitary, reflecting moral consciousness. ..” (McCarthy, 1978; p. 326). The shift in 
perspective allows one to move to an interactive position within the situation.
Habermas then moves on to explain how this scenario is applied in communicative 
action by showing that the “web of moral feelings that [are] embedded in everyday life” 
(Habermas, 1990; p. 50) serve as a an anchoring point that highlight the validity o f the 
sense of communicative ethical action between individuals. He holds that normative 
claims to communicative action are based on what K.-O. Apel (1980) called the 
recognition o f a transcendent form o f argumentation legitimated universally by 
language users. The attempt to resolve conflict morally involves “an intersubjective 
process of reaching understanding [that] can produce an agreement that is reflexive in 
nature; only it can give participants the knowledge that they have collectively become 
convinced o f something” (Habermas, 1990; p.67). Habermas maintains that needs and 
values are socially, culturally constructed and revision must come through 
consensuality within a “horizon provided by the lifeworld of a specific social group 
[with] real conflicts in a concrete situation which the actors consider it incumbent upon 
them to reach a consensual means of regulating some controversial social matter” 
(Habermas, 1990; p .103). Expanding on Habermas’ ideas, Honneth (1995) relates that 
ethics cannot prescribe values in contemporary society “but can only provide a specific 
procedure for conflict resolution; and in order for it in turn to be able to satisfy moral
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daims, this procedure must give expression to the substantive conviction that all human 
beings have to respect one another as free and equal persons” (Honneth, 1995 p. 295).
When generating a piece of research for publication in the field, the social 
worker enters this communication community with her/his ideas and can then hope to 
elicit commentary on the position presented. When this occurs in a communicative, 
interactive field where critical perspectives can be exchanged, participants benefit, ideas 
are clarified and the best possible resolution of conflicts can potentially occur. During 
the process o f selection o f materials for inclusion in the research generated, a similar 
dynamic can potentially occur. Through the activity of taking different value 
perspectives on the subject, a dialogue of sorts occurs and can provide the individual 
social worker with more information about personal values and where these values 
align with client well being and social work value positions. It is in this place that the 
social worker begins the reflexive process of social work in eliminating social power 
abuses.
Social W ork and Social Power
The question contemporary social workers face is how to move into practice 
and research activities given these changing conditions o f  social discourse from a 
position o f politicly (in it’s definition of “prudential or not impulsive” (Oxford English 
Dictionary [O.E.D.], 1924) oriented interactivity with the social environment which 
moves towards social work’s long term goals of self- and other-empowerment and 
balancing power. Here we will outline one approach which may address this concern.
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Donald Schon (1983) sets out a framework for reflective practice and this framework 
will be woven into the fabrics of the discussion here. Next, we will delineate, from 
Richard Neilson’s (1996) work on “the politics of ethics” the meeting places, or the 
forms of the meeting places between power usage/abuse and ethical programs. We will 
begin by lining out the frameworks of typical ethics/power management prototypes or 
“archetypes” he describes. Decision making patterns used by the specific prototypical 
ethical actors’ approaches to ethical dilemmas are described. Then Robert Kegan’s
(1982) ideas about “evolving moral development” are drawn upon and parallels 
between the specific ethical actors discretionary decisions and the frameworks of 
ethical decision making he describes are underlined. A method o f application of these 
frames o f reference within the “reflective practitioner” structure o f Donald Schon
(1983) will be described in order to enable social workers to recognize what kind of 
processes may be occurring within themselves, their clients or their auspices when 
decision making takes place in practice and research.
The decisions following on the recognition of the types o f potential ethical 
decisionmaking, along with the elements o f the social influences outlined above, will 
serve to help social workers make choices that are more informed and less “akratic” in 
nature. Ideally, social workers decisions will come from reflective/reflexive position 
that seeks to make choice to balance power in very possible situation. It may allow 
social workers a better understanding o f  the level o f ethical decision making the client 
may feel stuck with as well as allowing for appropriate decision making when dealing 
with auspices bureaucracy. We will then look to Kegan (1982, 1994) for some of the
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contexts that social workers and their clients are dealing with relative to the types of 
decisions that must be made.
Reflexive Practitioners 
The focus for reflective practice is rooted in the “deeper questioning of the 
professionals’ claim to extraordinary knowledge in matters o f human importance” 
(Schon, 1983; p.5). Do social workers represent themselves as individuals who have 
grappled with the types of conflicts over problems that populations served encounter? 
Do we misuse this authority we claim to have through our professional position by the 
kinds of ethical decisions we make regarding personal conduct, service availability, or 
resource distribution? “Practitioners are frequently embroiled in conflicts of values” or 
even over what constitutes a value (Schon, 1983; p. 17). Different perspectives on 
values generate differing frameworks for generating meaning and these meaning 
systems differences can result in specific communication problems; between parents 
and children, partners and work peers (Kegan, 1993). These meaning systems 
differences can result in differing perspectives about what constitutes moral/ethical 
decision making (Bauman, 1993; Kegan, 1982, 1993; Nielson, 1996; Schon, 1983).
Here we begin with a look at Nielson’s description of a typology o f different 
perspectives on ethical decision making with a view toward social worker recognition 
and reflection in the moment about the most effective way to meet each perspective 
without compromising one's own moral/ethical position.
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Nielson ( 1996) delineates several “archetypes” of ethical decision making 
processes. Nielson’s work provides a format for recognizing and overcoming obstacles 
to ethical decision making within an organizational context which can be applied 
productively to contexts social workers find themselves faced with. Regardless o f  the 
discipline, from anthropology to zoology, there is an organizational structure that 
operates to ensure the viability of the discipline. Organizational dynamics, while not 
alike within and between disciplines, are still populated by individual with agendae that 
are expressed through differing levels of moral meaning making capacity. This capacity 
is described by Kegan and Neilson’s framework serves to explicate the effects o f  the 
relative levels described.
Before looking further at Nielson’s work, we will explicate the development of 
Kegan’s (1994) four orders of consciousness that help us to set into context the ethical 
frames o f reference to be developed below. Kegan, expanding on Jean Piaget’s work, 
begins by describing the principle o f “elements” which become the foci of conscious 
interest in first order consciousness. These elements are constrained to having qualities 
contingent on the perceiving individual, usually a child psyche. He goes on to describe 
the “durable category” which includes the “ability to construct a concrete world, 
independent points o f view and a property bearing self’ (Kegan, 1994; p.23). This 
ability allows it’s holder to differentiate one’s self from the selves of others and allow 
that these other selves to have certain “properties” that belong to them. The elements 
from the first order of consciousness become the objects of the consciousness o f  the 
second order. Kegan then describes the movement to the third order wherein durable
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categories “become an element o f [a] principle o f knowing rather than the principle of 
knowing itself’ (p.26). This “cross-categorical” knowing takes a “reflective” view of 
those things or individuals or thoughts that were previously durable categories. Each 
successive category is a “new way of making sense” (p.28) of one’s environment; a 
new way o f “organizing experience” (p.29). Finally the fourth order o f  consciousness 
takes into consideration that at the third order, individuals have developed structures of 
values from and through which they live and interact with he world. As individuals, we 
have developed certain ways of being within our relationships whatever their nature 
(i.e. parent, partner or employee) and we are consistent in maintaining these aspects of 
our identity. This fourth order o f consciousness would “take values and ideals as the 
object rather than the subject of our knowing” (p. 91); we develop “values about 
values ’ (p.90). Kegan delineates four main points about these orders o f conscious 
meaning making.
First, they are not merely principles for how one thinks but for how one 
constructs experience more generally, including one’s think, feeling and social 
relating....
Second, they are principles for the organization (the form or complexity) of 
one’s thinking, feeling or social relating not the content [of the latter]...
Third, a principle o f mental organization has an inner logic, an “epistemologic .” 
The root or “deep structure” of any principle o f mental organization is the 
subject-object relationship ...
Fourth, the different principles o f mental organization are intimately related to 
each other.. .the relation is transformative, qualitative, and incorporative... Each 
successive principle subsumes or encompasses the prior principle. (Kegan,
1994; p p .33-34)
It has been necessary to go into more detail with Kegan’s work as it is the fundamental 
structure within which the other frameworks must be integrated.
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A return now to Neilson’s “archetypes” or “evocative representational models” 
(Nielson, 1996; p 10) is required. These archetypes set out the characteristics of 
unethical actors in the decision making interaction to be represented. Within Nielson’s 
descriptions, the main archetypes are delineated and then several examples o f parallels 
from historical corporate decision making follow. For the purposes o f this study, 
discussion will be limited to brief descriptions of the archetypes alone. The 
“Eichmaim” archetype represents an “upper-middle level” manager who facilitated the 
“ administrative massacre’” o f millions of individuals through obedience to authority 
that was expected and valued within the organization (the Nazi party) he was a part of. 
“He obeyed orders without thinking of ethical implications” (Nielson, 1996, p. 10). As 
an ethical archetype his focus is narrowly constrained to what his job and needs are and 
he does not even consider ethical implications. The “Richard HT’ archetype is said to 
recognize the difference between right and wrong relative to an ethical frame of 
reference but to act on the impulses for “personal gain” sloughing off the ethical 
dimension. The next archetype is “Socrates’ Jailer” and his actions are taken with 
some sense o f the ethical ramifications o f the act but while sidetracking the 
responsibility the conflict onto the higher power who will punish him if he does not do 
it’s bidding. This decision maker has a sense of the ethical dimension but also 
considers other obligations (wife, family etc.) that would preclude his not being 
obedient. The next is the “Phaedo” archetype who is consciously concerned with the 
ethical dimensions of things but does not seem to have a knack for ethical thinking or
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decisions except when his teacher Socrates is around (which cannot be constantly). 
There is a tendency of the individual actor actualizing this archetype to allow unethical 
behavior o f usually ethical others go unquestioned. Here, the issue of conflict about 
actions o f an otherwise likable person we e come into play. The “Faust” archetype 
represents that actor who would make a decision which s/he knew was wrong because 
the ends would be far better than the immediate harm that the decision would cause. 
Another form o f this is making policy decisions that are the “lesser of two evils” . The 
big picture or goal obscures the reality of the immediate negative affects of the decision 
made. The “Dr. Saguro” represents the next archetype. The actor here knows and 
understands the ethical ramifications o f the proposed actions, is not under any coercive 
pressure to act but decides that not to cooperate would be “impractical” given the 
“corrupt” nature o f his environment and the need to please the government to whom 
his decisions are subordinate (Nielson, 1996; p. 11-23). Each of these archetypes 
parallels in some ways qualities described by Kegan (1982) as representative o f specific 
stages of moral meaning making evolution. Each also represents specific organizational 
decision making strategies as well as a specific “masks” the actor has donned in dealing 
with his/her ethical reality (Bauman, 1993; P. 115).
How do social workers go about deciding in the moment which is the best 
course of action to adopt in dealing with situations involving variations on the above 
described actors? Could we describe our own process to another (Schon, 1983; p.49)? 
Neilson ( 1996) delineates the types of decision-making techniques by which each of 
theses archetypal actors may be potentially addressed. He describes sbc types of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
discourse or dialog methods which are used by actors in decision making ; ( 1 ) “single­
loop, win-lose forcing methods”, which entail an actor forcing accommodation to some 
“ethical” program by threat o f  punishment of the individual not concurring; (2) “single­
loop, win-win” strategies, in which both parties to a negotiation come away with 
something they see as desirable for themselves without conceding much ethically; (3) 
“double-loop dialog methods,” which “retain much of the win-win method while 
encouraging mutual ethical learning, mutual ethical belief conversion and mutual ethical 
development” (Nielson, 1996; p.73); (4) “triple-loop dialog I,” otherwise known as 
“friendly disentangling,” seeks, through one actor, to connect that actor with another 
actor or group of actors by identifying a common belief system or structure and help in 
addressing a specific aspect o f  that belief structure thought to be unethical; (5) “triple­
loop dialog n,” a mode o f “upbuilding” process that seeks to adapt an extant “ethical 
internal tradition in the context of a problematical environment” (Nielson, 1996; 
p. 123); and (6) “triple-loop dialog III” which integrates postmodern thinking, such as 
deconstruction, into a situation where participants are seen to be from very different or 
even antithetical positions regarding ethics (Nielson, 1996; p . 8). Each of these 
methods can reflect ways by which to understand a new “repertoire o f expectations [or] 
images” (Schon, 1983; p. 60) o f these dynamics, adoptable by social workers. The 
result can be widened practice wisdom with regard to how both clients and auspices 
orient themselves to individual social workers and how we as social workers orient 
ourselves to them.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
Whose Benefit? Evolving Moral Development 
So what does a decision-making strategy which includes an awareness of an 
evolving moral development look like? Here an outline o f one decisional process that 
could associate a moral/ethical framework with the decision making structure outlined 
above is described and discussed. It can provide for social workers a method of 
“integrating or choosing among the values at stake in the situation” (Schon, 1983; 
p.63). How these matrices are exercised (relative to some of the major life contexts 
these decisions will have to be made within) by social workers and their clients is then 
explored.
Kegan’s (1982) structure consists o f  six stages o f consistently expanding frames 
o f reference relative to what constitutes the field o f ethical choice making o f a given 
individual. Beginning with the “incorporative self” the self goes through a process o f 
“growth and loss” of, successively, the “impulsive,” the “imperial,” the “interpersonal,” 
the “institutional,” and finally the “interindividual” selves. Each of these successively 
wider “selves” represents a completely new frame of reference, a new order o f 
consciousness which encompasses the previous one, about what constitutes “self’ for 
the given individual and what constitutes the “other” to which this self is associated. 
Each can represent a new or expanded sense of ethical awareness with the previous 
frame o f ethical awareness as an object o f reflection. Each “pulls scattered bits of 
information together” (Schon, 1983; p. 121) to reframe the previous stage of 
awareness. The “incorporative self’ is a “psychologic” based on an individuals sense of 
need for holding by the environment; a need for the environment to take care o f felt
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entitlement. This would correspond loosely to the “single-loop, win-lose forcing 
structure described above in the sense that one individual forcing others to see the issue 
his/her way and generally regarded as a last ditch effort to force ethical behavior. The 
“impulsive” self has recognized the “othef’-ness o f environmental objects, including 
people and recognizes an other as other and valid in that otherness but still subordinate 
to my needs. This would correspond roughly to the “single-loop, win-win structure. 
Ethical decisions are relativized within a structure that still looks to satisfy some 
unrereflective or often akratic need. The “imperial” self now recognizes the need to 
deny the validity o f only focusing only on one’s own needs and demand that others 
treat me as I know I should treat them’. Here, the Other becomes valid in their own 
right and their perspective becomes commensurate with one’s own. This might be 
adequately represented in the “double-loop” dialog method of ethical choice. The 
“interpersonal” self will now resist the kind of fusion with others in one’s environment 
in the form of expectations about how these Others should act regarding one’s own 
interests while still remaining in association with those Others. This perspective 
attempts to find mutual location for consensuality while still arguing from a different 
perspective. The “triple-loop I” methodology is the closest example o f this resolutions 
strategy. The “institutional” self acknowledges the capacity for self definition with 
regard to a valid external environment seeking definition through valuing some 
personal idea of an environmental good. The “triple-loop IT’ method would 
incorporate the mutuality considerations of the dialog process. The “interindividual”
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self has defined oneself and is engaged on the course of continuous redefinition of the 
self s/he has evolved in the previous stages (Kegan, 1984). The “triple-loop III” dialog 
method will be a loose approximation of this category of ethical decision strategy.
Integrated as a strategy, these frameworks of approach to a reflective process 
of moral meaning making, or social construction, of responses to ethical 
decisionmaking can aid the social worker who takes it as their task to move in the 
direction of balancing social power imbalances that come about through discretionary 
abuses of authority in generating research and practice knowledge. The integration of 
these three frameworks can provide a possible method for social workers to apply for 
their own process o f practice whether it be in applied or research oriented activity. The 
provision of more detail for these methods was required for the macro-and micro-level 
applications to be more readily visible.
Social worker practitioners are involved in work that spans every level o f the 
ecological system in implication if not in applied practice activity. It is necessary to 
have a sense of the elements of the inter- and intrapersonal makeup of this multi-tiered 
system within which this practice activity takes place in order to make the very best 
possible decisions. A knowledge of the public sphere and of the members of this public 
sphere can provide for a fuller intrapersonal grasp of the scope within which power 
balancing in social work practice takes place. Having grasped this lager context, 
potential ramifications o f practice decisions may be more fully appreciated. The 
necessity to hold oneself accountable, and, as a social worker, to evolve through a 
reflective, reflexive process, becomes clearer within this recognition of scope.
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CONCLUSION
Social power and knowledge construction are inextricably linked especially in 
this contemporaiy’ historical period where the economic welfare of increasing numbers 
of individuals is dependent on handling of information in some form or fashion 
(Nussbaum & Sen. 1993). The ways that knowledge and social power are viewed are 
in constant change (Walzer. 1993). In the field of social power, the previously overt 
displays of individual whim manifested in power expression have given way slightly 
to more covert operations of power abuse; at least to some extent in Western society. 
This counts as a move in awareness no matter how slight. Traditional sources 
previously counted as “unquestionable knowledge” are now in question as are the 
ways that these traditions were perpetuated. The words used, as well as other aspects 
of the construction of knowledge, are now under scrutiny to better understand how 
they function within their contexts (Bordieu. 1991).
Social power has been abused since the beginning of recorded history. The 
very first available social histories are documents detailing wars between disagreeing 
factions of individuals. History, from some perspectives, is the documentation of 
humanity’s learning and evolving from this learning. And yet the sometimes akratic 
resistance to this learning is just as strong in some spheres as is the impetus towards it.
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The ethical systems of thought, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, (who, it seems, are 
still the beginning point for most contemporary ethical systems) attempted to answer 
the justifications for abuses o f power with reasoned “discourse” in the communities of 
public hearing.
This project has endeavored to continue this “answering” process vis-à-vis the 
abuses o f  power, however subtle, within the narrower sphere of social work practice. 
This answering process has taken the form of a critical exploration o f a particular social 
artifact, knowledge, from a number o f different areas of academic interest. The 
primary reasoning behind doing this is that there is, inscribed within the language of 
these academic social artifacts, insight that would be helpful to the clientele o f social 
work if they had access to it. Togo into the reasons for this inaccessibility would 
require a more complete history of social power abuse in general and would be outside 
o f the scope o f this project but has been addressed in previous work (Hamilton & 
Sharma, 1997). It is hoped that some o f these insights have been culled and translated 
into a form that may be more accessible to use by clientele served by social workers.
Persons using and abusing social power take their precedents for their actions 
from the information and other social artifacts available in the environment. Their 
justifying rationale are frequently based on what is seen as “normal” in this 
environment. Whether this framework is drawn from popular media, such as movies, 
news, o r popular novels, or academic discourse within any field, there are tendencies o f 
thought that are being expressed which have become part of the normative Zeitgeist. It
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is therefore necessary to look into the aspects of the Zeitgeist in order to bring to 
clarity, or answer, all o f the sources o f possible justification.
Analyses o f the Zeitgeist currently take the form o f  the modernity/ 
postmodemity debate. It has been necessary to survey the themes generated in this 
debate in order to convey an understanding of how these themes underlie, at the most 
basic level, themes o f interest in the other areas o f contemporary thinking. It is not 
possible to generate a brief summary of the multitudinous variety of themes 
characterizing this debate within the space of this conclusion that would do the debate 
justice. Primarily, postmodemity has been concerned with correcting, what are, from 
it’s perspective, injustices imposed by modernity. Modernity, in it’s own perspective, 
had the same agenda regarding the period now identified as pre-modemity. Given that 
the debate is still current, thinkers in other fields o f thought, expressed in any o f the 
media outlined above, may be couching their expressions in the language of those 
themes.
Social workers are affected by this level of the debate sometimes directly, when 
the professedly modem or postmodem view is brought to bear on a given social issue, 
but social workers are also affected when research or practice requires utilization o f 
information to be drawn from other academic fields. These fields have knowledge 
bases generated by individuals who may be adherents o f either (or both, or neither) side 
o f  this modernity/ postmodemity debate. When the social worker can become familiar 
with the currents of this debate as it expresses the Zeitgeist, more informed choices can 
be made with regard to issues o f power abuse as they may surface in practice decisions.
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While the modemity/postmodemity debate and the effects it has on other 
academic disciplines have expressed the macroeconomic level o f concern to social 
workers, the meso- and microeconomic levels are more in focus when attention shifts 
to social power and the workings o f social power. Since social power functions 
through frequently invisible forms and media, it has been necessary to make these forms 
and media more visible. This has entailed going into an extended discussion about 
forms that the abuse o f power operate through, the authority and discretion, and about 
the media abuses o f power operate through, the margin and marginality. A number o f 
ways that social workers come to be faced with power abuses are delineated with the 
intent of providing individual social workers with the knowledge to answer these 
abuses when encountered.
Social construction is discussed as one of those modes through which power 
abuses become manifest in sources of information used by social workers in practice. 
Social construction, first described in the early 60’s, is now recognized as a more 
accurate perspective on knowledge construction than the paradigm of the “objective” 
scientific observer. From this perspective it becomes clear that the previously idealized 
objectivity o f the positivist research paradigm has been partially a self-deception and 
when carried to the extreme of dogmatic ideological positioning, an abuse of power in 
and o f itself. Social constructions o f a narrow range o f themes are traced through the 
specific disciplines chosen to represent social works communication community to 
underline how these constructions might affect social workers utilizing materials from 
these disciplines to generate social work practice knowledge.
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The activity of taking a critical step back from the subject o f interest enables 
postmodemity now (and modernity previously) to see and analyze the workings of 
thought as it is expressed in the media society uses to represent the Zeitgeist. In 
seeking to provide an answer to the activity of power abuse a similar stepping back can 
be productive for social workers. This process is identified in this project as the 
reflexive practitioner perspective and combines the methodology o f reflective action 
from a small group of theorists to propose an integrated framework of reflexive 
practice for use by the social worker in everyday practice situations. Drawn from 
organizational, developmental and ethical frameworks, this model can be utilized to 
assist the individual social worker in making decisions that answer power abuses in the 
immediate practice situation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbott, A., (1995). Boundaries of social work or social work boundaries? The 
Social Service Review. 69. 545-562.
Abramson, M. (1996). Reflections on knowing oneself ethically: Toward a 
working framework for social work practice. Families in Society. 77 195-201.
Airaksinen, T. ( 1992).The rhetoric of domination. In T. Wartenberg (ed.) 
Rethinking power. New York: State University of New York Press.
Alexander. J. ( 1988) Action and its environments: toward a new synthesis. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Angeles, P. A. (1981). Dictionary of philosophy. New York: Barnes & Noble
Books.
A pel. K.-O. ( 1980). Towards a transformation of philosophy. (G. Adey & D. 
Frisby. Trans.). London; Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Austin. J. L. ( 1979). Philosophical papers. (3rd, edn.). J.O. Urmson & G. J. 
Wamock (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Banks, C.K. & Mangan, J.M. ( 1995). Researching social networks in action. 
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, 23. 69-88.
Barber. J.G. ( 1995). Politically progressive casework. Families in Society. 76.
30-37.
Barker. R. L. ( 1995). The social work dictionary. (3rd, edn.). Washington, DC: 
NASW Press.
Barwise. J. ( 1988). On the circumstantial relation between meaning and 
content. In U. Eco, M. Santambroglio & P. Violi (Eds.). Meaning and mental 
representations. Bloomington. lA: Indiana University Press.
Bateson, G. ( 1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Chandler 
Publishing.
125
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
Bauman, Z. (1993). Postmodern ethics. Oxford, UK. Blackwell
Baumgartner, M.P. (1992). The m>th of discretion. In Hawkins, K. (Ed.) 
(1992) The uses of discretion. Oxford; Clarendon Press.
Benhabib, S. (1992). Models o f the public sphere: Hannah Arendt. the liberal 
tradition, and Jurgen Habermas. In Calhoun, C. (Ed.) Habermas and the public sphere. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.
_________ . (1996). the democratic moment and the problem o f difference. In
S. Benhabib (Ed ). Democracy and difference. Contesting the boundaries of the 
political. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bennett, J. (1993). Event causation; The counterfactual analysis. In Sosa, E. & 
M. Tooley. (Eds ). (1993). Causation. Oxford; Oxford University Press.
Berger, P. & Luckmann. T. (1966). The social construction o f reality Garden 
City, NY ; Doubleday.
Berlin, S B (I996).Contructivism and the environment; A cognitive-integrative 
perspective for social work practice. Families in Society. 77. 326-335.
Berman, M. (1992). Why modernism still matters. In Lash, S. & Friedman, J. 
(Eds.) Modernity & identity. Ojrford, UK; Blackwell Publishers.
Berry, J. O. (1995). Families and deinstitutionalization; an application of 
Bronfenbrenner’s social ecology model. Journal o f Counseling & Development, 73, 
379-383.
Best, S. & Kellner, D. (1991). Postmodern theory; Critical interrogations. New 
York; The Guilford Press.
Bisno, H. & Cox, F. (1997). Social work education; Catching up with the 
present and the future. Journal of Social Work Education, 33 (2), 373-387.
Plan, J. (1992). The visible poor: Homelessness in the United States. New 
York; Oxford University Press.
Blitz, M. (1996). How to think about politics and culture. The Political Science 
Reviewer. 25, 5-21.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127
Bordwell, B. & Carroll, N. (Eds.). (1996). Post theory: Reconstructing film 
studies. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Structures, habitus, power: Basis for a theory o f symbolic 
forms. In Dirks, N., G. Eley & S. B. Ortner (Eds ). (1994). Culture, power, history; A. 
reader in contemporary social theory. Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press
____________. ( 1990). The logic o f practice. Stanford. CA. Stanford University
Press.
____________. (1991). Language and symbolic power. (G. Raymond & M.
Adamson, Trans.; J. B. Thompson, Ed ). Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press.
Broadie, S. (1994). Another problem o f akrasia. International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies. 2 (2), 229-242.
Calhoun, C. (1992).Introduction; Habermas and the public sphere. In C. 
Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the public sphere. Cambridge; MIT Press.
Calhoun, C. (Ed.). (1992). Habermas and the public sphere. Cambridge; MIT
Press.
Chapin, R K. (1995). Social policy development; The strengths perspective. 
Social Work. 40 (41 506-514.
Chescheir, M.W. (1995). Projective processes as interpersonal communication. 
Smith College Studies in Social Work. 66 (1). 18-35.
Cole, J. B. (Ed.). (1988). Anthropology for the nineties; Introductory readings. 
(Rev. edn.) New York; The Free Press.
Collier, R. (1997). After Dunblane; Crime, corporeality, and the (hetero-)sexing 
of the bodies o f men. The Journal of Law and Society. 24 (2). 177-198.
Collingwood, R. G. (1940) An essav on metaphysics. Oxford; Clarendon Press.
Collins, R. (1994). Four sociological traditions. New York; Oxford University
Press.
Compton, B. R. & Galaway, B. (1979). Social work processes. Homewood, IL; 
The Dorsey Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
128
Cooper, D. E. (1993). Postmodernism and ‘The end o f Philosophy’. 
International Journal o f Philosophical Studies. (1), 1.
Cutler, C.E. (1991). Deconstructing the DSM-III. Social Work. 36 (2), 154-
157.
Dean, R.G. & Fenby B.L. (1989). Exploring epistemologies; Social work action 
as a reflection o f philosophical assumptions. Journal of Social Work Education. 46 ( 1 ), 
46-54.
Dennett, D. C. (19951.Elbow room: Varieties of free will worth wanting. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.
d ’Entreves, M. P. (1997). Introduction. In d’Entreves, M.P. & Benhabib, S. 
(Eds.) Habermas and the unfinished project of modernity: Critical essays on The 
philosophical discmirse o f modenUtv. Cambridge. MA:_The MIT Press.
DeRoos, Y. S. (1990). The development o f practice wisdom through human 
problem-solving processes. Social Services Review. 64. 276-287.
Derrida, J. (1976). Of grammatology. (G.C. Spivak, Trans ). Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press.
_______ . (1978). Writing and difference. (A. Bass, Trans.) Chicago: Chicago
University Press.
_______ . (1981). Dissemination. (B. Johnson, Trans ). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
_______ . (1981). Positions. (A. Bass, Trans). Chicago: University o f  Chicago
Press.
_. (1982). Margins o f philosophy. (A. Bass, Trans.).Chicago; University
of Chicago Press.
DiMaggio, P. J. & Powell, W. W. (1991). Introduction. In W.W. Powell & P. J. 
DiMaggio (Eds ). The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago: The 
University o f  Chicago Press.
Dirks, N., G. Eley, & S. B. Ortner. (Eds ). (1994). Culture, power, history: a 
reader in contemporary social theory. Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
Dreyfus, H. L. & Hall, H. (Eds.). (1992). Heidegger: A critical reader. 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Dreyfus, H.L. & Rabinow, P. (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism & 
hermeneutics. (2nd edn ). Chicago; The University o f  Chicago Press.
Drower, S. J. (1996). Social work values, professional unity, and the South 
African context. Social Work. 41 (2), 138-146.
Duff, R.A. (1995). Subjectivism, objectivism and criminal attempts. In A.P. 
Simester & A.T.H. Smith, (eds.) Harm and culpability. Oxford; Oxford University 
Press.
Dunn, W. N. (1993). Policy reforms as arguments. In Fischer, F. & J. Forrester. 
(Eds.) The Argumentative turn in policy analysis. Durham; Duke University Press
Durrheim, K. (1997). Theoretical conundrum: The politics and science of 
theorizing authoritarian cognition. Political Psychology. 18 (3), 625-648.
Dworkin, R. (1985). A matter o f principle. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Edwards, R. L. et al. (Eds ). (1995).Encvclopedia o f Social Work (19th ed.. 
Vols. 1-3). Washington, DC: NASW Press.
Eliade, M. (1965).The mvth of the eternal return: Or. cosmos and history. 
Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press.
Ellsworth, E. (1989).Why doesn’t this feel empowering? Working through the 
repressive myths o f critical pedagogy. Harvard Educational Review. 59 (3), 297-324.
Ewalt, P.L. (1996). Social work in an era o f diminishing federal responsibility; 
Setting the practice, policy, and research agenda. Social Work. 41 (5), 439-440.
Ewalt, P.L. & Mokuau, N. (1995). Self-determination from a Pacific 
perspective. Social Work. 40 (2). 168-176.
Fairlamb, H. L. (1994). Critical conditions; Postmodemity and the question o f 
foundations. New York; Cambridge University Press.
Fegan, E. (1996). ‘Ideology’ after ‘discourse’; A reconceptualization for 
feminist analyses o f law. Journal o f Law & Society. 23 (2), 173-197.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 3 0
Feldman, M. (1992). Social limits to discretion. In Hawkins, K. (Ed.) The uses 
of discretion. Oxford; Clarendon Press.
Ferguson, R. (1990). Introduction; Invisible center. In Ferguson, R , Gever, M., 
Minh-ha, T. T. & West, C. (Eds ). (1990).Out there; Marginalization and contemporary 
cultures. New York & Cambridge; The New Museum of Contemporary Art & The 
MIT Press.
Ferguson, R , Gever, M., Minh-ha, T. T. & West, C. (Eds ). (1990).Out there; 
Marginalization and contemporary cultures. New York & Cambridge; The New 
Museum o f Contemporary Art & The MIT Press.
Ferré, J.P. (1990). Communication ethics and the political realism o f  Reinhold 
Niebuhr. Communication Ouarterlv. 38 (3), 218-225.
Finnis, J.M. (1990). Authority. In J. Raz (Ed.). Authority. New York; New 
York University Press.
Fischer, F. & J Forrester (Eds ). (1993). The Argumentative turn in policy 
analysis. Durham; Duke University Press.
FischhofF, B. (1988). Judgement and decision making. In Sternberg, R. J. & 
Smith, E.E. (Eds.) The psychology o f human thought. New York; Cambridge 
University Press.
Fisher, R. ( 1995). Political social work. Journal of Social Work Education. 31 
(2), 194-203.
Flanagan, O. & A. O. Rorty. (Eds.) (1990). Identity, character and morality; 
Essavs in moral psychology. Cambridge; MIT Press.
Foucault, M. (1972). Power/knowledge (Ed.) C. Gordon New York; Pantheon
__________ . (1977). Language, counter-memory, practice. (Ed.) D.F.
Bouchard.
Ithica, Cornell.
__________ . (1983).On the genealogy of ethics; An overview o f a work in
progress. In H.L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (Eds.) Michel Foucault: Bevond structuralism 
and hermeneutics. Chicago; The University of Chicago Press.
Fowler, F. G. & Fowler, H. W. (1924) The pocket Oxford dictionary o f current 
English. (4th. ed.. Rev ). Oxford; Clarendon Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
131
Frankfurt, A G (1988) The importance of what we care about. New York; 
Cambridge.
Franklin, C. & Jordan, C (1995). Qualitative assessment; A methodological 
review. Families in Society. 76. 281-295
Fraser, N. (1992). Rethinking the public sphere: Models and boundaries. In 
Calhoun, C. (Ed.) Habermas and the public sphere. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Fraser, N. & Nicholson, L. (1990). Social criticism without philosophy: An 
encounter between feminism and postmodernism. In L. Nicholson (Ed.).
Feminism / postmodernism. New York; Routledge.
Freire, P. (1990). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York; Continuum.
_______ . (1992) Pedagogy of hope. New York; Continuum.
Friedman, M. (1994). Truth and confirmation. In H. Komblith (ed.). 
Naturalizing epistemologv. (2nd. edn.). Cambridge; MIT Press.
Friedman, R. B. (1990). On the concept o f authority in political philosophy. In 
J. Raz (ed.) Authority. New York; New York Uniyersity Press.
Furr, L. A. (1995). The relative influence o f social work journals: Impact 
factors vs. core influence. Journal of Social Work Education. 31 (1). 38-45.
Galbraith, J. K. (1983). The anatomy of power. Boston; Houghton Mifflin.
Gasche, R. (1987). Infrastructures and systematicity. In J. Sallis (ed.) 
Deconstruction and philosophy; The texts of Jacques Derrida. Chicago; The University 
o f Chicago Press.
Gandhi, M. (1928). Satvagraha in South Africa. Ahmedabad, India; Navajivan
Trust.
_________ . (1951). Non-violent resistance; Satvagraha. New York; Schoken
_________ . (1957). An autobiography: The story of mv experiments with truth.
Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Geertz, C. (1983). Local knowledge: Further essavs in interpretive 
anthropology. USA: Basic Books.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
132
Gellman, S.R., Pollack, D. & Auerbach, C. (1996). Liability issues in social 
work education. Journal o f Social Work Education. 32 (3), 351-361.
Gergen, K. J. (1985) The social constructionist movement in modem 
psychology. American Psychologist. 40 (3), 266-275.
Germain, C.B. (1994). Emerging conceptions of family development over the 
life course. Families in Society. 75. 259-268.
Gibson, C M. (1997). Facing off on social policy; Can the right and left find 
middle ground? Social Service Review. 71. 172-199.
Giddens, A (1982). Class structuration and class consciousness. In Giddens, A. 
& Held, D. (Eds.) Classes, power & conflict. Berkeley; University of California Press
_________ . (1987). Social theory and modem sociology. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Giddens, A. & Held, D. (Eds ). (1982). Classes, power & conflict. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Giddens, A &  J. Tumer. (Eds ). (1987). Social theory today. Stanford: Stanford 
university press.
Gillespie, D. F. (1995). Ethical issues in research. In Edwards, R. L. et al.
(Eds ). (1995). Encyclopedia o f Social Work (19th ed.. Vols. 1-3). Washington, DC: 
NASW Press.
Giroux, H. A. (1991). Introduction: Modernism, postmodernism, and feminism: 
Rethinking the boundaries o f educational discourse. In Giroux, H. A. (Ed.) 
Postmodernism, feminism, and cultural politics. New York: SUNY Press.
Gitterman, A. (Ed ). (1991). Handbook of social work practice with vulnerable 
populations. New York: Columbia University Press.
Goldman, A. I. (1972). Toward a theory of social power. Philosophical Studies 
23,221-268.
Goldstein, H. (1990). Strength or pathology: Ethical and rhetorical contrasts in 
approaches to practice. Families In Society. 71. 267-265.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 3 3
Gorenstein, E.E. (1984). Debating mental illness - implications for science, 
medicine and social policy. American Psychologist. 4 (4), 50-56.
Granvold, D.K. (1996). Constructivist psychotherapy Families in Society. 77. 
345-357.
Grayling, A C (Ed ). (1995). Philosophy: A guide through the subject. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Gutierrez, L , GlenMaye, L. & DeLois, K. (1995). The organizational context 
o f empowerment practice. Social Work. 40 (2), 249-258.
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action. (Vols. 1 & 2) (T. 
McCarthy, Trans ). Boston: Beacon Press.
___________. (1987). The philosophical discourse o f modernity. (F. G.
Lawrence, Trans ). Cambridge: MIT Press.
___________. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An
inquiry into a category o f bourgeois society. (T. Burger & F Lawrence, Trans.) 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
___________. (1990) Moral consciousness and communicative action. (C.
Lombardt & S.W. Nicholsen, Trans.) Cambridge: The MIT Press.
___________. (1992).Postmetaphvsical thinking. (W. M. Hohengarten, Trans.)
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
_. (1993). Justification and application. (C.P.Cronin, Trans.)
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
 . (1997). Modernity: An unfinished project. In dEntreves, M. P.
(1997). Introduction. In d’Entreves, M.P. & Benhabib, S. (Eds.) Habermas and the 
unfinished project o f  modernity: Critical essavs on The philosophical discourse o f  
modernity. Cambridge, MA:_The MIT Press.
Hajer, M. (1993). Discourse coalitions and the institutionalization of practice; 
The case of acid rain in Great Britain. In F. Fischer & J. Forester (eds ). The 
argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning. Durham; Duke University Press.
Hall, S. (1996). Introduction. In Hall, S., Held , D , Hubert, D. & Thompson,
K. (Eds ). Modernity; An introduction to modem societies. Cambridge. MA; Blackwell 
Publishers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134
Hall, S., Held , D , Hubert, D. & Thompson, K. (Eds ). (1996). Modernity; An 
introduction to modem societies. Cambridge. MA; Blackwell Publishers.
Hamilton, T. & Sharma, S. (1997). The violence and oppression o f power 
relations. Peace Review. 9 (4). 555-561.
Handler, J. (1992). Discretion; Power, quiescence, and trust. In K. Hawkins. 
(Ed.) The uses of discretion. Oxford; Clarendon Press.
________ . (1995). The poverty o f welfare reform. New Haven, CT; Yale
University Press.
Hanus, J. J. (1996). Political Science; All dressed up with nowhere to go. The 
Political Science Reviewer. 25. 43-73.
Harman, G. (1994). Positive versus negative undermining in belief revision. In 
H. Komblith fed.). Naturalizing epistemologv. (2nd edn ). Cambridge; MET Press.
Hartman, A. (1992). In search o f subjugated knowledge. Social Work. 37 (6), 
483-484.
Hartsock, N. C. M. (1983). Money, sex and power; Toward a feminist 
historical materialism. Boston, MA; Northeastern University Press.
Hawkins, K. (Ed.) (1992) The uses of discretion. Oxford; Clarendon Press.
Hawkins, K. (1992) The use o f legal discretion; perspectives from law and 
social science. In K. Hawkins (Ed.) The uses of discretion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hillman, J. (1964). Suicide and the soul. Dallas, TX: Spring Publications.
Hoffman, L. (1990). Constructing Realties; An art of lenses. Family Process. 29 
(1 ) ,  l - l l .
Honderich, T. (Ed.). (1995). The Oxford companion to philosophy. New York; 
Oxford University Press.
Honneth, A. (1995). The other o f justice; Habermas and the ethical challenge of 
postmodernism. In White, S. K. (Ed ). The Cambridge companion to Habermas. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
135
Hubbuch, S. M. (1990). Confronting the power in empowering students. The 
Writing Instructor. Fall 1989/Winter 1990, 35-44.
Hummel, R. P. (1994). The bureaucratic experience: A critique o f life in the 
modem organization. (4th. edn.) New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Hyppolite, J. (1997). Logic and existence. (L. Lawlor & A. Sen, Trans.) New 
York: StateUniversity of New York Press.
Imbrogno, S. (1996). A syncretic construct to a multicultural program. Journal 
o f  Multicultural Social Work. 4 (1), 27-35.
Jankowski, M. S. (1991). Islands in the street: Gangs and American Urban 
Society. Berkeley. CA. University of California Press.
Jason, L. A., Richman, J. A , Friedburg, F, Wagner, L., Taylor, R., & Jordan, 
K. M.. (1997). Politics, science, and the emergence o f a new disease. American 
Psychologist. 52 (9). 973-983.
Jayarante, S., Croxton, T. & Mattison, D. (1997). Social work professional 
standards: An exploratory study. Social Work. 42 (2), 187-200.
Jennings, J.L. (1986). Husserl revisited: The forgotten distinction between 
psychology and phenomenology. American Psychologist.. 41 (11), 1231-1240.
Jepperson, R. L. (1991). Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism. 
In Powell, W. W. & P. J. DiMaggio. (Eds.) The new institutionalism in organizational 
analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jones, D.J. (1970).Towards a native anthropology, in J. B. Cole (Ed ). 
Anthropology for the nineties: Introductory readings. (Rev. ed.). New York: Free 
Press.
Kaarbo, J. (1997). Prime minister leadership styles in foreign policy decision­
making: A framework for research. Political Psychology. 18 (3), 553-582.
Kagan, S. (1989) The limits of morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kayser, J., Rothstein, J. & Stevenson, K. (1997). MSW students private 
practice: Conflicts and challenges for social work education. Joumal o f Social Work 
Education. 33 (3). 507-517.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136
Kegan, R. (1982). The evolving self. Cambridge, MA; Harvard University
Press.
_______ . (1994). In over our heads. Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press
Kelly, M. (Ed.) (1994). Critique & power: recasting the Foucault/Habermas 
debate. Cambridge. MIT Press.
Kelly, J. M. (1992). A short history of western legal theory. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Komblith, H. (Ed.). (1994). Naturalizing epistemologv. (2nd. Ed.). Cambridge: 
MIT Press.
Kemohan, A. (1989). Social power and human agency. The Joumal o f 
Philosophy. 86. 712-726.
Kim, J. (1994) What is “Naturalized Epistemology”? In H. Komblith (Ed ). 
Naturalizing epistemologv. (2nd edn ). Cambidge: MIT Press.
Klein, W. C. & Bloom, M. (1995). Practice wisdom. Social work. 40 (6), 799-
808.
Knodt, E. (1995). Foreword. In Luhmann, N. Social systems. (J. Bednarz, Jr. & 
D Baeker, Trans ). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Kondrat, M E. (1995). Concept, act and interest in professional practice: 
Implications o f an empowerment perspective. Social Service Review. 69. 405-428.
Kopels, S. & Gustavsson, N. (1996). Infusing legal issues into the social work 
curriculum. Joumal of Social Work Education. 32 (1), 115-125.
Krauss, RM . & Fussell, S.R (1991). Perspective-taking in communication: 
Representations o f others’ knowledge in reference. Social Cognition. 9 (1), 2-24.
Kreuger, L.W. (1997). The end o f  social work. Joumal o f  Social Work 
Education. 33 (I). 19-27.
Krippendorff, K. (1995). Undoing power. Critical Studies in Mass 
Communication. 12 (2) 101-132.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
__________ , (1994). A recursive theory of communication. In D. Crowley &
D..Mitchell, (eds.) Communication Theory Today. Stanford; CA: Stanford University 
Press.
Kuhn, T, (1970). The structure o f scientific revolutions. (2nd.edn). Chicago: 
Chicago University Press.
Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary political philosophy: .\n  introduction. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Laird, J. (1995) Family-centered practice in the postmodern era. Families in 
Society. 71. 150-162.
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. ( 1980). Conceptual metaphor in everyday language. 
The Joumal o f Philosophy. 77 (8), 453-487.
Lakatos, I. & A. Musgraye.(Eds ). (1970). Criticism and the growth o f 
knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lane, R. E. (1988). Experiencing money and experiencing power. In. I. Shapiro 
& G. Reeher (eds ). Power, inequality, and democratic politics. Essavs in honor of 
Robert A. Dahl. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Lash, S. & Friedman, J. (Eds.). (1992). Modernity & identity. Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell Publishers.
Lash, S. & Friedman, J. (1992). Introduction: Subjectivity and modernity’s 
other. In Lash, S. & Friedman, J. (Eds.) Modemity & identity. Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishers.
Latting, J.K. (1990). Identifying the “isms” : Enalbing social work students to 
confront their biases. Joumal o f Social Work Education. 26 (1), 36-44.
Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space. (D. Nicholson-Smith, Trans ). 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Le Grand. J. (1997). Knights, knaves or pawns: Human behavior and social 
policy. Joumal o f  Social Policy. 26 (2). 149-169.
Leiby, J. (1978). A history of social welfare and social work in the United 
States. New York: Columbia University Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13 8
Leonard, P. (1996). Three discourses on practice; A postmodern re-appraisal. 
Joumal o f  Sociology and Social Welfare. 23 (2), 7-25.
Levy-Bmhl, L. (1985). How natives think. (L A. Claire, Trans.). Princeton, NJ; 
Princeton University Press.
Lilienfeld, S. O. (1995). Seeing both sides: Classic controversies in abnormal 
psychology Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
Lindblom, C. E. & Woodhouse, E. J. (1993). The policy-making process. (3rd. 
edn ). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Livingston, P. (1996). Characterization and fictional truth in the cinema. In 
Bordwell, B. & Carroll, N. (Eds.) Post theory: Reconstructing film studies. Madison, 
WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Luhmann, N. (1995). Social systems. (J. Bednarz, Jr. & D. Baeker, Trans ). 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Lukes, S. ( 1977). Essavs in social theory. New York: Columbia University
Press.
_______ . (1990). Perspectives on authority. In J. Raz (ed ). Authority. New
York: New York University Press.
_______ . (1991). Moral conflict and politics. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge. (G. 
Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans).Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
 . (1988).The différend: Phrases in dispute. (G. Van Den Abbeele,
Trans. ).Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press.
MacIntyre, A. (1990). Is akratic action always irrational. In O. Flanagan & A. 
O. Rorty (Eds ). Identity, character and morality. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Manning, P. K. (1992). ‘Big bang decisions: Notes on a naturalistic approach. 
In K. Hawkins (Ed.) The uses of discretion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Manning, SS (1997). The social worker as moral citizen: Ethics in action. 
Social Work. 42 (3), 223-230.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
139
March, J. G. (1987). Theories of choice and making decisions. In F M. Cox, J. 
L. Erlich, J. Rothman & J. E. Tropman, (Eds.) Strategies of Community Organization: 
Macro Practice. Itasca, EL: F. E. Peacock Publishers.
_. (1988). Preferences, power and democracy. In I. Shapiro & G.
Reeher (eds ). Power, inequality, and democratic politics: Essavs in honor o f Robert A. 
Dahl. Boulder: Westview Press.
March, J. G. & Simon, H. A. (1958). Bounded rationality and satisficing. In R. 
Collins (Ed ), Four sociological traditions: Selected readings. (Rev.ed ). New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Marger, M. (1997). Race and ethnic relations: American and global 
perspectives. (4th. edn ). Belmont, CA: Wadworth Publishing Company.
Marin, MTV. & Vacha, ELF. (1994). Self-help strategies and resources among 
people at risk of homelessness: Empirical findings and social services policy. Social 
Work. 39 (6). 658-668.
Markus, H. & Nurius, P. ( 1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist. 41 
(9), 954-969.
Marshall, G. & Swift, A. (1993). Social class and social justice. British Joumal 
o f  Sociology. 44 (2), 188-211.
Masterson, M. (!970). The nature of a paradigm. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave 
(Eds ). Criticism and the growth o f knowledge London: Cambridge University Press.
Mattaini, M.A. & Kirk, S. A., (1991). Assessing assessment in social work. 
NASW. 36. (3). 260-266.
McCarthy, T. (1978). The critical theory of Jurgen Habermas. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
__________ . (1987). Introduction. In F. G. Lawrence (ed.). The philosophical
discourse o f modemity : Twelve lectures. Cambridge: MIT Press.
__________ . (1992). Practical discourse: On the relation of morality to politics.
In Calhoun, C. (Ed.) Habermas and the public sphere. Cambridge: MIT Press.
McLaren, P. & P. Leonard (Eds.) (1993). Paulo Freire: A critical encounter. 
London: Routledge.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
140
Merton, R. K. (1988). The Matthew effect II. In Sztompka, P. (Ed.). Robert 
Merton: On social structure and science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Mitchell, W.E. (1988). A goy in the ghetto: Gentile-Jewish communication in 
fieldwork research, in J. B. Cole (Ed.). Anthropology for the nineties: Introductory 
readings. (Rev. ed ). New York. Free Press.
Mohan, B. (1996). Self, society and science: On transforming social reality. 
International Joumal o f Contemporary Sociology. 33 (1). 59-78.
________ . (1997). Notes toward a theory of secondary integration: .Aporias of
a lost paradigm. Joumal of Sociology and Social Welfare. 25. 113-127
Molidor, C.E. (1996). Female Gang Members: A profile o f aggression and 
victimization. Social Work. 41 (3). 251-260.
Morriss, P. (1987). Power: A philosophical analysis. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. New York: Oxford University
Press.
_______ . (1991). Equality & partiality. New York: Oxford University Press.
 . (1994). Consciousness and objective reality. In R. Wamer & T.
Szubka (eds ). The mind-bodv problem: A guide to the current debate. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Neimeyer, R.A. (1993). An appraisal of constructivist psychotherapies. Joumal 
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. 6 1 (2), 221-234.
Nelken, D. & Levi, M. (1996). The corruption of politics and the politics of 
corruption: An overview. Joumal of Law & Society. 23 (1), 1-17.
Nelsen, J. C. (1986). Communication theory and social work treatment. In 
Tumer, F. J. (Ed ). Social work treatment: Interlocking theoretical approaches. (3rd. 
edn ). New York: The Free Press.
Nielson, R.P. (1996). The politics of ethics. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Nozick, R. (1993). The nature o f rationality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
Nussbaum, M C & A Sen. (Eds.) (1993). The quality of life. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Palaver, W. (1995). Schmitt’s critique of liberalism. Telos. 102 (4), 43-72.
Pardeck, J. T., Murphy, J. W., & Choi, J. M. (1994). Some implications o f 
postmodernism for social work practice. Social Work. 39 (4), 343-346.
Persons, J.B. (1986). The advantages o f studying psychological phenomena 
rather than psychiatric diagnoses. American Psychologist. 41 (11). 1252-1260.
Pinderhughes, E.B. (1997). Developing Diversity Competence in child welfare 
and permanency planning. (1997). Journal o f Multicultural Social Work. 5 (1/2). 19-38
________. (1983). Empowerment for our clients and for ourselves. Social
Casework: The Journal o f Contemporary Social Work. 64. 31-338.
Polansky, N.A. (1986). There is nothing so practical as a good theory. Child 
Welfare. 115 (1). 4-15.
Popper, K. (1979). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. (Rev.
Edn ). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Powell, W. W. & P. J. DiMaggio. (Eds ). (1991). The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pozatek, E. (1994). The problem of certainty: Clinical social work in the 
postmodern era. Social Work. 39 (4), 396-403.
Priban, J. (1997). Beyond procedural legitimation: Legality and its ‘infiction’. 
Journal o f  Law & Society. 24 (3), 331-349.
Quine, W. V O. (1980). Elementary logic. (Rev. edn ). Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Rabinow, P. & W. M. Sullivan. (Eds.) (1987). Interpretive social science: A 
second look. Berkeley . University of California Press.
Rae, D. W. (1988). Knowing power: A working paper. In I Shapiro & G. Reher 
(Eds.) Power, inequality and democratic politics: Essays in honor of Robert A. Dahl. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
142
Raffoui, P R. & Holmes, K.A. (1986). DSM-III content in social work 
curricula: Results of a national survey. Journal o f  Social Work Education. 24( 1 ), 24-
31.
Ramakrishnan, K.R. & Balgopal, P R. (1994) Journal of Sociology & Social 
Welfare. 22. 11-27.
Raz, J. (1990). Authority and justification. In J. Raz (Ed.) Authority. New 
York: New York University Press.
Reamer, F. G. (1990). Ethical dilemmas in social service. (2nd. Edn ). New 
York: Columbia.
___________ . (1993). The philosophical foundations of social work. New
York: Columbia.
(1994). Social work malpractice and liability: Strategies for
prevention. New York: Columbia University Press.
_. (1995). Ethics and values. In Edwards, R. L. et al. (Eds ).
(1995).Encyclopedia o f Social Work (19th ed.. Vols. 1-3). Washington, DC. NASW 
Press.
Rescher, N. (1993). Pluralism: Against the demand for consensus. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Richardson, H. S. (1995). Beyond good and right: Toward a constructive 
ethical pragmatism. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 24 (2). 108-141.
Ricoeur, P. (1974). The conflict of interpretations. Evanston. IL. Northwestern 
University Press.
Rooney, R. H. (1992). Strategies for work with involuntary clients. New York: 
Columbia University Press.
Rorty, R. ( 1979). Philosophy and the mirror o f nature. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
_______ . (1992). Cosmopolitanism without emancipation: a response to
Lyotard. In Lash, S. & Friedman, J. (Eds ). (1992). Modernity & identity. Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell Publishers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
Rosati, J. & Creed, J. (1997). Extending the three-and-four-headed eagles: The 
foreign policy orientations of American elites during the 80’s and 90’s. Political 
Psychology. 18 (3), 583-624.
Rosenau. P. M. (1992). Post -modernism and the social sciences: Insights, 
inroads and intrusions. Princeton: Princeton Uniyersity press.
Rubin, A. & Babbie, E. (1997). Research methods for social work. (3rd, ed ). 
Pacific Grove, CA. Brooks / Cole Publishing Company.
Runes, D. D. (1960). Dictionary o f philosophy: Ancient, medieval and modem. 
Ames, 10: Littlefield, Adams and Co.
Saari, C. (1992). The person-in-environment reconsidered: New theoretical 
bridges. Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal. 9 (3), 205-219.
_______ . (1995). The concept projective identification: A narrative critique.
Smith College Studies in Social Work. 66 (I). 3-15.
Salter, M. (1997). Habermas’ new contribution to legal scholarship. Journal of 
Law & Society. 26 (3), 285-305.
Sandoz, E. (1996). The crisis of civic consciousness: Nihilism and political 
science as resistance. The Political Science Reviewer. 25. 22-42.
Schatzki, T.R. (1992). Early Heidegger on being, the clearing, and realism. In 
Dreyfus, H. L. & Hall, H. (Eds.) Heidegger: A critical reader. Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell
Schlesinger, E.G. & DeVore, W (1995). Ethnic sensitive social work practice: 
The state f  the art. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare. 23. 29-58.
Schneider, C. E. (1992). Discretion and rules: A lawyers yiew. In Hawkins, K. 
(Ed.) (1992) The uses o f discretion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schon, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in 
action. USA: Basic Books.
Schwartz, B. (1990). The creation and destruction o f value. American 
Psychologist. 45 ( 1 ). 7-15.
Schweder, R. A. (1984). Anthropology’s romantic rebellion against the 
enlightenment, or there’s more to thinking than reason and evidence. In Schweder, R.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
144
A. & Le Vine, R. A (Eds.). Culture theory: Essays on mind, self and emotion. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Schweder, R. A. & Le Vine, R. A. (Eds). (1984). Culture theory: Essavs on 
mind, self and emotion. New York. Cambridge University Press.
Scott, W. R. (1991). Unpacking institutional arguments. In Powell, W. W. & P. 
J. DiMaggio. (Eds.) The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press.
Self, C.L. & Self, R. J. Jr., (1994). The politics of the interface: Power and its 
exercise in electronic contact zones. CCC. 45 (4), 480-504.
Sheafor, B. W., Horesji, C. R., & Horesji, G. A. (1994). Techniques and 
guidelines for social work practice. (3rd. ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Shokeid, M. (1997). Negotiating multiple viewpoints. Current Anthropology. 
38_(4),631-645.
Simester, A.P. & Smith, A.T.H. (1996) Introduction: Criminalization and the 
role o f theory. In A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith, (eds.) Harm and culpability. Oxford. 
Oxford University Press.
Smith M. B. (1994). Selfhood at risk: Postmodern perils and the perils o f  
postmodernism. American Psychologist. 49 (3), 405-411.
Smith., C. & White, S. (1997). Parton, Howe and postmodemity: a critical 
comment on mistaken identity. British Association of Social Workers. 27. 275-295.
Souflée Jr., F (1993). A metatheoretical framework for social work practice. 
Social Work. 38 (3). 317-331.
Sosa, E. & M. Tooley. (Eds ). (1993). Causation. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Spencer, M B. & Markstrom-Adams, C. (1990). Identity processes among 
racial and ethnic minority children in America. Child Development. 61. 290-310.
Spivak, G. (1976). Preface. In Derrida, J. (1976). O f grammatologv. (G.C. 
Spivak, Trans.). Chicago: University o f Chicago Press.
Sternberg, R. J. & Smith, E.E. (Eds ). (1988). The psychology o f human 
thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
Stich, S. P. (1990). The fragmentation of reason. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Szaz, T. ( 1986). The case against suicide prevention. American Psychologist. 
4L(7), 806-812.
 . (1960). The myth of mental illness. In Lilienfeld, S. O. (1995). Seeing
both sides: Classic controversies in abnormal psychology Pacific Grove, CA. 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
Sztompka, P. (Ed ). (1996). Robert Merton: On social structure and science. 
Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press.
Tannen, D. (1995). The power o f talk: Who gets heard and why. Harvard 
Business Review. 73 (5). 138-148.
Taylor, C. (1985). What is human agency? In Philosophical papers. (Vol. 1). 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thomas, G. (1993). An introduction to ethics: Five central problems o f moral 
judgment. London. UK: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.
Thompson, J.B. (1994). Social theory and the media. In D. Crowley & D. 
Mitchell, (eds.) Communication Theory Today. Stanford: CA: Stanford University 
Press.
Trattner, W. I. (1994). From poor law to welfare state: A history of social 
welfare in America. (5th. ed.) New York: The Free Press.
Tropman, J. E. & Erlich, J. L. (1987). Strategies: Introduction. In F. M. Cox, J. 
L. Erlich, J. Rothman & J. E. Tropman, (Eds.) Strategies o f Community Organization: 
Macro Practice. Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock Publishers.
Tropman, J. E. & Erlich, J. L. & Rothman, J. (Eds.) (I995).Tactics and 
techniques o f  community intervention. (3rd. edn). Itasca, IL: F.E.Peacock Publishers.
Tropman, J.E. & Momingstar, G. (1995). The effective meeting: How to 
achieve high quality decisions. In Tropman, J. E. & Erlich, J. L. & Rothman, J. (Eds ). 
Tactics and techniques o f community intervention. (3rd. edn ). Itasca, EL: F.E.Peacock 
Publishers.
Tucker, D. J (1996). Eclecticism is not a free good: Barriers to knowledge 
development in social work. Social Service Review. 70. 400-434.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
146
Tucker, D. J., Garvin, C. & Sarri, R. (Eds.). (1997). Integrating knowledge and 
practice: The case o f social work and social science. Westport. CT : Praeger Publishers.
Turner, F. J. (Ed.). (1986). Social work treatment: Interlocking theoretical 
approaches. (3rd. edn ). New York: The Free Press.
Van Den Bergh, N & Cooper, L. B. (1995). Introduction to feminist visions for 
social work. In J. E. Tropman, J. L. Erlich & J. Rothman (Eds.) Tactics and techniques 
o f  community intervention. Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock Publishers.
Van Dijk, T.A. (1994). Discourse and cognition in society. In D. Crowley & D. 
Mitchell, (eds.) Communication Theory Todav. Stanford: CA: Stanford University 
Press.
Van Krieken, R. (1997). Sociology and the reproductive self: demographic 
transitions and modernity. Sociology. 31 (3), 445-471.
Von Eckardt, B. (1993). What is cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wakefield, J. C. (1992) The concept o f mental disorder. American 
Psychologist. 47 (3), 373-388.
Wartenberg, T. E. (1992). Situated social power. In T. Wartenberg (ed.) 
Rethinking power. New York: State University of New York Press.
Wartenberg, T. (Ed ). (1992). Rethinking power. New York: State University 
o f New York Press.
Waldron, J. (Ed.). (1984). Theories of rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walzer, M. (1993). Objectivity and social meaning. In Nussbaum, M. C. & A. 
Sen. (Eds.) The quality o f life. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wamke, G, (1995). Communicative rationality and cultural values. In White, S. 
K. (Ed ). The Cambridge companion to Habermas. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
Weik, A. & Saleebey, D. (1995). Supporting Family Strengths: Orienting policy 
and practice toward the 21str century. Families in Society. 71. 141-149.
Weiss, L. (1997). Globalization and the myth of the powerless state. New Left 
Review. 225 (5), 3-27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
White, S. (1997). Beyond retroduction? Hermeneutics, reflexivity and social 
work practice. British Journal of Social Work. 27. 739-753.
White, S. K. (Ed ). (1995). The Cambridge companion to Habermas. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Wiggins, D. (1995). Substance. In Grayling, A C (Ed ). Philosophv: A guide 
through the subject. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wiggershaus, R. (1994). The Frankfurt school: It’s history, theories and 
political significance. M. Robertson (Trans ). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Williams, B. (1995a).Ethics. In Grayling, A C (Ed ). (1995). Philosophv: A 
guide through the subject. New York: Oxford University Press.
_________ . (1995b). Making sense of humanity: and other philosophical
papers. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, A. (1988). American catalogues of Asian brides. In Cole, J. B. (Ed ). 
(1988). Anthropology for the nineties: Introductory readings. (Rev. edn.) New York: 
The Free Press.
Wilson, G. (1997). A postmodern approach to structured dependency theory. 
Journal o f  Social Policy. 26 (3). 341-350.
Wilson, L. (1988). Epistemology and power: Rethinking ethnography at 
Greenham, in J. B. Cole (Ed ). Anthropology for the nineties: Introductory readings. 
(Rev. ed.). New York: Free Press.
Winant, H. (1997). Behind blue eyes: Whiteness and contemporary US racial 
politics. New Left Review. 225 (5), 73-88.
Wolff, R. P. (1990). The conflict between authority and autonomy. In J. Raz 
(Ed.) Authority. New York: New York University Press.
Wright, C. (1993). Scientific realism and observational statements. International 
Journal o f Philosophical Studies. 1 (2), 231-254.
Zastrow, C. (1995). The practice of social work. (5th. ed.) Pacific Grove, CA: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
148
Zippay, A. (1995). The politics o f empowerment. Social Work. 40 (2), 263-
267.
Zizek, S. (1997). Muiticulturalism, or, the cultural logic o f multinational 
capitalism. New Left Review. 225 (5), 28-51.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
College of Urban Affairs 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Timothy D. Hamilton
Local Address:
4992 Aubom Ave 
Las Vegas. Nevada 89108
Home Address:
4992 Aubom Ave 
Las Vegas. Nevada 89108
Degrees Earned:
Bachelor of Arts. Psychology 
University of Nevada. Las Vegas
Special Honors and Awards:
Graduated Cum Laude. 1993 
.Member. Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society 
Member. Phi Alpha Honor Soceity
Publications:
Hamilton. T. & Sharma. S. ( 1996). Power, power relations and oppression: A 
perspective for balancing the power relations. Peace Research. 2 8 (1). 1-12.
Hamilton. T. & Sharma. S. ( 1997). Family violence and anti-oppressive family 
counseling. Peace Research. 29 ( 1 ). 25-40.
Hamilton. T. & Sharma. S. ( 1997). The violence and oppression of power 
relations. Peace Review. 9 (4). 555-561.
Thesis Title:
Philosophical Foundations. Social Power, and Social Work Practice
Thesis Examination Committee:
Chairperson. Dr. Satish Sharma. Ph. D.
Committee Member. Dr.. Thomas O’ Brien. D P.A.
Committee Member. Dr. Linnea GlenMaye. Ph. D.
Graduate Faculty Member. Dr. Nasim Dil, Ph. D.
149
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
S i r
IMAGE EVALUATION 
TEST TARGET (Q A -3 )
/ ,
1.0
l.l
“ la
L i I m
!i us.
c LS
m
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.25 1.4 1.6
150mm
V
V
y
/ /
o/
A
/A P P L IE D  A IIVMGE . In c
1653 East Main Street 
Rochester. NY 14609 USA 
Phone; 716/482-0300 
- = ~- =  Fax: 716/288-5989
O 1993. Applied Image. Inc. All Rights Reserved
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
